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1. SUMMARY: ~9 found that the Eleventh Amendment did 
not bar a suit for damages e gainst a state under §504 of the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Douglas Scanlon suffers 
from diabetes mellitus and a lack of vision in one eye. After he 
was denied a job as a graduate student assistant at Atascadero 
State Hospital, he filed this action against the hospital and the 
California Department of Mental Health in DC (CD Cal.}. Scanlon 
~____., 
claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of 
his handicap, in violation of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 u.s.c. §794. The~ held that the §504 claim was barred 
by the Eleventh Amendment, as it was a suit against the State of 
California for damages. vt9 affirmed, but did not address the 
~ 
Eleventh Amendment issue. Instead, the CA held that the com-- ----- - _____.,. 
plaint was properly dismissed because the plaintiff had not al-
leged that the federal financial assistance recieved by the de-------fendants was for the primary purpose of providing employment. 
-·-·- --
In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 104 S.Ct. 1248 
(1984}, this Court held that an employer could be sued under §504 
regardless of the pourpose of the federal financial assistance 
C4 
that it had recieved. Thus, on March 19, 1984, this Court grant- lJ~rJ ~ 
fds.-1/~ ( 
ed Scanlon's petition for certiorari, vacated the court of ap-
peals' decision, and remanded the matter for further consider-
that Scanlon's claim was~ 
The court acknowledged that 
the only other CA's to consider the issue had held that the Elev-
: 
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enth Amendment did bar suits against the state brought under §504 
of the Rehabi 1 i tat ion Act. Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabi 1 ita-
tion Commission, 718 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Miener v. State of 
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, ~ CA 
expressly dec! ined to follow the other courts of appeals. CA9 
stated that the acceptance of federal funds indicated that the 
State of California had waived its sovereign immunity. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petitioner contends that the CA erred 
in holding that Scanlon's action was not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Congress may, by legislating to enforce a constitu-
tiona! provision, abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immuni-
ty from suits for damages. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 
( 445 (1976). To override the states' immunity, however, Congress 
( 
must evidence an unequivocal intent to do so. This Court has 
generally required such congressional intent to be either explic-
it in the staute orplainly evident form the legislative history. 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 u.s. 332, 345 (1979). The current section 
504 and the legislative history indicate that Congress did not 
consider the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity in enacting or 
amending section 504. Indeed, Congress never got as far as ex-
plicitly providing a private cause of action under section 504. 
Congress cannot by omission override an important constitutional 
immunity. 
The fact that the state accepts federal funds for reha-
bili tati ve services does not, without more, abrogate the peti-
tioner 's otherwise valid Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Su-
preme Court has rejected the argument that a state agency may 
No. 84-351-CFX page 4. 
waive its immunity by participating a federal assistance program. 
Florida Dept. of Health Services v. Florida Nursing Horne Assn., 
450 u.s. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). In this case, CA9 found 
that there was more than the "mere fact" of state participation, 
but did not explain further. 
4. DISCUSSION: ~titioner appears to be correct. Re-
spondent does not point to anything in the contemporaneous legis-
state's immunity. Moreover, it is clear that the state's partie-
ipation in the federal program, standing alone, does not consti-
tute a waiver of sovereign irnmuni ty. Although CA9 states that 
its finding of waiver is based on something more than the "mere 
( fact" of state participation, it does not explain this cryptic 
statement. 
Regardless of the merits of the issue, it is clear that 
there is CA9's decision is in direct 
conflict with decisions from CAl and CAB. This is an important 
issue that promises to recur. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend a grant. 
There is a response. 
November 13, 1984 Bentley Opin in petn 
( 
November 21, 1984 
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84-351 ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
On the basis a preliminary look at the opinion of 
CA9, the fairly strong briefs of the State of California 
on behalf of petitioners and by the NAACP on behalf of 
Scanlon, the case presents a rather close question. It is 
stated briefly as follows: 
"Whether Congress intended to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity of a state that 
accepts federal funds under Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act?" 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversing 
the DC, held that Congress had intended to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment immunity of states that accept federal 
funds under this Act. Its decision is in direct conflict 
~
with Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission, 
718 F. 2d 1 (1983). We probably granted the case to 
resolve the conflict, although the question may be one 
that arises frequently. 
Section 504 prohibits discrimination against 
handicapped persons in "any program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance." Respondent, Scanlon, who 
2. 
suffers from several disabilities, commenced this suit 
against the California State Hospital alleging that it had 
denied employment solely because of his physical 
handicaps. In this private suit in federal court against 
a state institution, respondent seeks monetary, injunctive 
and declaratory relief. The state moved to dismiss on the 
ground that the suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Originally, there was a second question in this case that 
was resolved by our decision last Term in Consolidated 
Rail Corp. v. Darrone. In Darrone, we held that an 
employer who has discriminated could be sued under Section 
504 regardless of the purpose of the federal financial 
assistance it had received. The only remaining question 
in the case is the Eleventh Amendment issue. 
The Court of Appeals (CA9) relied primarily on 
Section 505 (a) (2) of the Act that provides for remedies 
against "any recipient of federal assistance". It argues 
that states therefore may be sued where they have received 
federal assistance. 
The SG's amicus brief urges reversal of CA9. The SG 
recognizes, of course that Congress may require states to 
waive their immunity as a condition of receiving federal 
funds, but argues that there must be "an unequivocal 
3. 
expression of Congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh 
Amendment immunity before a state will be held to have 
waived that immunity." Apparently, nothing in the 
legislative history, particularly of the 1978 Amendment 
that allows attorneys' fees, that expressly addresses the 
question of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The parties 
argue Congressional intention based primarily on 
inference. 
The SG in answering CA9 's reliance on the ..J!.any 
recipient" language, argues that "states are not just 
'any' recipient. States are recipients with special 
constitutional status and perogatives. 
The State of California, as well as the SG, rely on 
my opinion last Term in Pennhurst, as well as other 
decisions that emphasize that waiver of soverign immunity 
must be explicit - not implicit. 
Respondent relies primarily on the argument that this 
private action against California is authorized by Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That section provides that 
"Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article". Respondent 
contends that the Rehabilitation Act is a civil rights act 
within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment. One need 
4. 
not quarrel with this argument. The issue still remains 
as to whether Congress intended to exercise its power to 
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity when the Act and 
Section 504 were enacted. 
I have not read CAl's opinion in Ciampa - a case that 
CA9 declined to follow. Prior to the decision in Ciampa, 
and when this case was here in 1980, the SG had filed an 
amicus brief arguing that immunity had been abrogated or 
waived by the state when it accepted federal funds. In 
its present brief, the SG states that nour prior position 
was incorrectn, citing Ciampa and Pennhurst. When the 
case was here in 1980, as indicated above, we held it for 
Darrone - and remanded it to CA9. Darrone did not address 
the Eleventh Amendment issue. 
I would like the view of my law clerk. As is evident 
from what I wrote in Pennhurst, I think the Eleventh 
Amendment remains an important safeguard for the states. 
I therefore intuitively believe that the SG is correct. I 
recognize, however, that the NAACP brief for respondent 
makes a strong case also. 
LFP, JR. 
alb 03/13/85 ~·~ 3/t'f 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell March 13, 1~5 
From: Lee 
No. 84-351, Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon (::!/2 s-') 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Does the Eleventh Amendment bar a private suit brought 
under §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against a 
State in federal court? 
BACKGROUND 
I. Statutory Background 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
provides in pertinent part: 
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in 
the United States, as def i 'ned in section 7 06 ( 7) 
of this title, shall, solely by reason of his 
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under a~rQ~ or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistanc~ 
29 u.s.c. §794. 
Sections 505 (a) ( 2) and 505(b) of 
L.. 
the 
Rehabilitation Act, which were added in 1978, provide as 
follows: 
(a) (2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set 
forth in title VI, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
shall be available to any person aggrieved by any 
act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance 
under section 794 of this title. 
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or 
charge a violation of a provision of this 
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party, other than the United 
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs. 
29 u.s.c. §794a(a) (2), (b). 
II. General Background 
In Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 
(1793), this Court assumed original jurisdiction over a 
suit brought by a citizen of South Carolina against the 
State of Georgia. The decision created such "a shock of 
surprise that the Eleventh Amendment was at once proposed 
and adopted. " Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 u.s. 313, 325 
(1934). The Amendment provides: 
-
The Judicial power of the Upited States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or 
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, 
or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 
,j. 
The Amendment's language, of course, overruled the 
particular result in Chisolm. This Court has recognized, 
however, that the provision's greater significance lies in 
its affirmation that the principle of sovereign immunity 
limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III. 
Pennhur§.t State Hospital v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900, 906 
(1984) v('Pennhurst II). Thus, in ~ns v. Louisiana, 134 
u.s. 1 (1890), the Court held that despite the limited 
terms of the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court cannot 
entertain a suit brought by a citizen against his own 
State. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 u.s. 1 (1890). 
The Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action 
against a State that has waived its sovereign immunity. 
See, ~, Clark v. Barnard, 108 u.s. 436 (1883). The 
"mere fact" that a State participates in a federally-funded ----program, however, "is not sufficient to establish consent -
on the part of the State to be sued in the federal courts." 
/ Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651, 673 (1974). The State's 
participation in such a program constitutes a waiver only 
if Congress clearly intended to abrogate the State's 
sovereign immunity. Id., at 672. In several cases, this 
Court has held that the "threshold fact" of abrogation was 
not present because there was no "congressional 
authorization to sue a class of defendants which literally 
4. 
~· 
includes States." Id. See also Employees v. Missouri 
Public Health Dept., 411 u.s. 279 (1973). 
Under some circumstances, a State may be sued in 
federal court even if it has not waived its sovereign 
.....-" 
immunity. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 445 (1976), 
this Court held that the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily 
limited by the enforcement provisions of the~h 
Amendment." The Court has required, however' nan -unequivocal expression of congressional intent to 'overturn 
the constitutionally guaranteed imunity of the several 
Stcites. '" Pennhurst II, at 907 (quoting Quern v. Jordan). 
III. Factual Background and Decision Below 
The Atascadero State Hospital denied Douglas 
;::: c .-
Scanlon, who suffers from diabetes mellitus and impaired 
vision, a position as a student intern. Scanlon then filed 
this action against the Hospital and the California Dept. 
\) 
of Mental Health in the DC for the Central District of Cal. 
Scanlon alleged that the Hospital, which receives federal 
financial assistance, denied him employment solely because 
of his physical disabilities. Claiming that this 
discrimination violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973 (quoted above), Scanlon sought monetary, 
injunctive, and declaratory relief. 
The DC, finding that Scanlon's action was barred /)c_. 
by the Eleventh Amendment, granted the defendants' motion 
to dismiss. Although CA9 affirmed, it did not address the 
5. 
Eleventh Amendment issue. Instead, CA9 held that "a 
private action under [Section 504] to redress employment 
discrimination cannot be maintained unless the primary 
objective of the federal financial assistance is to provide 
employment." Shortly after the CA's decision, in 
~onsolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, this Court held that an 
employer could be sued under §504 regardless of the purpose 
of the federal financial assistance it received. 
~~ Therefore, Scanlon's petition for a writ of certiorari was 
~ ~ granted, the judgment of CA9 vacated, and the case remanded 
for further consideration in light of Darrone. 
On remand, CA9 reversed the judgment of the DC. 
Relying on Darrone, the CA held that the Hospital could be 
sued under §504, even if the primary purpose of the federal 
financial assistance was not to provide employment. The 
CA then proceeded to address the Eleventh Amendment issue. 
CA9 recognized that the Eleventh Amendment 
ordinarily bars suits in the federal courts against States 
or their agencies. The court found, however, that this ..-----.., 
action was not barred because California had waived its 
~-------- -----;..-.-
constitutionally-guaranteed immunity. According to the CA, ---------
1
Section 504 "by its terms authorized suit by designated 
plaintiffs against a general class of defendants which 
literally included States or state instrumentalities." By 
accepting federal funds subject to this nondiscrimination ----------~ 
requirement, the State of California had consented to this 





that of <c_A~, 
~ 
6. 
that its decision 
Ciampa v. Massachusetts 
Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 1 (1983), and CA8, Miener 
v. State of Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (1982). 
This Court granted the Hospital's petition for a 
writ of certiorari in order to resolve the conflict among 
the CA's. 
DISCUSSION 
Petitioners contend here that Congress was 
exercising its powers under the Spending Clause when it _________ _______, 
-------enacted §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In the courts 
below, however, petitioners conceded that §504 was passed 
---------------~~,.
pursuant to §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the 
,...-------- ~
legislative history of §504 suggests that Congress was 
------- -----------------~ 
relying on its enforcement powers under the Fourteenth 
---------....___ ~---~--~~-~-~---·( 
Amendment. Senator Humphrey, for example, stated that the --Rehabilitation Act would affirm and guarantee ·the "civil 
rights of 40 million Americans." 118 Cong. Rec. 525 
(1972). When the Act was amended in 1978, both principal 
---"? 
sponsors of the amendment asserted that Congress was acting -------.--...... 
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See 124 Cong. Rec. 
30347 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Cranston) ; id. at 37508 
(remarks of Senator Stafford) • Therefore, in deciding this 
I 
case, the Court should hold that Congress enacted §504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to its powers under §5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
7. 
As discussed above, Congress, when acting to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, may abrogate a State's 
sovereign immunity. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 u.s. 
445 (1976). Congress' intent to overturn the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, must be unequivocally 
expressed. Pennhurst II, at 907. The Court has not yet 
decided whether this "unequivocal expression" must be in 
the statutory language, or whether the Court will look to 
v 
the legislative history. In Quern v. Jordan, the Court 
held that ~t was unnecessary to decide "whether an express 
waiver is required because neither the language of the 
statute nor the legislative history [of §1983] discloses an 
intent to overturn the States' Eleventh ~endment immunity 
by imposing liability upon them." 
n.l6. 1 
440 u.s., at 344-345 
I believe that this Court should permit suits 
---------------~- 1 
intent to abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity 
is clear on the face of the statute. This is the position 
that you took in your dissent in Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 
1 rn Hutto v. Finney, 437 u.s. 678 (1978), the Court relied on 
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees 
Awards Act, 42 u.s.c. §1988, in holding that Congress abrogated 
the States' sovereign immunity. The Hutto decision, however, is 
of limited applicability. There the Court noted that "the Act 
imposes attorney's fees 'as part of the costs.' Costs have 
traditionally been awarded without regard for the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity." 437 u.s., 695. See also Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 u.s. 344-345 n.l6. 
678, 704 (1978) (Opinion of POWELL, J.). There you 
asserted that nthe clear statement rule ••• ensure[s] that 
attempts to limit state power [are] limit state power [are] 
unmistakable, thereby structuring the legislative process 
to allow the centrifugal forces in Congress the greatest 
opportunity to protect the states' interests.n !d., at 706 
(quoting Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, 
Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in 
Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L.Rev. 682, 695 
(1976). The clear statement rule also avoids the 
separation of powers problems that you addressed in the 
brilliant Cannon dissent. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
441 U.S. 677, 742-749 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting). The 
{! Fourteenth Amendment gives { ongress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, not the Supreme Court. 
If the Court adopts the clear statement rule, this 
~
is an easy case. Section 504 simply provides that programs 
receiving federal financial assistance may not discriminate 
against the handicapped. The statute neither provides for 
a private cause of action, nor indicates that States may be 
sued in federal court. Therefore, I believe that the 
judgment of CA9 should be reversed. 
RECOMMENDATION 
I recommend that the judgment of CA9 be reversed. 
~. 
Justice-
I did not address the legislative history of §504 because I 
feel that you should continue to adhere to the clear 
statement rule. If you nevertheless would like a 
discussion of the legisla~~tory, I will be more than 
happy to oblige. ~ 
March 19, 1985 
SCANLON GINA-POW 
84-351 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 
SECOND MEMO TO FILE 
I have now reviewed Lee's bench memo of March 13, and 
find it more helpful than the briefs. I am still inclined 
tentatively to reverse CA9. 
In brief, the California State Hospital denied 
Scanlon (respondent) employment because of serious 
physical disabilities. Scanlon sued in the DC for damages 
and injunctive relief. The state's defense was that the 
suit was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. CA9 rejected 
this argument, holding that California had waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity by accepting federal funds. 
The parties agree, also, that §504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act was enacted by Congress in the exercise of its 
authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer we held that Congress 
acting under Section 5 may abrogate a a state's 
sovereign immunity. But only last Term, in Pennhurst II, 
we held that: 
"an unequivocal expression of congressional 




immunity of the several states" is 
This is a quotation from Quern v. 
There is no clear or unequivocal expression of 
congressional intent in Section 504 of the Act to abrogate 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Only Congress not this 
Court - has authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity from 
suit. I am inclined to hold that there must be an express 
and unequivocal intent to accomplish this. 
As noted in my prior memo, CAl in Ciampa v. 
Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission (1983), so held. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that 
it was disagreeing with CAl. 
I think CAl has a better of this argument, and am 
inclined - at least tentatively - to reverse CA9. 
LFP, JR. 
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84-351 No. ___ _ Atascadero v. Scanlon Conf. 3/27/85 
The Chief Justice ~ , 
'~1-4 ~""'.4~ 1'2--k~-~ ~ .. 
Justice Brennan ~~ ~ 
?Lo 1- I.A-1-~ 4/'1 ~ ~ 
/J!f~, 
~ g:-_ 
!h-e_ ~ rtJ ZJ-~ 
~~4o~~ 
~~~ y~ ~· ~-t-
Il~~~. . 
Justice White f(.4;, 
~ 
g._ ~1- c.h a-~ 
Justice Marshall a;J-4----
Justice Blackmun ~ ~ 
Justice Powell ~. 
5~~ ~k-.t__ . 0-~ ~ 
c.-i!..L~ r"L-~~~-~ 
Justice Rehnquist /J . .. 
1~. 
Justice Stevens ~ c:Lff-~ 
w~~~J!~ 
(. -~ ,_,_~ ~ ~~\ 
Justice O'Connor J~ 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.i'upuutt <!):!turl d t!r.t ~itth ~hrlt,tr 
.. M'lfiugfun. ~. <!):. 2.0~~$ 
April 29, 1985 
Re: 84-351 - Atascadero State Hospital 
v. Scanlon 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await the dissent. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE w .. . ..J . BRENNAN, ..JR. 
.Jnprtm:t Qftturl ttf tfrt ~h )hdtg 
'Jfu~ ~. Of. 2ll.;t,.~ 
April 30, 1985 
No. 84-351 
Atascadero State Hospital 
v . Scanlon 
Dear Lewis, 
I' 11 be circulating a dissent in 




Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
j;uvrtmt <!fcurt of tqt 11fuitt1t j;talt.tr 
JI~U¥frhtgton, ~. Of. 2ll.;t'!~ 
April 30, 1985 
No. 84-351 Atascadero State Hospital and 
California Dept. of Mental Health v. Scanlon 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
j;nprtmt Qftturt ttf tlft ~ttittb j;tatts 






Re: No.84-351-Atascadero State Hospital and 
California Dept. of Mental Health v. 
Douglas James Scanlon 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
C HAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
JSnpumt Qj:qttrfqf tfrt ~tb JStatts 
'~htsfringhm. ~. <!f. 20~~;l 
May 1, 1985 
Re: 84-351 - Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.jupumt Qfourl of tltt ~tb .jtatts-
~~·~· <lf· 20~~~ 
May 2, 1985 
84-351 - Atascadero State Hospital and 
California Department of Mental Health v. Scanlon 
Dear Lewis, 
I join your circulating draft with a comment or 
two. First, I am surprised to find that §504 is a 
statute enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment rather than 
Spending Clause legislation. The section was patterned 
after Title VI, which is a Spending Clause law, and 
both are triggered by the acceptance of federal funds. 
Second, the Eleventh Amendment argument is all the 
stronger because the Rehabilitation Act does not 
contain a private right of action. That right has to 
be implied, all of which indicates Congress did not 
have an eye on authorizing litigation against states. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Jl.1av 3 , 1985 
84-351 Atascaiero State Rosnital v . Scanlon 
Dear Bvron: 
My t~anks for your ioin note . 
As for your suggestions , I will leave open in mv 
next circulation th~ question whether ~504 was a~opte~ pur-
suant to the Fourtrte~'>nth Amendment or the Spencing Clause 
or both . 'rhe petitioners concec1ed belm; t'ia t the Act \vas 
Fourteenth Amendment legislation . l'Je therefore flo not have 
to neci~e the question . 
I diJ rot mention t~e absence o~ any provision fnr 
a private right of action. I do not think the presence of 
such a Provision tvouhl in any wav relieve Conqr.,.ss from the 
requirement that its intent~on to authorize suits aqainst 
states be ma~e unequivocaJly clear . T could montion the 
absence of the Private riqht of action, ~ut add that the 
presence of such a Provision would nnt relievP ~onqress of 
its basic obligation . Unless you think we should add such a 
note , I am inclined to lenve the ~raft as written - though I 
~ave no real objection to such a note . 
Sincerely , 
Just. ice White 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.p:rtutt <!fcuri of t4t ~~ j;btltll 
~agJrin:ghtn. 10. <!f. 2.Llgt'!~ 
May 22, 1985 
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lfp/ss 06/21/85 ANM SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: June 21, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-351 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 
This is a rough memo dictated as I read WJB's 65 
typed page dissent delivered to us only today, even though 
our opinion was circulated five weeks ago. Most of my notes 
are simply quotes or statements as to what WJB says. 
1. WJB says the Court has put the federal judi-
ciary "in the unseemly position of exempting the states from 
compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in 
our nation". P. 1. This is a gross overstatement for which 
WJB cites no authority. 
2. Our decisions make it "difficult, but not im-
possible, for Congress to create private rights of action 
against the states". P. 9. And, in fn. 7, the Court "re-
lentlessly" - by application of "its clear statement rule 
• • serves no purpose other than obstructing the will of 
Congress". Annmarie, this could be answered because it is 
such an extreme statement. We could cite statutes in which 
Congress made its intention clear, and certainly the opinion 
of the Court today - if Congress was ever in doubt - reiter-
ates the rule of construction repeatedly announced by the 
Court. 
3. WJB states that our "sovereign immunity doc-
trine" has various unfortunate results, and is "inconsistent 
2. 
with the essential function of the federal courts - to pro-
vide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform interpreta-
tion and enforcement of the supreme law of the land". P. 
10, 11. We might point out as a general observation with 
respect to the dissent that it appears to believe that only 
the federal courts can be trusted to enforce the supreme law 
of the land. This is a view that wholly rejects the concept 
of federalism upon which our government was founded. 
4. WJB refers to numerous decisions of this Court 
as "unprecedented intrusion on Congress' law making power", 
but says he could "tolerate" the decisions if they did not 
show such a "lack of respect for precedent". P. 13. Iit is 
the dissent, of course, that would disregard - and in effect 
overrule - numerous decisions of the Court going back to 
Hans. 
We have discussed, Annmarie, that we might make a 
short answer to WJB by starting with Hans v. Louisiana and 
coming down to date, citing the cases that have sustained 
Hans' interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. And then 
make the point that it is more than a little curious that 
the dissent should accuse the Court of lack of respect for 
precedent in view of the extent to which WJB ignores stare 
decisis. If you have not had an opportunity to do so, I 
suggest that you ask the Library today to try to give you a 
list decisions of this Court that have followed Hans. 
5. In Part III (p. 14, et seq.) WJB purports to 
examine "new evidence" that indicates the Framers never in-
3. 
tended to constitutionalize the doctrine of "state sovereign 
immunity". The dissent goes on to say there is "no consti-
tutional principle of state sovereign immunity" - despite 
numerous cases to the contrary. P. 15. The dissent quotes 
extensively from the ratifying conventions and other contem-
porary sources that we need not try to answer except in very 
general terms. I note a quote from John Marshall on p. 24 
that seems to say that no one would "think that a state will 
be called to the bar of the federal court." I do not know 
why this statement from John Marshall was used, but WJB 
seems to think it supports his view with respect to sover-
eignty. 
6. On p. 27, WJB acknowledges that Madison and 
Marshall have been cited as supporting an inherent limita-
tion on Article III jurisdiction, citing Edelman, Monaco, 
and Hans. 
7. On p. 38, the dissent quotes from the First 
Judiciary Act. On its face, the quote seems to support us, 
but I have not read carefully what Brennan says about it. 
8. The dissent goes to work Chisholm v. Georgia, 
2 Dall. 419 (1793). From a hurried reading, the dissent's 
prolonged discussion seems only to explain how that case 
resulted in the Eleventh Amendment. (P. 39, et seq.) The 
Amendment was adopted by vote of 23-2. See p. 44. 
9. I do not find, even near the end of the dis-
sent, any explicit call to overrule Hans. This, however, is 
4. 
the purport of the elaborate historical essay. The conclud-
ing sentence on p. 65 makes this clear. 
* * * 
Annmarie: Obviously I have made only a fraction 
of the comments that come to mind when one reads this essay 
that is more approp~te for some historical society publi-
cation than a Supreme Court decision. In considering what 
we might say as a minimum, I think we should answer the as-
sertion that our cases frustrate efforts by Congress to make 
the jurisdiction of this Court clear. We could cite stat-
utes and cases. 
Perhaps the most effective response would be a 
brief one. Perhaps we could start by saying that we have no 
inclination to accept the dissent's invitation to overrule 
Hans and the long line of decisions that have accepted its 
construction of the Eleventh Amendment for almost a century. 
(Cite as many cases here as we can}. We might that even if 
there were time this near the end of our Term to write an 
historical essay in response to the 55 pages of the 
dissent's essay, this would serve no useful purpose. The 
Court has written a judicial opinion relying on long-settled 
precedents. As interesting as a counter historical essay 
might be in some quarters, we decline to engage in a debate 
that may be more appropriate in publications devoted to his-
tory. We do add that despite the claim of "new evidence", 
we find none in the dissent that isn't familiar to scholars 
or that the substance of which has not been recognized in 
5. 
prior decisions. Justice Brennan's dissent certainly re-
fleets a considerable scholarly effort that we respect, but 
it does no more than elaborate his long-held view with re-
spect to Hans and the Eleventh Amendment - a view the Court ~ 
consistently rejected. {Cite WJB's prior expressions). 
I have not tried to state the foregoing very pre-
cisely, but it conveys thoughts that - if they appeal to you 
- can be refined by some of your skillful writing. With 
respect to federalism, there may be occasion to cite to Gar-
cia and to the statements of Madison and others quoted 
therein. But as Garcia was a dissent, I would not rely on 
it except where other cases can be cited and Garcia can be 
referred to as "see also". 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
lfp/ss 06/26/85 Rider A, p. (Scanlon) 
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In view of Justice Stevens' dissent, I may add a footnote 
substantially as follows: 
~ s 
In a dissent expre ~ing his willingness to j1 
overrule Edelman as well as the Supreme Court 
decisions that have followed Hans v. Louisiana, Justice 
Stevens would "further unravel[] the doctrine of stare 
decisis" because he views the Court's decision in 
Pennhurst as "repudiating at least 28 cases". (Cite) In 
short, Justice Stevens would ignores stare decisis in this 
case because of the view of a minority of the Court that 
we ignored it in two prior decisions. This reasoning 
J 2. 
would indeed "unravel" a doctrine upon which the rule of 
law depends. 
Annmarie: If you and your co-clerks think this sort of 
additional footnote is appropriate, I will try it out on 
Byron White. I would like for you, Annmarie, to fill in 
citations as well as counting the number of cases that 
have followed Hans. I would like ~~ ~~fa 
1\ 
Edelman. And check Edelman, Annm~ ie, to see whether ~ 
Justice Stewart joined that. Maybe we could say somewhat 
that six Justices of the Court including Justice Stewart, 
who sat in Edelman, have continued to follow Hans. 
lfp/ss 06/21/85 ANM SAI,LY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: June 21, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-351 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 
This is a rouqh memo dictated as I read WJB's 65 
typed page dissent delivered to us only today, even though 
our oP,inion was circulated five weeks ago. Most of my notes 
are simply quotes or statements as to what WJB says. 
1. WJB says the Court has put the federal iudi-
ciary "in the unseemly position of exempting the states from 
compliance with laws that bind ever'' other legal actor in 
our nation". P. 1. This is a gross overstatement for which 
WJB cites no authority. 
2. Our decisions make it "difficult, but not im-
possible, for Congress to create Private riqhts of action 
against the states". P. 9. And, tn fn. 7, the Court "re-
lentlessly" - by application of "its clear statement rule • 
• • serves no purpose other than obstructinq the wtll of 
Congress''. Annmarie, this could be answered because it is 
such an extreme statement. We coulo cite statutes in which 
Congress made its intention clear, and certainly the o~inion 
of the Court today - if Congress was ever in doubt - reiter-
ates the rule of construction repeatedly announced by the 
Court. 
3. ~7JB states that our "sovereign tmmuni tv doc-
trine" has various unfortunate results, and is "inconsistent 
2. 
with the essential function of the federal courts - to pro-
vide a fair and impartial forum for the uniform interpreta-
tion and enforcement of the supreme law of the land". P. 
10, lJ. We might poi.nt out as a general observation \'l:f th 
respect to the dissent that it appears to believe that only 
the federal courts can be trusteo to enforce the supreme law 
of the land. This is a view that wholly reiects the concept 
of federalism upon which our government was founded. 
4. l'lJB refers to numerous dec:i s i.ons of this Court 
as "unprecedented intrusion on Congress' law making power", 
but says he could "tolerate" the decisions if they did not 
show such a "lack of respect for precedent". P. 13. Iit is 
the dissent, of course, that would disreqarn - and in effect 
overrule - numerous decisions of the Court qoing back to 
Hans. 
We have discussed, Annmarie, that we mlght make a 
short answer to WJB hy starting with Hans v. Louisiana and 
coming down to date, citing the cases that have sustained 
Hans' interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. And then 
make the noint that i.t is more than a little curious that 
the dissent should accuse the Court of lack of respect for 
precedent in view of the extent to which WJB lgnores stare 
decisis. If you have not had an opportunity to do so, I 
suggest that you ask the Library today to tr.y to give you a 
list decisions of this Court that have followed Hans . 
5. In Part III (p. 14, et seq.) WJB purports to 
examine "new evidence" that indicates t~e Framers never in-
3. 
tended to constitutionalize the doctrine of "state sovereign 
tmmunity". The dissent qoes on to sav there is "no consti-
tutional pr:inciple of sta.te sovereign i.mmunitv" - despite 
numerous cases to t~e contrary. P. 15. The dissent quotes 
extensively from the ratifying conventions and other contem-
porary sources that we need not try to answer except in very 
general terms. I note a quote from John Marshall on p. 24 
that seems to say that no one would "think that a state will 
be called to the bar of the federal court." I do not know 
why this statement from John Marshall was used, but 't'~JB 
seems to think it supports his view with respect to sover-
eignty. 
6. On p. 27, WJB acknowledges that Madison ann 
Marshall have been cited as supporting an inherent limita-
tion on Article III jurisdiction, citing Edelman, Monaco, 
and Hans. 
7. On p. 38, the d5.ssent quotes from the First 
Judiciary Act. On its face, the quote seems to support us, 
but I have not read carefullv what Brennan says about it. 
8. The dissent qoes to work Chisholm v. Georgia, 
2 Oall. 419 (1793). From a hurried reading, the dissent's 
prolonged discussion seems only to explain how that case 
resulted j_n the Eleventh Amendment. (P. 39, et seq.) The 
Amendment was adopted by vote of 23-2. See p. 44. 
9. I do not find, even near the end of the dis-
sent, any explicit call to overrule Hans. This, however, is 
4. 
the purport of the elaborate historical essay. The conclud-
ing sentence on p. 65 makes this cl•ar. 
* * * 
Annmarie: Obviously I have made onlv a fraction 
of the comments that come to mind when one reads this essay 
that is more a-ppropratte for some historical society pubU.-
cation than a Supreme Court decision. In cons~dering what 
we might say as a minimum, I think we should answer the as-
sertion that our cases f~ustrate efforts by Congress to ma~e 
the jurisdiction of this Court clear. We could cite stat-
utes and cases. 
Perhaps the most effective response would be a 
brief one. Perhaps we could start hy saying that we have no 
inclination to accept the dissent's invitation to overrule 
Hans and the long line of decisions that have accepted its 
construction of the Eleventh Amendment for almost a century. 
(Cite as many cases here as we can). We miqht that even if 
there were time this near the end of our Term to write an 
historical essay in response to the SS pages of the 
d i.ssent 's essay, th l.s would serve no usefu1 purpose. The 
Court has written a judtcial opinion relying on long-settled 
precedents. As interesting as a counter historical essay 
might be in some quarters, we decline to engage in a debate 
that may be more appropriate in publications devoted to his-
tory. We do add that despite the clafm of "new evidence", 
we find none in the dissent that isn't familiar to scholars 
or that the substance of which has not been recognized in 
-
s. 
prior decisions. Justice Brennan's dissent certainly re-
flects a considerable scholarly effort that ~.,.e respect, but 
it does no more than elaborate his ~ong-hPld view with re-
spect to Hans and th~ Eleventh Amendment - a view the Court 
cons istentl'' re;ected. (Cite w.JB' s prior expressions) • 
I have not tried to state the foregoing very pre-
cisely, hut it convr-vs thoughts that - i.f they appP.al to vou 
- can be refined by some of your skillfuJ writing. With 
respect to federalism, there may be orcaslon to cite to Gar-
cia and to the statements of Madison and others quoted 
therefn. But as Garcia was a dissent, I would not relv on 
it except where other cases can he cited and Garcja can he 







The ,.new evidence,. discovered by the dissent in the 
) 
~deralis~Jrapers and the records of the state ratifying -
conventions, has been available to historians and Justices 
of this Court for almost two centuries. Some of it, 
viewed in isolation, is subject to varying 
interpretations. But none of the Framers questioned that 
d.-
the Constitution was - eo creat~ a federal system with some 
authority expressly granted a federal govrnment and the 
remainder retained by the several states. The 
Constitution would never had been ratified if the states 
2. 
and their courts were to be stripped of their sovereign 
authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution 
itself. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.l'tqtr~m~ C4omt o-f tJr~ ~iu~· .l'tattlf 
._u4ht!lhtn, ~. Clf. 21l.;i'!~ 
June 24, 1985 
Re: 84-351 - Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JU STI CE SAN D RA DAY O'CO N NOR 
.in;rutttt <!Jlltlrt ~f tqt ,nib~ .itab.tl' 
Jl~qingt~n. ~. <!J . 2llbt~~ 
June 25, 1985 
Re: 84-351 Atascadero State Hos ital & California D artment 
of Mental Health v. Douglas J. Scanl n 
Dear Lewis, / 
You have responded very well to the hefty 
(and tardy) dissent in this case. Altho4gh I may be 
overly sensitive, it occurs to me you ay ag~ e with 
me that the wording of the last sente~ce in foo note 2 
on page 5 might more properly refer to "judges" of 
state courts rather than "our brethren\:~-=~le ve it 
to you whether to change it because I h~ly endorse 
the thought expressed in the sentence. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
CH .. MBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.ilnpuuu Qt&tltri gf tlf.t ~ttb ·jlbdtg 
Jfulfittgbrn. '!J. Qt. 2llbi'l-~ 
June 26, 1985 
Re: 84-351 - Atascadero State Hospital 
v. Scanlon 
Dear Harry: 
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CHAMISE~S OF" 
.JUSTICE: w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
June 25, 1985 
No. 84-351 
Atascadero State Hospital 
v. Scanlon 
Dear Harry, 
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~uprtmt <!fourt of tqt ~b ,jbdts 
'Basfrington. ~. <If. 2ll.?~~ 
CHAMI!IERS 01'" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL / 
June 26, 1985 
Re: No. 84-351-Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 
Dear Bill: 










JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
.iuprtm.t <!f(tlttt .n tl{t 1lnittb ,jtzdts 
'lhtslfinghrn. ~.<If. 21l?~ci' 
June 26, 1985 
Re: No. 84-351-Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 
Dear Harry: 






cc: The Conference 
June 26, 1985 
84-351 Atascadero v. Scanlon 
Dear John: 
Here is a footnote I propose to add to note 3, on 
page 9 of my opinion in response to your dissent that I did 
not see until this morning - though I believe a typewritten 
draft came in yesterday. I enclose a copy of page 9 of my 
opinion on which I will make two stylistic changes. 
Unless you wish to make a further response, the 




cc: The Conference 
84-351-0PINION 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 9 
tention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistak-
able language in the statute itself. 3 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. 4 Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act provides in pertinent part: 
}"l(.}kQ. 8:.vtVI"1Qv1t5 
1 In a remarkable view of stare decisis, W'dissent states that our deci-
sion today evinces a "lack of respect for precedent." Post, at--. Not a 
single authority is cited for this claim. In fact, adoption of the dissent's 
position would require us to overrule numerous decisions of this Court. 
However one may view the merits of the dissent's historical argument, the 
principle of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), that ''the fundamental 
principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in 
Art. III," Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,-- U. S. 
--, -- (1984), has been affirmed time and time again, up to the present 
day. E . g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. 
McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell v. Mississippi, 177 U. S. 693 
(1900); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 446 (1900); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 
U. S. 32, 34 (1918); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920); Ex 
Parte New York, 256 U. S. at 497; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 
(1933); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944); 
Ford Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945); Geor-
gia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, n . 13 (1952); 
Parden v. Terminal R . Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964); United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); Employees v. Missouri Public 
Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279,280 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U. S. 651, 662-663 (1974); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, supra. JUSTICE BRENNAN~e<&Ytbor of toda;y's di~;seRt,.D 
long has maintained that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, as estab-
lished in the holdings and reasoning of the above cited cases, is wrong. 
See, e. g., County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, --
U. S. --, -- (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting in part); Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital v. Halderman,-- U.S.--,-- (BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting); Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 
U. S., at 298 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 
687 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is a view, of course, that he is entitled 
to hold. But the Court has never accepted it, and we see no reason to 
< 
make a further response to the scholarly, fifty-five page elaboration of it A tcJ I' -h. OVl a ~ 
today. 6:::._----- u 0< ....; 
• Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre- ke~ 
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
. I 
No. 84-351 
~ascadeo State Hospital v. Scanlon 
Add a footnote on p. 9 of the Court opinion as follows: 
In a dissent expressing his willingness to 
overrule Edelman v. Jordan, 415 u.s. 651 (1974), as well 
as at least sixteen other S1;1preme Court decisions that 
have followed Hans v. Louisiana, see supra, JUSTICE 
STEVENS would "further unravel[] the doctrine of stare 
decisis," Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Homes 
Assn., 450 u.s. 147, 155 (1981), because he views the 
Court's decision in Pennhurst as "repudiating at least 28 
cases." Post, at .--J citing Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital v. Halderman, 465 u.s. n. 50 (1984) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting). We previously have addressed 
at length his allegation that the decision in Pennhurst 
overruled precedents of this Court, and decline to do so 
again here. See Pennhur s t State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 465 u.s. 89, nn. 19, 20, & 21 (1984). 
JUSTICE STEVENS would ignore stare decisis in this case 
because in the view of a minority of the Court two prior 
decisions of the Court ignored it. This reasoning would 
indeed "unravel" a doctrine upon which the rule of law 
depends. 
lfp/ss 06/26/85 Rider A, p. (Scanlon) 
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In view of Justice Stevens' dissent, I may add a footnote 
substantially as follows: 
In a dissent expresing his willingness to 
overrule Edelman as well as the Supreme Court 
decisions that have followed Hans v. Louisiana, Justice 
Stevens would "further unravel[] the doctrine of stare 
~cisis" because he views the Court's decision in 
Pennhurst as "repudiating at least 28 cases". (Cite) In 
short, Justice Stevens would ignores stare decisis in this 
case because of the view of a minority of the Court that 
we ignored it in two prior decisions. This reasoning 
2. 
would indeed "unravel" a doctrine upon which the rule of 
~w depends. 
Annmarie: If you and your co-clerks think this sort of 
additional footnote is appropriate, I will try it out on 
Byron White. I would like for you, Annmarie, to fill in 
citations as well as counting the number of cases that 
have followed Hans. I would like to put the date of 
Edelman. And check Edelman, Annmerie, to see whether 
Justice Stewart joined that. Maybe we could say som~ 
that six Justices of the Court including Justice Stewart, 
who sat in Edelman, have continued to follow Hans. 
June 27, 1985 
84-351 Atascadero State Hospita l v. Scanlon 
This case is here on certiorari to the Court of Appeals for 
the 9th Circuit. Respondent Scanlon instituted suit against 
0----
petitioners, ~sa&e~ State Hospital and the California 
/' ~ ~.t;-4._d_ ~ 
Department of Mental Health, allegiag be was denied employment 
solely because of certain physical h:ndicap~in violation of 
Section 504 of 1973. 
The DC granted summary judgment to petitioners~holding that 
the suit in federal court against these state institutions was 
1/f! 
barred by the Eleventh amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed,~ 
<Jf~h b h ·· a· h -:;J a ~aftg ~t at ecause t e state part1c1pate 1n t e programs un er 
the Act, / and received £~1 funds ;fit had implie~ consented 
to suit. 
We granted this case to resolve a conflict with decisions in 
two other circuits. We now reverse the Court of Appeals~ ~ 
tJ..e_ .._ /. 
~ agree ~ the District Cour y that the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibits this suit in federal court. 
A~~~ lrhe Amendment does not apply when a state has 
-
waived its immunity, / or when Congress~- acting pursuant to the 
~ \W~ 
Fourteenth AmendmentJ-~abrogateE( the state's immunity , we find 
that neither of these requirements has been met. 
The language of the Rehabilitation Ac~does not make clear 
an intention by Congress to~9~, immunity. Nor did 
~A 
Congress condition participation in the funded programs;'on a 
state having c~?sent~d/to be sued in federal court. 
For these reasons,~more fully stated in the opinion pf •he 
~.t fil~ay with the Clerkf'we conclude that the Eleventh 
Amendment~ bar/ respondent's lawsuit. 
Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which -----, 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens join. Justice Blackmun - --
also has filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, 
Marshall and Stevens join, j and Justice Stevens has filed a 
separate dissenting opinion. 
c::.....--- ._, 
2. 
84-351 Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon (Lee) 
LFP for the Court 4/1/85 
1st draft 4/29/85 
2nd draft 5/24/85 
3rd draft 6/25/85 
Joined by SOC 4/30/85 
WHR 5/1/85 
WJB dissenting 
BRW will comment or two 5/2/85 
CJ 5/22/85 
1st draft 6/21/85 
2nd draft 6/26/85 




Typed draft 6/25/85 
1st printed draft 6/25/85 




Typed draft 6/25/85 
1st draft 6/26/85 
JPS will await dissent 4/29/85 
WJB will dissent 4/30/85 
TM will await dissent 
Two copies to Mr. Lind 5/8/85 
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice Brennan 
SUPJlEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-351 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL AND CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PETITIONERS 
v. DOUGLAS JAMES SCANLON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1985] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
If the Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine were 
grounded on principles essential to the structure of our fed-
eral syst~m or necessary to protect the cherished constitu-
tional liberties of our people, the doctrine might be unobjec-
tionable; the interpretation of the text of the Constitution in 
light of changed circumstances and unforeseen events-and 
with full regard for the purposes underlying the text-has al-
ways been the unique role of this Court. But the Court's 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text and his-
tory virtually without regard to underlying purposes or genu-
inely fundamental interests. In consequence, the Court has 
put the federal judiciary in the unseemly position of exempt-
ing the States from compliance with laws that bind every 
other legal actor in our nation. Because I believe that the 
doctrine rests on flawed premises, misguided history, and an 
untenable vision of the needs of the federal system it pur-
ports to protect, I believe that the Court should take advan-
tage of the opportunity provided by this case to re-examine 
the doctrine's historical and jurisprudential foundations. 
Such an inquiry would reveal that the Court, in Professor 
. . 
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Shapiro's words, has taken a wrong turn. 1 Because the 
Court today follows this mistaken path, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
I first address the Court's holding that Congress did not 
succeed in abrogating the States' sovereign immunity when it 
enact~d § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794. If 
this holding resulted from the Court's examination of the 
statute and its legislative history to determine whether Con-
gress intended in § 504 to impose an obligation on the states 
enforceable in federal court, I would confine my dissent to 
the indisputable evidence to the contrary in the language and 
history of § 504. 
Section 504 imposes an obligation not to discriminate 
against the handicapped in "any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance." This language is general 
and unqualified, and contains no indication whatsoever that 
an exemption for the States was intended. Moreover, state 
governmental programs and activities are undoubtedly the 
recipients of a large percentage of federal funds. 2 Given this 
widespread state dependence on federal funds, it is quite in-
credible to assume that Congress did not intend that the 
states should be fully subject to the strictures of§ 504. 
The legislative history confirms that the States were 
amorig the primary targets of § 504. In introducing the 
predecessor of § 504 as an amendment to Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d, Rep. Yanik clearly 
indicated that governments would be among the primary tar-
gets of the legislation: "Our Governments tax [handicapped] 
1 See Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Penn-
hurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 (1984). 
z For instance, in 1972-1973, the year in which Congress was consider-
ing § 504, state governments received over $31 billion in revenue from the 
federal government. By 1981-1982, this had grown to $66 billion. Bu-
reau of the Census, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and 
Employment, at 34 (1982). 
" 
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people, their parents and relatives, but fail to provide serv-
ices for them. . . . The opportunities provided by the Govern-
ment almost always exclude the handicapped." 117 Cong. 
Rec. 45,974 (1971). He further referred approvingly to a 
federal court suit against the State of Pennsylvania raising 
the issue of educational opportunities for the handicapped. 
See 1"17 Cong. Rec. 45,974-45,975 (citing Pennsylvania 
Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 
279 (ED Pa 1972), and characterizing it as a "suit against the 
State"). In a debate two months later, Rep. Yanik noted the 
range of state actions that could disadvantage the handi-
capped. He said that state governments "lack funds and fa-
cilities" for medical care for handicapped children and "favor 
the higher income families" in tuition funding. 118 Cong. 
Rec. 4341 (1972). He pointed out that '~the States are un-
able to define and deal with" the illnesses of the handicapped 
child, and that "[e]xclusion of handicapped children [from 
public schools] is illegal in some States, but the States plead 
lack of funds." !d. Similarly, Senator Humphrey, the bill's 
sponsor in the Senate, focused particularly on a suit against a 
state-operated mental insitution for the mentally retarded as 
demonstrating the need for the bill. See 118 Cong. Rec. 
9495, 9501 (1972). 
The language used in the statute ("any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance") long been used to im-
pose obligations on the States under other statutory 
schemes. For example, Title VI, enacted in 1964, bans dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by 
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." 42 U. S. C. § 2000d. Soon after its enactment, 
seven agencies promulgated regulations that defined a recipi-
ent of federal financial assistance to include "any State, politi-
cal subdivision of any State or instrumentality of any State or 
political subdivision." See, e. g., 29 Fed. Reg. 16274, 
§ 15.2(e) (19t?4). See generally Guardians Assn. v. Civil 
Service Comm'n, 463 U. S. 582, 618 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., 
.. 
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dissenting). Over forty federal agencies and every Cabinet 
department adopted similar regulations. Id., at 619. As 
Senator J avits remarked in the debate on Title VI, "[ w ]e are 
primarily trying to reach units of government, not individ-
uals." 110 Cong. Rec. 13700 (1964). 
Similarly Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
20 U . . S. C. § 1681(a), prohibits discrimination on the basis of · 
sex by "any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." The regulations governing Title IX 
use the same definition of ''recipient"-which explicitly in-
cludes the States-as do the Title VI regulations. See 34 
CFR § 106.2(h). The Congress that enacted § 504 had the 
examples of Titles VI and IX before it, and plainly knew that 
that the language of the statute would include the States. 3 
Implementing regulations promulgated for § 504 included 
the same definition of "recipient" that had previously been 
used to implement Title VI and Title IX. See 45 CFR 
§ 84.3(f). In 1977, Congress held hearings on the implemen-
tation of § 504, and subsequently produced amendments to 
the statute enacted in 1978. Pub. L. 95-602, § 505(a)(2), 29 
U. S. C. § 794a. The Senate Report accompanying the 
amendments explicitly approved the implementing regula-
tions. S. Rep. No. 85-890, at 19. No member of Congress 
questioned the reach of the regulations. In describing an-
other section of the 1978 amendments which brought the 
Federal Government within the reach of§ 504, Rep. Jeffords 
noted that the section "applies 504 to the Federal Govern-
ment as well as State and local recipients of Federal dollars." 
3 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1974, a year after its original 
enactment. Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). The Senate Report 
that accompanied the amendment acknowledged that "Section 504 was pat-
terned after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of 
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ... and section 901 of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1974 [sic]." S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 39-40. These 
amendments and their history "clarified the scope of § 504" and "shed sig-
nificant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted." Alexander v. 
Choate,- U.S.-,-, n. 27 (1985). 
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124 Cong. Rec. 13, 901 (1978). 4 Rep. Sarasin emphasized 
that "[n]o one should discriminate against an individual be-
cause he or she suffers from a handica.rr-not private employ-
ers, not State and local governments, and most certainly, not 
the Federal Government." 124 Cong. Rec. 38,552 (1978). 
The 1978 amendments also addressed the remedies for vi-
olations of § 504: 
"The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[, 42 U. S. C. § 2000d 
et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any 
act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assist-
ance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 
794 of this title." 29 U. S. C. § 794a. 
Again, the amendment referred in general and unqualified 
terms to "any recipient of Federal assistance." An addi-
tional provision of the 1978 amendments made available at-
torney's fees to prevailing parties in actions brought to en-
force § 504. Discussing these two provisions, Senator 
Cranston presupposed that States would be subject to suit 
under this section: 
"[W]ith respect to State and local bodies or State and 
local officials, attorney's fees, similar to other items of 
cost, would be collected from the official, in his official 
capacity; from funds of his or her agency or under his or 
her control; or from the State or local government-re-
gardless of whether such agency or Government is a 
named party." 124 Cong. Rec. 30,346-30,347 (1978) 
Given the unequivocal legislative history, the Court's con-
clusion that Congress did not abrogate the States' sovereign 
immunity when it enacted § 504 obviously cannot rest on an 
analysis of what Congress intended to do or on what Con-
• Rep. Jeffords also noted that ''it did not seem right to me that the Fed-
eral Government should require States and localities to eliminate dis-
crimination wherever it exists and remain exempt themselves." 124 
Cong. Rec. 38,551 (1978) . 
.. 
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gress thought it was doing. Congress intended to impose a 
legal obligation on the States not to discriminate against the 
handicapped. In addition, Congress fully intended that 
whatever remedies were available against other entities-in-
cluding the Federal Government itself after the 1978 amend-
ments-be equally available against the States. There is 
simplY, not a shred of evidence to the contrary. 
II 
Rather than an interpretation of the intent of Congress, 
the Court's decision rests on the Court's current doctrine of 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which holds that 
''the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the 
grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitution. 
Pennhurst, at --. Despite the presence of the most 
clearly lawless behavior by the State government, the 
Court's doctrine holds that the judicial authority of the 
United States does not extend to suits by an individual 
against a state in federal court. 
The Court acknowledges that the supposed lack of judicial 
power may be remedied, either by the state's consent, 5 or by 
'The "stringent," see ante, at 5, test that the Court applies to pur-
ported State waivers of sovereign immunity is a mirror image of the test it 
applies to congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Just as 
the Court today decides that Congress, if it desires effectively to abrogate 
a state's sovereign immunity, must do so expressly in the statutory lan-
guage, so the Court similarly decides that a State's waiver, to be effective, 
must be "specifically aplicable to federal court jurisdiction." Ante, at 6. 
In the Court's words, "Although a State's general waiver of sovereign im-
munity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the 
immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment." Ante, at-. Or-
dinarily, a federal court is expected· faithfully to decide state-law questions 
before it as the courts of a state would. I would think that a federal court 
deciding the scope of a state waiver of sovereign immunity should attempt 
to construe the state law of sovereign immunity as a state court would, 
making use of relevant legislative history and legal precedents. Yet, de-
spite the absence of any identifiable federal interest that would justify a 
departure from state law, the Court eschews any effort to construe Califor-
nia's constitutional waiver requirement in accordance with California law. 
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express congressional abrogation pursuant the Civil War 
Amendments, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980), or per-
haps pursuant to other congressional powers. But the Court 
has raised formidable obstacles to congressional efforts to ab-
rogate the States' immunity; the Court has put in place a se-
ries o(special rules of statutory draftsmanship that Congress 
must obey before the Court will accord recognition .to its act. 
Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 
(1973), held that Congress must make its intention "clear" if 
it sought to lift the States' sovereign immunity conditional on 
their participation in a federal program. I d., at 285. 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973), made it still more 
difficult for Congress to act, stating that "we will find waiver 
only where stated by the most express language or by such 
overwhelriring implications from the text as will leave no 
room for any other reasonable construction." I d., at 673. 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, --
U. S. -- (1984), required "an unequivocal expression of 
congressional intent." I d., at --. Finally, the Court 
today tightens the noose by requiring "that Congress must 
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in 
unmistakable language in the statute itself." Ante, at--
(emphasis added). 
These special rules of statutory drafting are not justified 
(nor are they justifiable) as efforts to determine the genuine 
intent of Congress; no reason has been advanced why ordi-
See, e. g. , Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. 
Rpts. 89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961) (abrogating state sovereign immunity for all 
tort cases and holding it to be an "anachronism, without rational basis, and 
exist(ing] only by the force of inertia"). Instead, the Court seems to be-
lieve that the Eleventh Amendment justifies the Court in imposing on the 
state legislatures, as well as Congress, special rules of statutory drafts-
manship if they would make a waiver of state sovereign immunity in fed-
eral court "successful." Apparently, even states that want to make a fed-
eral forum available for the fair adjudication of grievances arising under 
federal law ought to be deterred from doing so . 
. . 
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nary canons of statutory construction would be inadequate to 
ascertain the intent of Congress. Rather, the special rules 
are designed as hurdles to keep the disfavored suits out of the 
federal court. In the Court's words, the test flows from 
need to maintam "the usual constitutional balance between 
the States and Federal Government." Ante, at --.6 The 
doctrine is thus based on a fundamental policy decision, 
vaguely attributed to the framers of Article III or the Elev-
enth Amendment, that the federal courts ought not to hear 
suits brought by individuals against states. This Court exe-
cutes the policy by making it difficult, but not impossible, for 
Congress to create private rights of action against the 
States. 7 
• See also Pennhurst, supra, at -- ("Our reluctance to infer that a 
State's immunity from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems 
from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 
our federal system"). 
1 In this case, the Court's decision relentlessly to apply its clear state-
ment rule demonstrates how that rule serves no purpose other than ob-
structing the will of Congress. When Congress enacted § 504, it could 
have had no idea that it must obey the extreme clear statement rule 
adopted by the Court for the first time today. The roots of that rule are 
found in Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973), 
which was decided on April18, 1973. Cf. Parden v. Terminal Railway, 
377 U. S. 184 (1964). The Employees case, of course, did not itself lay 
down the extreme rule adopted today. In any event, the bill which be-
came § 504 had been first enacted six months previously. See 118 Cong. 
Rec. 32279 (September 26, 1972) (enactment of bill by Senate); 118 Cong. 
Rec. 36409 (October 14, 1979) (enactment of bill by House). It was then 
vetoed by the President and reenacted in February, 1973. See 118 Cong. 
Rec. 5901 (Feb. 15, 1973) (Senate); 118 Cong. Rec. 7139 (Feb. 28, 1973) 
(House). Another veto followed, and the legislation was finally signed 
into law on September 26, 1973. See 119 Cong. Rec. 29615 (Sept. 13, 
1973) (Senate enactment of final bill); 119 Cong. Rec. 29698, 30148 (Sept. 
18, 1973) (House enactment of final bill). Given this chronology, for the 
Court now to hold that Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity be-
cause it did not "unequivocally express this intention in the statutory lan-
guage" is to change the rules for lawmaking after Congress has already 
acted. Congress, like other officials, "cannot be expected to predict the 
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Reliance on this supposed constitutional policy reverses 
the ordinary role of the federal courts in federal question 
cases. Federal courts are instruments of the national gov-
ernment, seeing to it that constitutional limitations are . 
obeyed while interpreting the will of Congress in enforcing 
the federal laws. In the Eleventh Amendment context, 
however, the Court instead relies on a supposed constitu-
tional·-policy disfavoring suits against States as justification 
for ignoring the will of Congress; the goal seems to be to ob-
struct the ability of Congress to achieve ends that are other-
wise constitutionally unexceptionable and well within the 
reach of its Article I powers. 
The Court's sovereign immunity doctrine has other unfor-
tunate results. Because the doctrine is inconsistent with the 
essential function of the federal courts-to provide a fair and 
impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and enforce-
ment of the supreme law of the land-it has led to the devel-
opment of a complex body of technical rules made necessary 
by the need to circumvent the intolerable constriction of fed-
eraljurisdiction that would otherwise occur. Under the rule 
of Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a State may be re-
quired to obey federal law, so long as the plaintiff remembers 
to name a state official rather than the State itself as defend-
ant, see Alabama v. Pugh,-- U.S. -- (1985), and so 
long as the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospec-
tive. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). 8 These in-
future course of constitutional law." Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 
555, 562 (1978). 
5 There are other rules created specifically to permit suits that would 
appear to be barred by any thoroughgoing interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment as a bar to exercise of the federal judicial power in suits 
against states. For instance, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 
530 (1890), established that the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to suits 
against local governmental units. In addition, it seems to have been a 
longstanding, though unarticulated, rule that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not limit exercise of otherwise proper federal appellate jurisdiction 
over suits from state courts. For instance, in Bacchus. Imports, Ltd. v . 
.. 
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tricate rules often create manifest injustices, while failing to 
respond to any legitimate needs of the States. A damage 
award may often be the only practical remedy available to the 
plaintiff, 9 and the threat of a damage award may be the only 
effective deterrent to a defendant's willful violation of federal 
law. While the prohibition of damage awards thus imposes 
substantial costs on plaintiffs and on members of a class Con-
gress sought to protect, the injunctive relief that is permitted 
can often be more intrusive-and more expensive-than a 
simple damage award would be. 10 
The Court's doctrine itself has been unstable. As I shall 
discuss below, the doctrine lacks a textual anchor, a firm his-
Dias, -- U. S. -- (1984), we adjudicated a taxpayer's appeal from an 
unfavorable judgment in a suit against state officials for refund of taxes. 
Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Compare Martinez v. 
Claifonria, 444 U. S. 2:77 (1980) (adjudicating appeal of § 1983 action 
brought against State in state court) with Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 
(1978) (holding that § 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity in 
federal court). See also Williams v. Vermont, -- U. S. -- (1985); 
Summa Corp. v. California,-- U. S. -- (1984); Aloha Airlines v. Dir. 
of Taxation, - U. S. - (1983); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 
707 (1981); Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U. S. 313 (1974). 
• In this case, for instance, damages may well be the only practical relief 
available for the respondent. He originally brought suit in 1979 alleging 
that the State had improperly denied him employment as a graduate stu-
dent assistant recreational therapist. Even if he had brought suit against 
state officjals as well as the State itself, it is reasonable to suppose that 
now-six years later-he has attained his degree and would obtain no ben-
efit from an injunction ordering the end of discrimination against the handi-
capped in hiring graduate student assistants. "For people in [Scanlon's] 
shoes, it is damages or nothing." Bivens v. Siz Unknown Federal Narcot-
ics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971). 
1° Congress, of course, may decide in a given case that a remedial scheme 
should be limited to either damages or injunctive relief. Cf. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000a-3(a) (statute limiting remedy to "preventive" relief against all de-
fendants). Our role in such a case is to interpret the will of Congress with 
respect to the scope of the permissible relief. In the Eleventh Amend-
ment context, however, the Court seems to have decided that the supposed 
constitutional policy disfavoring suits against States justifies limiting the 
scope of relief regardless of the apparent will of Congress. 
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torical foundation, or a clear rationale. As a result, it has 
been impossible to determine to what extent the principle of 
state accountability to the rule of law can or should be accom-
modated within the competing framework of state non-
accountability put into place by the Court's sovereign immu-
nity doctrine. For this reason, we have been unable to 
agree on the content of the special "rules" we have applied to 
acts of Congress to. determine whether they abrogate state 
sovereign immunity. Compare Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 
377 U. S. 184 (1964) with Employees v. Missouri Dept. of 
Public Health , 411 U. S. 279 (1973). Whatever rule is de-
cided upon is then applied retroactively to actions taken by 
Congress. See n. 7, supra. Finally, in the absence of any 
plausible limiting principles, the Court has overruled and ig-
nored past cases that seemed to stand in the way of vindica-
tion of the doubtful States' right the Court has created. See 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, --
U. S. -, -, n. 50 (1984). 
I might tolerate all of thes·e results-the unprecedented in-
trusion on Congress' lawmaking power and consequent in-
crease in the power of the courts, the development of a com-
plex set of rules to circumvent the obviously untenable 
results that would otherwise ensue, the lack of respect for 
precedent and the lessons of the past-if the Court's sover-
eign immunity doctrine derived from essential constitutional 
values protecting the freedom of our people or the structure 
of our federal system. But that is sadly not the case. In-
stead, the paradoxical effect of the Court's doctrine is to re-
quire the federal courts to protect States that violate federal 
law from the legal consequences of their conduct . 
. III 
Since the Court began over a decade ago aggressively to 
expand its doctrine of Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
munity, see Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 
U. S. 279 (1973), modern scholars and legal historians have 
. . 
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taken a critical look at the historical record that is said to sup-
port the Court's result. 11 Recent research has discovered 
and collated substantial evidence that the Court's const~tu­
tional doctrine of state sovereign immunity has rested on a 
mistaken historical premise. The flawed underpinning is the 
premise that either the Constitution or the Eleventh Amend-
ment embodied a principle of state sovereign immunity as a 
limit qn the federal judicial power. New evidence concern-
ing the drafting and ratification of the original Constitution 
indicates that the Framers never intended to constitutional-
ize the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Consequently, 
the Eleventh Amendment could not have been, as the Court 
has occasionally suggested, an effort to reestablish a a limita-
. tion on the federal judicial power granted in Article III. 
Nor, given the limited terms in which it was written, could 
the Amendment's narrow and technical language be under-
stood to have instituted a sweeping new limitation on the fed-
eral judicial power whenever an individual attempts to sue a 
State. A close examination of the historical records reveals 
a rather different status for the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity in federal court. There simply is no constitutional 
principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally 
11 See, e. g., Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdic-
tion Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 
(1983) (hereinafter Fletcher); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and 
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 
(1983) (hereinafter Gibbons); C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and 
Sovereign Immunity (1972) (hereinafter Jacobs); Field, The Eleventh 
Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 1203 
(1978) (hereinafter Field); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to 
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the 
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 (1975); 
Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case 
Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423; Shapiro, Wrong Turns: 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 
(1984); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental 
Wrongs, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1972) . 
. . 
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mandated policy of excluding suits against States from fed-
eral court. 
A 
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court stated 
that to permit a citizen to bring a suit against a State in fed-
eral court would be "an attempt to strain the Constitution 
and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of." 
!d., at 15. The text of the Constitution, of course, contains 
no explicit adoption of a principle of state sovereign immu-
nity. The passage from Hans thus implies that everyone in-
volved in the framing or ratification of the Constitution be-
lieved that Article III included a tacit prohibition on the 
exercise of the judicial power when a State was being sued in 
federal court. The early history of the Constitution reveals, 
however, that the Court m Hans was mistaken. The 
unamended Article III was often read to the contrary to pro-
hibit not the exercise of the judicial power, but the assertion 
of state sovereign immunity as a defense, even in cases aris-
ing solely under state law. 
It is useful to begin with the text of Article III. Section 2 
provides: 
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority; to all Cases affecting Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a 
State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of . 
different States; between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects." 
. . 
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The judicial power of the federal courts thus extends only to 
certain types of cases, identified either by subject matter or 
parties. The subject-matter heads of jurisdiction include 
federal questions ("all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under th,is Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made") and admiralty ("all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction"). The party-based head of jurisdic-
tion iridude what might be called ordinary diversity ("Con-
troversies ... between Citizens of different States"), state-
citizen diversity (''between a State and Citizens of another 
State"), and state-alien diversity ("between a State . .. and 
foreign .. . Citizens"). It is the latter two clauses, provid- · 
ing for state-citizen and state-alien diversity, that were at 
the focus of the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 
Dall. 419 (1793) and the subsequent ratification of the Elev-
enth Amendment. : 
To understand the dispute concerning the state-citizen and 
state-alien diversity clauses, it is crucial to understand the 
relationship between the party-based and subject-matter 
heads of jurisdiction. The grants of jurisdiction in Article 
III are to be read disjunctively. The federal judicial power 
may extends to a case if it falls within any of the enumerated 
jurisdictional heads. Thus, a federal court can hear a federal 
question case even if the parties are citizens of the same 
state; it can exercise jurisdiction over cases between citizens 
of different states even where the case does not arise under 
federal law. Most important for present purposes, the lan-
. guage of the unamended Article III alone would permit the 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits in which a 
noncitizen or alien is suing a state on a claim of a violation of 
state law. 
This standard interpretation of Article III gave a 
specialimportance to the interpretation of the state-citizen 
and state-alien diversity clauses. The clauses by their terms 
permitted federal jurisdiction over any suit between a state 
and a noncitizen or a state and an alien, and in particular over 
. . 
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suits in which the plaintiff was the noncitizen or alien and the 
defendant was the state. Yet in most of the States in 1789, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity formally forbade the 
maintenance of suits against States in state courts, although 
the actual effect of this bar in frustrating legal claims against 
the state was unclear. 12 Thus, the question left open by the 
terms ,of the two clauses was whether the state law of sover-
eign immunity barred the exercise of the federal judicial 
power. 
A plaintiff seeking federal jurisdiction against a state 
under the state-citizen or state-alien diversity clauses would 
be asserting a cause of action based on state law, since a fed-
eral question or admiralty claim would provide an independ-
ent basis for jurisdiction that did not depend on the identity 
of the parties. To read the two clauses to abrogate the 
state-law sovereign immunity defense would be to find in Ar-
ticle III a substantive federal limitation on state law. Al-
though a State could previously create a cause of action to 
which it would not itself be liable, this same cause of action 
could now be used (at least by citizens of other States or 
aliens) in federal courts to sue the State itself. This was a 
particularly troublesome prospect to the States that had in-
curred debts, some of which dated back to the Revolutionary 
War. The debts would naturally find their way into the 
hands of noncitizens and aliens, who at the first sign of de-
fault could be expected promptly to sue the State in federal 
court. The State's effort to retain its sovereign immunity in 
its own courts would turn out to be futile. Moreover, the re-
sulting abrogation of sovereign immunity would operate ret-
11 Professor Jaffe has explained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
in English practice prior to 1789 rarely was a bar to effective relief for 
those who had legitimate claims against the government. See Jaffe, Suits 
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 
1 (1963). Judge Gibbons'recent essay similarly points out that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in the colonies may also have had a very lim-
ited scope. See Gibbons, at 1895-1899 . 
. 
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roactively; even debts incurred years before the Constitution 
was adopted-and before either of the contracting parties ex-
pected that a judicial remedy against the State would be 
available-would become the basis for causes of action 
brought under the two clauses in federal court. 
· In short, the danger of the state-citizen and state-alien di-
versity clauses was that, if read to permit suits against 
States; they would have the effect of limiting state law in a 
way not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. The 
original Constitution prior to the Bill of Rights contained only 
a few express limitations on state power. Yet the States 
would now find in Article III itself a further limit on state ac-
tion: Despite the fact that the State as sovereign had created 
agiven cause of action, Article III would have made it impos-
sible for the State effectively to assert a sovereign immunity 
defense to that. action. . · 
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not reveal 
any substantial controversy concerning the state-citizen and 
state-alien diversity clauses. 13 The language of Article III, 14 
which provides one guide to its meaning, is undoubtedly con-
sistent with suits against States under both subject-matter 
11 See Fletcher, at 1045-1046; Jacobs, at 14-20. 
1
' As reported by the Committee on Detail, the original draft provided 
that "the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend . . . to such 
other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as involving the na-
tional peace and harmony, in the collection of the revenue[,] in disputes be-
tween citizens of different states[,] in disputes between a State and a Citi-
zen or Citizens of another State[,] in disputes between different states; and 
in disuputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are con-
cerned[,] and in Cases of admiralty jurisdiction." 2 The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787, at 147 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (hereinafter 
Farrand). This jurisdiction was to be appellate only, "except in .. . those 
instances, in which the legislature shall make it original." Id. Interest-
ingly, the Committee's draft of Article III was in James Wilson's handwrit-
ing, but the state-citizen diversity clause was written in the margin by an-
other Committee member, John Rutledge of South Carolina. See 
Putnam, How the Federal Courts were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 
Cornell L. Q. 460, 467 (1925) (facsimile of original document). 
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heads of jurisdiction (for example, a suit arising out of federal 
law brought by a citizen against a State) and party-based 
heads of jurisdiction (for example, a suit brought under the 
state-citizen diversity clause itself). However, a federal 
question suit against a State does not threaten to displace a 
prior ~tate-law defense of sovereign immunity, because state-
law defenses would not of their own force be applicable to 
federal causes of action. On the other hand, a state-citizen 
suit against a State does, as suggested above, threaten to dis-
place any extant state-law sovereign immunity defense. 
An examination of the debates surrounding the state rati-
fication conventions proves more productive. The various 
references to state sovereign immunity all appear in discus-
sions of the state-citizen diversity clause. Virtually all of the 
comments were addressed to the problem created by state 
debts that predated the Constitution, when the State's credi-
tors may often have had meager judicial remedies in the case 
of default. Yet, even in this sensitive context, a number of 
participants in the debates welcomed the abrogation of sover-
eign immunity that they thought followed from the state-citi-
zen and state-alien clauses. The debates do not directly ad-
dress the question of suits against States in admiralty or 
federal question cases, where federal law and not state law 
would govern. Nonetheless, the apparent willingness of 
many delegates to read the state-citizen clause as abrogating 
sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action suggests 
that they would have been even more willing to permit suits 
against States in federal question cases, where Congress had 
authorized such suits in the exercise of its Article I or other 
powers. 
The Virginia debates included the most detailed discussion 
of the state-citizen diversity clause. 15 The first to mention 
"A number of possible grounds for state liability existed in Virginia on 
the eve of that State's ratification convention. Aside from the problem of 
debts owed by the State, the Treaty of Paris of 1783, 8 Stat. 80, between 
Britain and the United States included a number of provisions that could 
I 
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the clause explicitly was George Mason, an opponent of the 
new Constitution. After quoting the clause, he referred to a 
dispute about Virginia's confiscation of property belonging to 
Lord Fairfax. 16 He asserted: 
"Claims respecting those lands, every liquidated ac-
count, or other claim against this state, will be tried be-
fore the federal court. Is not this disgraceful? Is this 
state to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent 
individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be ar-
raigned like a culprit, or private offender? Will the 
states undergo this mortification? I think this power 
perfectly unnecessary. ·But let us pursue this subject 
farther. What is to be done if a judgment be obtained 
against a state? Will you issue afierifacias? It would 
be ludicrous to say that y.ou could put the state's body in 
jail. How is the judgment, then, to be enforced? A 
power which cannot be executed ought not to be 
granted." 3 Elliot's Debates, at 527. 
Mason thus believed that the state-citizen diversity clause 
provided federal jurisdiction for suits against the States and 
would have the effect of abrogating the state's sovereign im-
munity defense in state-law causes of action for debt that 
would be brought in federal court. · 
Madison responded the next day: 
subject the States to liability to British creditors. Article V of the Treaty 
recognized completed State confiscations, or escheats, of British property. 
Article VI, however, prohibited escheats that had not yet been completed. 
Virginia, like other states, had provided for the confiscation of debts owed 
to British creditors or the discharge of such debts by payment into the 
state Treasury. See Gibbons, at 1903. The Treaty thus potentially sub-
jected Virginia to substantial liability to British creditors trying to collect 
these debts, although enforcement of the Treaty's provisions was largely 
impossible under the Articles of Confederation. See generally Gibbons, at 
1899-1902, 1903-1908. 
11 See also 3 Elliot's Debates, at 529 (further discussion of problem of 
land confiscation). · 
.. 
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"[Federal] jurisdiction in controversies between a state 
and citizens of another state is much objected to, and 
perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of indi-
viduals to call any state into court. The only operation 
it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit 
against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal 
cOurt. This will give satisfaction to individuals, as it 
will prevent citizens, on whom a state may have a claim, 
being dissatisfied with the state courts." I d., at 533. 
Madison seems to have believed that the Article III judicial 
power, at least under the state-citizen diversity clause, was 
limited to cases in which the states were plaintiffs. Al-
though he does deny that "[i]t is in the power of individuals to 
call any state into court," this remark could be understood as 
an explication of current state law which he believed would 
not be displaced by the state-citizen diversity clause. His 
remarks certainly do not suggest that Congress, acting under 
its enumerated powers elsewhere in the Constitution, could 
not "call a state into court," or, again acting within its own 
granted powers, provide a citizen with the power to sue a 
state in federal court. 
At any rate, the delegates were not wholly satisfied with 
Madison's explanation. Patrick Henry, an opponent of rati-
fication, was the next speaker. Referring to Mason, he said: 
"My honorable friend's remarks were right, with respect to 
incarcerating a state. It would ease my mind, if the honor-
able genetleman would tell me that manner in which money 
should be paid, if, in a suit between a state and individuals, 
t~e state were cast." I d., at 542. Returning to the attack 
on Madison, Henry had no doubt concerning the meaning of 
the state-citizen diversity clause: 
"As to suits between a state and the citizens of another 
state, his construction of it is to me perfectly incom-
prehensible. He says it will seldom happen that a state 
has such demands on individuals. There is nothing to 
warrant such an assertion. But he says that the state 
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may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert the most 
clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language 
of the people, there is an end of all argument. What 
says that paper? That it shall have cognizance of con-
troversies between a state and citizens of another state, 
without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. 
What says the honorable gentleman? The contrary-
that the state can only be plaintiff. When the state is 
debtor, there is no reciprocity. It seems to me that gen-
tlemen may put what construction they please on it. 
What! is justice to be done to one party, and not to the 
other?" I d., at 543. 
Edmund Pendleton, the President of the Virginia conven-
tion and the next speaker, supported ratification but seems 
to have agreed with Henry that the state-citizen diversity 
clause would subject the states to suit in federal court. He 
said that "[t]he impossibility of calling a sovereign state be-
fore the jurisdiction of another sovereign state, shows the 
propriety and necessity of vesting this tribunal with the deci-
sion of controversies to which a state shall be a party." !d., 
at 549. 
John Marshall next took up the debate: 
''With respect to disputes between a state and the citi-
zens of another state, its jurisdiction has been decried 
with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gentleman will 
think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal 
court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not 
many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a 
party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to 
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged be-
fore a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover 
claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend 
this contruction is warranted by the words. But, say 
they, there will be a partiality in it if a state cannot be 
defendant-if an individual cannot proceed to obtain 
judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a 
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state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. 
I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does 
not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only what can-
not be avoided, why object to the system on that ac-
count? If an individual has a just claim against any par-
ticular state, is it to be presumed that, on application to 
its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction? But how 
could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another 
state, without the establishment of these tribunals?" 
I d., at 555-556. 
Marshall's remarks, like Madison's, appear to suggest that 
the state-citizen diversity clause could not be used to make an 
unwilling state a defendant in federal court. The reason 
seems to be that ''it is not rational to suppose that the sover-
. eign power should be dragged before a court." Of course, 
where the cause of action is based on state-law, as it would be 
in a suit under the state-citizen diversity clause, the "sover-
eign power" whose law governed would be the state, and 
Marshall is consequently correct that it would be "irrational" 
to suppose that the sovereign could be forced to abrogate the 
sovereign immunity defense that its own law had created. 
However, where the cause of action is based on a federal law 
enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I powers, it would be 
far less clear that Marshall would have concluded that the · 
state still retained the relevant "sovereignty''; in such a case, 
there is nothing "irrational" about supposing that the rele-
vant sovereign-in this case, Congress-had subjected the 
state to suit. 17• 
Marshall's observations did not go unanswered. Edmund 
Randolph, a member of the Committee of Detail at the Con-
stitutional Convention and a proponent of the Constitution, 
referred back to Mason's remarks: 
17 To interpret Marshall's remarks to endorse a principle of wholesale 
state immunity from suit on any cause of action-State or Federal-in fed-
eral court would render them inconsistent with the views he later ex-
pressed as Chief Justice. See infra, at---. 
. . 
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"An honorable gentleman has asked, Will you put the 
body of the state in prison? How is it between inde-
pendent states? If a government refuses to do justice to 
individuals, war is the consequence. Is this the bloody 
alternative to which we are referred. . . . I think, 
whatever the law of nations may say, that any doubt re-
specting the construction that a state may be plaintiff, 
and not defendant, is taken away by the words where a 
state shall be a party. I d., at 573. 
Randolph was convinced that a state could be made a party 
defendant. Discussing some disputed land claims, he re-. 
marked that "[ o ]ne thing is certain-that . . the remedy will 
not be sought against the settlers, but the state of Virginia. 
The court of equity will direct a compensation to be made by 
the state." I d., at 57 4. Finally, he concluded his discus-
sion: "I ask the Convention of the free people of Virginia if 
there can be honesty in rejecting the government because 
justice is to be done by it? . . . Are we to say that we shall 
discard this government because it would make us all hon-
est?" I d., at 575. 18 One of the purposes of Article III was to 
vest in the federal courts the power to settle disputes that 
might threaten the peace and unity of the nation. 19 Ran-
dolph saw the danger of just this kind of internecine strife 
when a state reneges on debts owed to citizens of another 
state, and consequently applauded the extension of federal 
jurisdiction to avoid these consequences. 
11 Before the discussion of the state-citizen clause initiated by Mason, 
Randolph had earlier made much the same point while summariZing his 
· views of the Constitution: "I admire that part which forces Virginia to pay 
her debts." 3 Elliot, at 207. 
11 For example the draft of the Constitution referred to the Committee 
on Detail at the Convention had provided "[t]hat the jurisdiction of the na-
tional Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by the gen-
eral Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the National peace 
and harmony." 2 Farrand, at 39 . 
. . 
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The Virginia Convention ratified the Constitution. The 
Madison and Marshall remarks have been cited as evidence of 
an Inherent limitation on Article III jurisdiction. See, e. g., 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 660, n. 9; Monaco v. Mis-
sissippi, 392 U. S. 313, 323-325 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 
134 U. S., at 14. Even if this adequately characterized the 
subst~nce of their views, they were a minority of those given 
at the -convention. Mason, Henry, Pendleton, and Randolph 
all took an opposing position. 20 Equally important, the en-
tire discussion focused on the question of Virginia's liability 
for debts and land claims that predated the Constitution and 
clearly arose under Virginia law. The question that excited 
such interest was whether the state-citizen diversity clause 
itself abrogated the sovereign immunity defense that would 
be available to the state in a suit concerning these issues in 
state court. 21 The same issue arose in a few other state con-
111 It has been suggested that the remarks of the opponents of the Con-
stitution should be given less weight. However, the same argument could 
be made concerning the remarks of Madison and Marshall, especially in 
light of Marshall's later interpretation of Article III as Chief Justice. See 
infra, at --. Their fervent desire for ratification could have led them to 
downplay the features of the new document that were arousing contro-
versy. See Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrines, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 534 (1977). 
n The only element of the debate that suggests a broader concern is the 
repeated reference to the problem of enforcing a judgment against the 
state. Of course, even these statements were made in the context of the 
discussion of the state-citizen diversity clause, and the participants in the 
debate may well not have had their attention directed to the need, ulti-
mately vindicated by the Civil War, to enforce federal law against the 
States, regardless of the means necessary for enforcement. In any event, 
the Court has categorically rejected the difficulty of enforcing judgments 
against the States as ground for permitting States to avoid their obliga-
tions. It has long been established that a State may not claim sovereign 
immunity when it is sued by another State under the Article III State-
State diversity clause, see South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 
(1904), or when it is sued by the United States. See United States v. 
Texas, 143 U. S. 621, 642-646 (1882). Moreover, the prospective and in-
junctive relief that is permitted in actions pleaded against a state official, 
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ventions, but did not receive the detailed attention that it did 
in Virginia. 22 
The debate in the press sheds further light of the effect of 
the Constitution on state sovereign immunity. A number of 
influential anti-Federalist publications sounded the alarm at 
what they saw as the unwarranted extension of the federal 
judici~ power worked by the state-citizen diversity clause. 
The "-Federal Farmer," commonly identified as Richard 
Henry Lee of Virginia, was one influential and widely pub-
lished anti-Federalist. He objected that: 
"There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the 
general government in the judicial department, I think 
very unnecessarily, I mean pQWers respecting questions 
arising upon the internal laws of the respective states. 
It is proper the federal judiciary should have powers co-
extensive with the federal legislature-that is, the 
power of deciding finally on the laws of the union. By 
Art. 3. Sect. 2. the powers of the federal judiciary are 
extended (among other things) to all cases between a 
state and citizens of another state-between citizens of 
different states-between a state or the citizens thereof, 
and foreign states, citizens of subjects. Actions in all 
these cases, except against a state government are now 
brought and finally determined in the law courts of the 
states respectively; and as there are no words to exclude 
these courts of their jurisdiction in these cases, they will 
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, may raise enforcement problems as 
difficult as those raised by a judgment for damages in a suit against a 
State. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). 
• 
21 For discussion of the state-citizen clause in other conventions, see Gib-
bons, at 1902-1903 (Pennsylvania), 1912-1914 (North Carolina); Fletcher, 
at 1050-1051; Jacobs, at 27-40 (Pennsylvania). In the Pennsylvania con-
vention, for instance, James Wilson approved of the state-citizen clause 
that had been drafted in his own Committee on Detail: ''When a citizen has 
a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both 
parties· may stand on a just and equal footing." 2 Elliot, at 491. 
' 
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have concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior federal 
courts in them." 14 The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution, at 40 (Kaminski & 
Saladino, eds., 1983) (hereinafter Documentary History) 
(emphasis added). 23 
Later in the same essay, which was published and circulated 
in 1787 and 1788, see id., at 14-17, the author becomes even 
more explicit: 
"How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the 
citizen of another state to bring actions against state 
governments, which have failed in performing so many 
promises during the war, is doubtful: How far it may be 
proper so to humble a state, as to bring it to answer to an 
individual in a court of law is worthy of consideration; 
the states are now subject to no such actions; and this 
new jurisdiction will subject the states, and many de-
fendants to actions, and processes, which were not in the 
contemplation of the parties, when the contract was 
made; all engagements existing between citizens of dif-
ferent states, citizens and foreigners, states and foreign-
ers; and states and citizens of other states were made the 
parties contemplating the. remedies then existing on the 
laws of the states-and the new remedy proposed to be 
given in the federal courts, can be founded on no princi-
ple whatever." Id., at 41-42. 
This discussion undoubtedly presupposes that states would 
be parties defendant in suits on state-law causes of action 
under the state-citizen diversity clause; the author objects to 
barring sovereign immunity defenses in cases "arising upon 
the internal laws of the several states." However, the anti-
Federalist author plainly also believes that the powers of the 
federal courts are to be coextensive with the powers of Con- . 
23 The essay cited here can also be found at 2 The Complete Anti-Feder-
alist 245 (H. Storing ed. 1981). Professor Storing has questioned the its 
attribution to Richard Henry Lee. !d., at 214-216 . 
. . 
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gress. Thus, the deficiency of state-citizen diversity juris-
diction is not that it permits the federal courts to hear suits 
against states based on federal causes of action, but that it 
permits the federal courts to exercise jur-isdiction beyond the 
lawmaking powers of Congress: it provides new remedies for 
state creditors "which were not in the contemplation of the 
partie·s, when the contract was made." 
Another noted anti-Federalist writer who published under 
the pseudonym "Brutus" also attacked what he saw as the 
untoward implications of the state-citizen diversity clause: 
"I conceive the clause which extends the power of the ju-
dicial to controversies arising between a state and citi-
zens of another state, improper in itself, and will in its 
exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive. 
It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in 
a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This is hu-
miliating and degrading to a government, and, what I 
believe, the supreme authority of no state ever submit-
ted to. 
Every state in the union is largely indebted to individ-
uals. For the payment of these debts they have given 
notes payable to the bearer. At least this is the case in 
this state. Whenever a citizen of another state becomes 
possessed of one of these notes, he may commence an ac-
tion in the supreme court of the general government; and 
I cannot see any way in which he can be prevented from 
recovering. 
If the power of the judicial under this clause will ex-
tend to the cases above stated, it will, if executed, 
produce the utmost confusion, and in its progress, will 
crush the states beneath its weight. And if it does not 
extend to these cases, I confess myself utterly at a loss 
to give it any meaning." 2 The Complete Anti-Federal-
ist, at 429-431 (H. Storing ed. 1981) . 
. . 
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Other materials, from proponents and opponents of ratifica-
tion, similarly view Article III jurisdiction as extending to 
suits against states. 24 Timothy Pickering, a Pennsylvania 
landowner who supported ratification and attended the Penn-
sylvania convention, wrote: 
"The federal farmer, and other objectors, say the causes 
b~tween a state and citizens of another state-between 
citizens of different states-and between a state, or the 
citizens thereof, and the citizens of subjects of foreign 
states, should be left, as they now are, to the decision of 
the particular state courts. The other cases enumer-
ated in the constitution, seem· to be admitted as properly 
cognizable in the federal courts. With respect to all the 
former, it may be said generally, that as the local laws of 
the several states may differ from each other-as par-
ticular states may pass laws unjust in their nature, or 
pm-tially unjust as they regard foreigners and the citi-
zens of other states, it seems to be a wise provision, 
which puts it in the power of such foreigners and citizens 
to resort to a court where they may reasonably expect to 
obtain impartial justice. . . . But there is a particular 
and very cogent reason for securing to foreigners a trial, 
:usee, e. g., J. Main, The Antifederalists 157 (1961) (quoting 1788letter 
raising question whether state-citizen diversity clause would not "expose 
every State to be sued in the New Court, on their public securities holden 
by Citizens of other States"); 13 Documentary History, at 434 (widely re-
printed essay by Federalist Tench Coxe) ("[W]hen a trial is to be had be-
tween the citizens of any state and those of another, or the government of 
another, the private citizen wil not be obliged to go into a court constituted 
by the state, with which, or with the citizens of which, his dispute is. He 
can appeal to a disinterestedfoederal court.''); 14 Documentary History, at 
72 (pro-Federalist pamphlet published in Philadelphia and reprinted else-
where) ("[States] will indeed have the privilege of oppressing their oum cit· 
izens by bad laws or bad administration; but the moment the mischief ex-
tends beyond their own State, and begins to affect the citizens of other 
States strangers, or the national welfare,-the salutary controul of the su-
preme power will check the evil, and restore strength and security, as well 
as honesty and right, to the offending state"). 
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either in the first instance, or by appeal, in a federal 
court. With respect to foreigners, all the states form 
but one nation. This nation is responsible for the con-
duct of all its members toward foreign nations, their citi-
zens and subjects; and therefore ought to possess the 
power of doing justice to the latter. Without this 
pqwer, a single state, or one of its citizens, might em-
broil the whole union in a foreign war." 14 Documen-
tary History, at 204. 
Pickering's comments are particularly revealing because, un-
like the previous comments, they do not focus on the problem 
caused by the abrogation of sovereign immunity in state-law 
causes of action. In fact, his views seem to be consistent 
with the view that a federal court adjudicating a state-law 
claim of action should apply ail applicable state-law sovereign 
immunity defense. Pickering justifies the existence of state-
citizen diversity jurisdiction in part as a remedy for state 
laws that are unjust or unfair to noncitizens. Such laws 
would, of course, implicate the interests protected by the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. His com-
ments, like those of the "Federal Farmer," thus suggest the 
recognized need for a federal forum to adjudicate cases impli-
cating the guarantees of the federal constitution-even those 
cases in which a state is the defendant. 
The Federalist Papers were written to influence the rati-
fication debate in New York. In No. 81, Hamilton discussed 
the issue of state sovereign immunity in plain terms: 
"I shall take occasion to mention here a supposition 
which has excited some alarm upon very mistaken 
grounds. It has been suggested that an assignment of 
the public securities of one State to the citizens of an-
other would enable them to prosecute that State in the 
federal courts for the amount of those securities; a sug-
gestion which the following considerations prove to be 
without foundation. 
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It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. 
This is the general sense and the general practice of 
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of 
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every 
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it 
will remain with the States and the danger intimated 
must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are 
necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty 
were discussed in considering the article of taxation and 
need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the princi-
ples there established will satisfy us that there is no 
color to pretend that the State governments would, by 
the adoption of that plani be divested of the privilege of 
paying their own debts in their own way, free from 
every constraint but that which flows from the obliga-
tions of good faith. The contracts between a nation and 
individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sov-
ereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. 
They confer no right of action independent of the sover-
eign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits 
against States for the debts they owe? How could re-
coveries be enforced? It is evident that it could not be 
done without waging war against the contracting State; 
and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, 
and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State 
governments, a power which would involve such a conse-
quence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable." 
The Federalist, at 511-512 (Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis 
in original). 
Hamilton believed that the states could not be held to their 
debts in federal court under the state-citizen diversity clause. 
The Court has often cited the passage as support for its view 
that the Constitution, even before the Eleventh Amendment, 
gave the federal courts no authority to hear any case, under 
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any head of jurisdiction, in which a state was an unconsenting 
defendant. See, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 
661; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., at 12-13. A careful 
reading ~f this passage, however, in the context of Hamil-
ton's views elsewhere in The Federalist, demonstrates pre-
cisely _the opposite. In the cases arising under state law that 
would·find their way into federal court under the state-citizen 
diversity clause, a defense of state sovereign immunity would 
be as valid in federal court as it would be in state court. The 
States retained their full sovereign authority over state-cre-
ated causes of action, as they did over their traditional 
sources of revenue. See Federalist No. 32 (discussing tax-
ation). On the other hand, where the Federal Government, 
in the "plan of the convention," 25 had substantive lawmaking 
21 Hamilton used the phrase "plan of the convention" frequently as a syn-
onym for the Constitution. See The Federalist Concordance, at 403-404 
(Engeman, Erler, Hofeller, eds. 1980). In No. 32, the discussion of tax-
ation to which Hamilton adverted in No. 81, Hamilton had said that "as the 
plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation, the 
State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which 
they before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to 
the United States." The Federalist, No. 32, at 241 (Wright ed. 1961) (em-
phasis in original). The Constitution had not delegated to the national 
government the general power to define defenses to state-law causes of ac-
tion; consequently, nothing in Article III abrogated state sovereign immu-
nity in state-law causes of action in federal or state courts. On the other 
hand, the Constitution had delegated to the national government a series 
of enumerated powers, and had made federal laws enacted pursuant 
thereto the supreme hiw of the land. Therefore, the States had surren-
dered their immunity from suit on federal causes of action when the Con-
stitution was ratified. 
In No. 80, Hamilton discussed the need for the federal question 
jurisdiction: 
"What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State 
legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance 
of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from 
doing a variety of things, some of which are incompatible with the interests 
of the Union, and others with the principles of good government." 
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authority, the states no longer retained their full sovereignty 
and could be subject to suit in federal court. 28 In these 
areas, in which the Federal Government had substantive law-
making authority, Article III's federal question grant of ju-
risdiction gave the federal courts power that extended just as 
far as the legislative power of Congresss; as Hamilton had 
said i.p discussing the judicial power, "every government 
ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by 
its own authority," No. 80, at 502 (emphasis in original). 27 
To interpret Article III to impose an independent limit on the 
lawmaking power of Congress would be to turn the "plan of 
t~e convention" on its head. 28 
Id., at 500. The constitutional mode for enforcing the federal laws, ac-
cording to Hamilton, was the federal judiciary. I d. Again, insofar as the 
states have thus given up powers to-.the federal government in the ''plan of 
the convention," they are no longer full sovereigns and may be subjected to 
suit. 
• A number of scholars have noted comments by Hamilton elsewhere in 
the Federalist Papers that strongly suggest that he foresaw the necessity 
for suits against states in federal court. See Fletcher, at 1048; Gibbons, at 
1908-1912; Field, at 534-535. 
n The view that the power of the federal courts under federal question 
jurisdiction had to be congruent with the power of Congress to legislate 
under Article I is strongly supported by· other writings of Hamilton, as well 
as by other comments made in defense of Article III. See, e. g., 3 Elliot's 
Debates, at 532 (remarks of Madison) ("With respect to the laws of the 
Union, it is so necessary and expedient that the judicial power should cor-
respond with the legislative, that it has not been objected to"). 
• One final piece of evidence concerning the meaning of the original Arti-
cle III comes from the amendments proposed by the various state ratifica-
tion conventions. The New York convention submitted an amendment to 
the First Congress ''that nothing in the Constitution now under consider-
ation. contained, is to be construed to authorize any suit to be brought 
against any state, in any manner whatever." 2 Elliot's Debates, at 409. 
This suggests at least that the New York delegates did not agree with 
Hamilton's reading of the state-citizen diversity clause. Virginia, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire also proposed 
amendments that would have modified or eliminated the state-citizen di-
versity clause. See Fletcher, at 1051-1052. The felt need for such 
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A sober assessment of the ratification debates thus shows 
that there was no firm consensus concerning the extent to 
which the judicial power of the United States extended to 
suits against States. Certain opponents of ratification, like 
Mason, Henry; and the "Federal Farmer," believed that the 
state-citizen diversity clause abrogated state sovereign im-
munity on state causes of action and predicted dire conse-
quences as a result. On the other hand, certain proponents 
ofthe Constitution, like Pendleton, Randolph, and Pickering, 
agreed concerning the interpretation of Article UI but be-
lieved that this constituted an argument in favor of the new 
Constitution. Finally, Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton be-
lieved that a State could not be made a defendant in federal 
court in a state-citizen diversity suit. The majority of the 
recorded comments on the question contravene the Court's 
statement in Hans, see supra, at --, that suits against 
States in federal court were inconceivable. 29 
Granted that most of the comments thus expressed a belief 
that state sovereign immunity would not be a defense to suit 
in federal court in state-citizen diversity cases, the question 
remains whether the debates evince a contemporary under-
standing concerning the amenability of States to suit under 
federal question or other subject-matter grants of jurisdic-
tion. Although this question received little direct attention, 
the debates permit some conclusions to be drawn. First, the 
belief that the state-citizen diversity clause abrogated state 
sovereign immunity in federal court implies that the federal 
question and admiralty clauses would have the same effect. 
It would be curious indeed if Article III abrogated a state's 
immunity on causes of action that arose under the state's own 
laws and over which the federal government had no legisla-
amendments suggests that the delegates to these conventions did not find 
such a limitation in Article III itself. 
21 Indeed, recent scholarship seems unanimously to agree that the 
weight of the evidence is against the Court's statement in Hans. See Ja-
cobs, at 40; Field, at 531; Gibbons, at 1913-1914; Fletcher, at 1054. 
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tive authority, but gave a state an absolute right to a sover-
eign immunity defense when it was charged with a violation 
of federal law. Second, even Hamilton, who believed that 
the state-citizen clause did not abrogate state sovereign im-
munity in federal court, also left substantial room for suits 
against states when "the plan of the convention" required 
this result. Given the Supremacy Clause and the enumera-
tion of-congressional powers in Article I, "the plan of the con-
vention" requires States to answer in federal courts for viola-
tions of duties lawfully imposed on them by Congress in the 
exercise of its Article I powers. Third, the repeated refer-
ences by Hamilton and others to the need for the federal 
courts to be able to exercise juridiction that is as extensive as 
Congress' powers to legislate suggests that, if Congress had 
the substantive power under Article I to enact legislation 
providing rights of action against the states, the federal 
courts under Article III coudl be given jurisdiction to hear 
such cases. 
B 
After the ratification of the Constitution, Congress pro-
vided in Section 13 of the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, that 
"the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, ex-
cept between a State and its citizens; and except also be-
tween a State and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which 
latter case it shall have original but not' exclusive jurisdic-
tion." The Act did not provide the federal courts with origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction, although it did in section 25 
provide the Supreme. Court with considerable jurisdiction 
over appeals in federal question cases from state courts. 
Despite the controversy over the suability of the states, the 
provision of the Act giving the Supreme Court original juris-
diction under . the state-citizen and state-alien diversity 
clauses surprisingly aroused little or no debate in Congress. 
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See Fletcher, at 1053-1054.30 
Those with disputes against States had no doubt that state-
citizen diversity jurisdiction gave them a remedy in federal 
court. The first case docketed in this Court was 
Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 Dall. 401 (1791), a suit by 
Dutch creditors who sought judgments to recover principal 
and interest on Revolutionary War loans to the State of 
Maryland. Although a number of other cases were brought 
against states prior to the passage of the Eleventh Amend-
ment,31 the most significant of course was Chisholm v. Geor-
gia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). Chisholm was an action in assumpsit 
by a citizen of South Carolina for the price of military goods 
sold to Georgia in 1777.32 The case squarely presented the 
question whether a State could be sued in federal court. 
30 The First Judiciary Act itself niay well suggest Congress' understand-
ing that states would be suable in federal court under the state-citizen di-
versity clause. Although section 13 of the Act did not differentiate be-
tween states as plaintiffs and states as defendants, the same section 
provided that the Supreme Court "shall have exclusively all such jurisdic-
tion of suits or proceedings against ambassadors ... as a court can have or 
exercise consistently with the law of nations." If Congress had thought 
that states could not, or ought not, be suable in federal court under the 
state-citizen diversity clause, it easily could have provided that the Su-
preme Court shall exercise such jurisdiction against a state "as a court can 
have or exercise consistently with that s~te's law." In addition, else-
where in the Act, Congress assigned jurisiction over cases in which the 
United States was the plaintiff. See § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (district court jurisdic-
tion of "all suits at common law where the United State sue" subject to 
jurisdictional amount); § 11, 1 Stat. 78 (circuit court jurisdiction of all civil 
suits where $500 or more is in dispute "and the United States are plaintiffs, 
or petitioners"). Congress exercised no such discrimination in assigning 
jurisdiction in cases "between a state and citizens of another state." 
81 See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 
2 Ga. L. Rev. 207, 215-230 (1968) (discussing cases); Jacobs, at 41-47, 
57-64 (same). 
•The precise facts of Chisholm have been the subject of some scholarly 
dispute. Compare 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States His-
tory 93, n. 1 (1922) (plaintiff in Chisholm was executor asserting claim on 
behalf of estate of British citizen) with Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: 
84-351-DISSENT 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 35 
The Court held that federal jurisdiction extended to suits 
against States under the state-citizen diversity clause. Each 
of the five sitting Justices delivered an opinion; only Justice 
Iredell was in dissent. Several features of Chisholm are 
crucial to an understanding of the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment. First, two members of the Committee on De-
tail tlr~t had drafted Article III at the Convention were in-
volved in the Chisholm case. Both believed that a state 
could be sued in federal court. Edmund Randolph, Wash-
ington's attorney general who had previously represented 
the plaintiff in Vanstophorst v. Maryland, supra, repre-
sented the Chisholm plaintiff and argued strongly that a 
state must be amenable to suit in federal court as a result of 
the plain words of Article III, 2 Dall., at 421, the necessity 
for enforcing the constitutional prohibitions on the states, id., 
at 422, and the implicit consent to suit that occurred on rati-
fication of the Constitution, id., at 423. Justice James Wil-
son, another of the drafters of Article III, delivered a lengthy 
opinion in which he urged that sovereign immunity had no 
proper application within the new Republic. I d., at 453-466. 
Second, Chisholm was not a federal question case. Al-
though the case involved a contract, it was brought pursuant 
to the state-citizen diversity clause and not directly under the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. See 2 Dall., at 420 (ar-
gument of counsel). 33 The case thus squarely raised the issue 
Adoption and Interpretation, 2 Ga. L. Rev. 207,217-218 (1968) (plaintiff in 
Chislwlm was executor of estate of South Carolina citizen). The tradi-
tional account, in which the plaintiff was identified as acting on behalf of a 
British citizen, may explain why. the Eleventh Amendment modified the 
state-alien diversity clause as well as the state-citizen diversity clause. 
• Most likely, Chislwlm could not have been brought directly under the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Prior to Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 
87 (1810), it was not at all clear that the Contracts Clause applied to con-
tracts to which a state was a party. Moreover, the case involved a simple 
breach of contract, not a "law impairing the obligation of the contract" to 
which the Clause would have applied. See Shawnee Sewerage & Drainage 
Co. v. Stearns, 220 U. S. 462, 471 (1911); Brown v. Colorado, 106 U. S. 95, 
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whether a suit against a State based on a state-law cause of 
action that was not maintainable in state court could be 
brought in federal court pursuant to the state-citizen diver-
sity clause. The case did not present the question whether a 
state could be sued in federal court where the cause of action 
arose under federal law. 
Th4'd, even Justice Iredell's dissent did not go so far as to 
argue -that a state could never be sued in federal court. He 
sketched his argument as follows: 
"I have now, I think, established the following particu-
lars.-lst. That the constitution so far as it respects 
the judicial authority, can only be carried into effect by 
acts of the legislature appointing courts, and prescribing 
their methods of proceeding. 2d. That Congress has 
provided no new law in r~gard to this case, but expressly 
referred us to the old. 3d. That there are no principles 
of the old law, to which we must have recourse, that in 
any manner authorized the present suit, either by 
precedent or by analogy." Id., at 449. 
He thus accurately perceived that the question presented 
was whether Article III itself created a cause of action in fed-
eral court to displace state law where a state was being sued. 
Because he believed that it did not, and because he found no 
other source of law on which the state could be held liable in 
the case, he believed that the suit could not be maintained. 34 
98 (1882). Finally, it was certainly not clear at the time of Chisholm that 
the Contracts Clause provided a plaintiff with a private right of action for 
damages. Chisholm was thus a suit on a state-law cause of action in as-
sumpsit against the State of Georgia pursuant to the state-citizen diversity 
clause. 
"Justice Iredell added, in what he conceded to be dicta: "So much how-
ever, has been said on the constitution, that it may not be improper to inti-
mate that my present opinion is strongly against any construction of it, 
which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a 
state for the recovery of money." Chisholm, 2 Dall., at 449. He empha-
sized, however, that he need not decide this broader question: "This opin-
ion !hold, however, with all the reserve proper for one, which, according to 
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The decision in Chisholm was handed down on February 
18, 1793. On February 19, a resolution was introduced in 
the House of Representatives stating: 
''that no State shall be liable to be .made a party defend-
ant in any of the Judicial Courts established or to be es-
tablished under the authority of the United States, at 
tlie suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, 
or of any body politic or corporate whether within or 
without the United States." 1 C. Warren, The Supreme 
Court in United States History 101 (1922). 36 
Another resolution was introduced in the Senate on February 
20. That resolution provided: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not ex-
tend to any suits, in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by citizens of an-
other State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
State." 3 Annals of Cong. 651-652 (1793). 
Congress then recessed on March 4, 1793 without taking any 
action on the proposed Amendment. 
By the time Congress reconvened in December, 1793, a 
suit had been brought against Massachusetts in the Supreme 
Court by a British Loyalist whose properties had been confis-
cated. Vassal v. Massachusetts. 'Jil Georgia had responded 
angrily to. the decision in Chisholm, and the Massachusetts 
legislature reacted to the suit against it by enacting a resolu-
tion calling for "the most speedy and effectual measures" to 
obtain a constitutional amendment, including a constitutional 
convention. Resolves of Massachusetts, at 28 (1793) 
my sentiments in this case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judi-
cial." ld., at 450. 
•The resolution was not reported in the Annals of Congress, but was 
reported in contemporary newspaper accounts. See Gibbons, at 1926, 
n. 186. 
• The case is unreported, but is discussed in 1 J. Goebel, History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, at 734-735 (1971) . 
. . 
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(No. 45). .Virginia followed with a similar resolution. 1793 
Va. Acts 52. The issue had thus come to a head, and the 
Federalists who controlled Congress no doubt felt consider-
able pressure to act to avoid an open-ended constitutional 
convention. 37 
On January 2, 1794, a resolution was introduced by a Sena-
tor whose identity is not now known with the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment as it was ultimately enacted: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend. to any suit in law or equity com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign state." 4 Annals of Cong. 25 (1794) (empha-
sis added). 
This differed from the originai February 20 resolution only in 
the addition of the three italicized words. Senator Gallatin 
moved to amend the .resolution to add the words "except in 
cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the 
United States" after "The Judicial power of the United 
States." I d., at 30. After rejecting Gallatin's proposal, the 
Senate then rejected an amendment offered by an unknown 
Senator that would have forbidden suits against states only 
''where the cause of action shall have arisen before the rati-
fication of this amendment." Ibid. 38 The Senate ultimately 
voted 23-2 in favor of the Amendment. Ibid. 
In the House of Representatives, there was only one at-
tempt to amend the resolution. The amendment would have 
n For a more detailed explanation of the political situation facing the 
Washington Administration and the Congress at the time, see Gibbons, at 
1927-1932. 
• The amendment read in full: 
"The Judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and 
equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or 
by citizens of subjects of a foreign State, where the cause of action shall 
have arisen before the ratification of this amendment." 
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added to the Senate version the following language: "[ w ]here 
such State shall have previously made provision in their own 
Courts, whereby such suit may be prosecuted to effect." 4 
Annals of Cong. 476 (1794). This resolution, of course, 
would have ratified the Chisholm result that States could be 
sued l.Plder the state-citizen diversity clause, but would have 
given -the States an opportunity to shift the litigation into 
their own courts. It was rejected, 77-8, and the House pro-
ceeded to ratify the Amendment by a vote of 81-9 on March 
4, 1794. 4 Annals of Cong. 476-478 (1794). Although the 
chronology of ratification is somewhat unclear, 39 President 
Adams certified that it had been ratified four years later on 
January 8, 1798. 
Those who have argued that the Eleventh Amendment was 
intended to constitutionalize a. broad prmciple of state sover-
eign immunity have always elided the question of why Con-
gress would have chosen the language of the Amendment as 
enacted to state such a broad principle. As shown above, 
there was-to say the least-no consensus at the time of the 
Constitution's ratification as to whether the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity would have any application in federal 
court. Even if there had been such a consensus, however, 
the Eleventh Amendment would represent a particularly 
cryptic way to embody that consensus in the Constitution. 
Had Congress desired to enshrine state sovereign immunity 
in federal courts for all cases, for instance, it could easily 
have adopted the first resolution introduced on February 19, 
1793 in the House. Alternatively, a strong sovereign immu-
nity principle could have been derived from an Amendment 
that merely omitted the last fourteen words of the enacted 
resolution. See Gibbons, at 1927. However, it does not 
take a particularly close reading of the Eleventh Amendment 
to see that it stops far short of that. Article III had pro-
vided "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies 
•see Jacobs, at 67, nn. 95-99. 
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. . . between a State and Citizens of another State" and "be-
tween a State .. . and foreign ... Citizens or Subjects." 
The Eleventh Amendment used the identical language in 
stating the the judicial power did not extend to "any suit in_ 
law or equity . . . against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any For-
eign State." The congruence of language suggests that the 
Amendment was intended simply to adopt the narrow view of 
the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses; henceforth, 
a state could not be sued in federal court where the basis of 
jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a citizen of another 
state or an alien. 40 
40 It might be argued that, because Congress rejected Senator Gallatin's 
proposal, which would have exempted treaty-based causes of action from 
the operation of the Amendment, Congress intended to leave intact no part 
of the federal question jurisdiction that would potentially have left the 
states open to suit. This argument, however, is untenable. First, it ig-
nores the language of the Amendment. If Congress were generally con-
cerned with suits against states under all Article III heads of jurisdiction, 
it would have had no rational reason to direct the Eleventh Amendment 
only against suits by noncitizens or foreigners. Second, Congress may 
well have rejected Gallatin's proposal precisely because to adopt that pro-
posal would have have implied some limitation on the ability of the federal 
courts to hear non-treaty based federal question claims. Thus, Congress' 
rejection of the proposal may well have been based on its desire to pre-
serve the full contours of Article III federal question jurisdiction, rather 
than on a desire to limit it. Third, the federal courts had no general origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction under the First Judiciary Act, although 
the Supreme Court did have substantial appellate federal question jurisdic-
tion over cases originating in state courts. In refusing in the First Judi-
ciary Act to grant original federal question jurisdiction to the federal 
courts, Congress had evidently decided that federal question cases, even 
those arising out of the Treaty of Paris, should be heard in the first in-
stance in state court. In deciding to enact the Eleventh Amendment to 
overrule Chisholm, Congress had decided that the state-citizen and state-
alien clauses ought not permit suits against states in federal court. Given 
these two decisions, Congress had little reason to make an exception to 
both decisions for suits that arose out of the Treaty. Finally, the case of 
Vassal v. Massachusetts , in which a British Loyalist had brought a chal-
lenge under the state-alien clause to the State's confiscation of his prop-
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It may be argued that the true intentions of the Second 
Congress were revealed by its use of the words "shall not be 
construed" in the text of the Amendment. According to this 
argument, Congress intended not merely to qualify the state-
citizen and state-alien diversity clauses, but also to establish 
a rule .of construction barring exercise of the federal jurisdic-
tion in any case-even one otherwise maintainable under the 
subject-matter heads of jurisdiction-in which a noncitizen or 
alien were suing a State. This view at least is consistent 
with the language of the Amendment, and would lead to the 
conclusion that suits by noncitizens or aliens against a state 
are never permitted, while suits by a citizen are permissi-
ble.41 Recent scholarship, however, suggests strongly that 
this view is incorrect. In particular, two other explanations 
for the use of these terms have been advanced. Some have 
argued that the words wer.e a natural means for Congress to 
rebuke the Supreme Court for its construction of the words 
"between a State and citizens of another State" in Chisholm; 
no longer should those words be construed to extend federal 
jurisdiction to suits brought under that clause in which the 
state was defendant. See, e. g., Fletcher, at 1061-1062. 
Others have argued that the words were added to assure the 
retrospective application of the Eleventh Amendment. See, 
e. g., Jacobs, at 68-69. Of course, if the latter meaning were 
intended, the words had their intended effect, for the Court 
dismissed cases pending on its docket under the state-citizen 
erty, had triggered a movement for a constitutional convention. See 
supra, at - . By rejecting the Gallatin proposal, which would have au-
thorized the Vassal suit, Congress no doubt acted in part to squelch the 
movement for an open-ended constitutional convention. 
41 When the Court is prepared to embark on a defensible interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment consistent with its history and purposes, the 
question whether the Amendment bars federal-question or admiralty suits 
by a noncitizen or alien against a State would be open. At the current 
time, as the text states, the commentators' arguments against this inter-
pretation seem to me quite plausible. 
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diversity clause when the Amendment was ratified. E. g., 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). 42 
The language of the Eleventh Amendment, its legislative 
history, and the attendant historical circumstances all 
strongly suggest that the Amendment was intended to rem-
edy an interpretation of the Constitution that would have had 
the st~te-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses of Article 
III abrogating the state law of sovereign immunity on state-
law causes of action brought in federal courts. The economy 
of this explanation, which accounts for the rather legalistic 
tenns in which the Amendment and Article III were written, 
does not require extravagant assumptions about the unex-
pressed intent of Congress and the state legislatures, and is 
itself a strong point in its favor. The original Constitution 
did not embody a principle of sovereign immunity as a limit 
on the federal judicial power:· There is simply no reason to 
believe that the Eleventh Amendment established such a 
broad principle for the first time. 
The historical record in fact confirms that, far from cor-
recting the error made in Chisholm, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment makes a similar mistake. 
The Chisholm Court had interpreted the state-citizen clause 
of Article III to work a major substantive change in state 
law, or at least in those cases arising under state law that 
found their way to federal court. The Eleventh Amendment 
corrected that error, and henceforth required that the party-
based heads of jurisdiction in Article III be construed not to 
work this kind of drastic modification of state law. The· 
Court's current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment 
makes the opposite mistake, construing the Eleventh 
Amendment to work a major substantive change in federal 
law. According to the Court, the Eleventh Amendment im-
poses a substantive limit on the Necessary and Proper Clause 
41 In any event, I find it much more plausible to leave the construction of 
these words somewhat unclear, than to leave the construction of much of 
the Amendment a superfluity, as the Court's construction would do . 
. . 
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of Article I, limiting the remedies that Congress may author-
ize for State violations of federal law. This construction suf-
fers from the same defect as that of Chisholm: both construe 
the enumeration of heads of jurisdiction to impose substan-
tive limits on lawmaking authority. 
Article III grants a federal question jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts that is as broad as is the lawmaking authority of 
Congress. If Congress acting within its Article I or other 
powers creates a legal right and remedy, and if neither the 
right nor the remedy violate any provision of the Constitu-
tion outside Article III, then Congress may entrust adjudica-
tion of claims based on the newly created right to the federal 
courts-even if the defendant is a State. Neither Article III 
nor the Eleventh Amendment impose an independent limit on 
the lawmaking authority of ·.Congresss. This view makes 
sense of the language, history, and purposes of Article III 
and of the Eleventh Amendment. It is also the view that 
was adopted in the earliest interpretations of the Amend-
ment by the Marshall Court. 
c 
After the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, the 
number of suits against States in the federal courts was 
largely curtailed. The Amendment itself had eliminated the 
constitutional basis for the provisions of the First Judiciary 
Act granting the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over 
suits against States by an alien or noncitizen. Because there 
was no general statutory grant of original federal question ju-
risdiction to the federal courts, 48 suits against states would 
not arise under that head of jurisdiction. 44 • Nonetheless, the 
Marshall Court did have a number of opportunities to con-
"The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89, did grant general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to the federal circuit courts, but that grant was repealed 
one year later. 2 Stat. 132, 156 (1802). 
"Nor coule a suit against a state be brought under diversity jurisdic-
tion, because a state is not a citizen of itself for such purposes. See Festal 
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482 (1894) . 
. . 
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front the issue of state sovereign immunity. The Court's de-
cisions reflect a consistent understanding of the limited effect 
of the Amendment on the structure of federal jurisdiction 
outside the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses. 
Because the Justices on the Marshall Court lived through the 
ratification of the Constitution, the decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia, and the subsequent enactment of the Eleventh 
Amenament, the Marshall Court's views on the meaning of 
the Amendment should take on particular importance. 
(1) 
Admiralty was perhaps the most significant head of federal 
jurisdiction in the early nineteenth century. As Hamilton 
noted in a much-quoted pasage from the Federalist Papers: 
"The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus 
far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cog-
nizance of maritime causes." The Federalist No. 80, at 478 
(Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Although few admiralty 
cases could be expected to arise in which the states were de-
fendants, the Marshall Court in the few instances in which it 
confronted the issue showed a strong reluctance to construe 
the Eleventh Amendment to interfere with the admiralty ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. 
In United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (1809), the Court 
adjudicated a controversy over whether certain funds, pro-
ceeds of an admiralty prize sale dating from the 1770's, be-
longed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or to a private 
claimant. ld., at 136-139. The Commonwealth claimed the 
money as the result of a state court judgment in its favor, 
while the private claimant's claim was based on a judgment 
received from a national prize court established under the 
Articles of Confederation. The money claimed by the Com-
monwealth had been held by the state treasurer, who had 
since died. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, 
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not interfere with the 
traditional common law suit against a state official for recov-
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ery of funds held with notice of an adverse claim. According 
to Marshall, the suit could be maintained against the state of-
ficial, even though the relief sought was a recovery of funds. 
Marshall carefully avoided deciding whether the Eleventh 
Amendment would have barred the action if it had been nec-
essary to bring it against the State itself: "If these proceeds 
had been the actual property of Pennsylvania, however 
wrongfully acquired, the disclosure of that fact would have 
presented a case on which it is unnecessary to give an opin-
ion." !d., at 139. Nonetheless, Marshall's construction of 
the Eleventh Amendment by preserving the essential rem-
edy of a money judgment that, in effect, ran against the 
state, left federal admiralty jurisdiction intact. 
Later that same year, Justice Bushrod Washington, who 
had sat on the Peters Court;_ heard a sequel to Peters that 
arose when the state resisted the execution of the Peters 
judgment. United States v. Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (1809) 
(No. 14,647). After agreeing with the Peters Court that the 
state treasurer could be sued for the funds in his private ca-
pacity, he went on to note that the Eleventh Amendment in 
terms applies only to suits "in law or equity." Because the 
Framers of the Amendment did not add the words "or to 
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," id., at 1236, 
the Amendment should not be construed to extend to admi-
ralty cases. 46 Washington thus did not read the Amendment 
to require a broad constitutional prohibition of suits against 
States in federal court. Moreover, given the importance of 
admiralty jurisdiction at the time, Congress' failure to in-
"Justice Washington explained the exclusion of admiralty jurisdiction in 
part on the ground that admiralty proceedings are often in rem and that a 
judgment could thus be enforced without implicating the "delicate" ques-
tion of how to execute a judgment against a State. United States v. 
Bright, 24 Fed. Cas., at 1236. Although this concern echoed some of the 
difficulties raised in the debate over ratification of the Constitution, the dif-
ficulty of executing a judgment against a state was ultimately rejected by 
the Courtas a ground to expand state sovereign immunity in federal court. 
See infra, at - . 
. . 
84-351-DISSENT 
46 ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
elude admiralty suits in the express terms of the statute was 
unlikely to have been an oversight. 
The Marshall Court again refused to hold that the Elev-
enth Amendment barred suits hi admiralty against States in 
Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828). On ap-
peal from a federal circuit court decision, a clamant alleged 
that he, and not the State of Georgia, was entitled to the pro-
ceeds of a prize sale. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the 
Court, held that the suit was in reality a suit against the 
State. Although the governor was named as defendant, 
there was no allegation that he had violated any federal or 
state law, and thus "no case is made which justifies a decree 
against him personally." Id., at 124. The Court then dis-
missed the case because the circuit court had no jurisdiction 
over it: ''if the 11th amendmept to the Constitution, does not 
extend to proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." I d., at 124.46 
Writing in 1833, Justice Joseph Story noted: 
"It has been doubted, whether this amendment extends 
to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where 
the proceeding is in rem and not in personam. There, 
the jUrisdiction of the court is founded upon the posses-
sion of the thing; and if the state should interpose a claim 
for the property, it does not act merely in the character 
of a defendant, but as an actor. Besides the language of 
the amendment is, that 'the judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity.' But a suit in the admiralty is not, correctly 
speaking, a suit in law, or in equity; but is often spoken 
.. In 1833, the Court dismissed an original action brought by Madrazo 
based on the same claim. Ex Parte Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627 (1833). The 
Court's one-paragraph opinion apparently dismissed the case on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds because it ''was a mere personal suit against a state, 
to recover proceeds in its possession." Id., at 632. This was the only 
case dismissed by the Supreme Court on Eleventh Amendment grounds 
between Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798) and the Civil War. 
·. 
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of in contradistinction to both." 3 J. Story, Commentar-
ies on the Constitution of the United States, at 560-561 
(1833). 47 
As Justice Story pointed out, the result of the early admi-
ralty cases was that the Eleventh Amendment was not seen 
as an obstacle to the exercise of otherwise legitimate federal 
admir:ilty jurisdiction. 
(2) 
Until1875, Congress did not endow the federal courts with 
general federal question jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court had several opportunities to decide federal 
question cases against States. In some of these, suit was 
brought against a State in state court and an appeal was 
taken to the Supreme Court.. If the Eleventh Amendment 
had constitutionalized state sovereign immunity as a limit to 
the Article III federal judicial power, it would have operated 
as a limit on both original ·and appellate federal question ju-
risdiction, for nothing in the text or subsequent interpreta-
tions of Article III suggests that the federal judicial power 
extends more broadly to hear appeals than to decide original 
cases. 48 . Although the Court has largely ignored this conse-
quence of its constitutional sovereign immunity doctrine/9 it 
was a consequence that the Marshall Court squarely faced. 
41 Justice Story cited Peters, Bright, and Madrazo in support of his . 
statement. 
"See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952) (Article III 
limits on federal jurisdiction apply to appeal of case from New Jersey state 
courts). 
"Cf. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 445 (1900) (state may consent to 
suit in its own courts "subject hlways to the condition, arising out of the 
supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in 
pursuance thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of the State 
in any action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or re-
examined, as prescribed by the act of Congress, if it denies to the plaintiff 
any right, title, privilege or immunity' secured to him and specially claimed 
under the Constitution or laws· of the United States"). 
·. 
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In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), Chief Justice 
Marshall addressed the question of the effect of the Eleventh 
Amendment on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to 
review a criminal conviction obtained in a Virginia state 
court. Counsel for the State argued that either the original 
Constitution or the Eleventh Amendment denied the federal 
courts the power to hear such an appeal, in which a State was 
being ·z'sued" for a writ of error in the Supreme Court. Mar-
shall noted at the outset of his opiruon for the Court that Ar-
ticle III provides federal jurisdiction "to all the cases de-
scribed, without making in its terms any exception whatever, 
and without any exception whatever, and without any regard 
to the condition of the party." I d., at 378. After repeating 
this principle several times, 50 the Chief Justice stated: ''We 
think, then, that, as the constitution originally stood, the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of this Court, in all cases arising under the 
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, was not 
arrested by the circumstance that a State was a party." !d., 
at 405. 
10 The repetitions of this principle make the point unmistakably. He 
states that the judicial department "is authorized to decide all cases of 
every description, arising under the constitution or laws of the United 
States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of 
those cases in which a State may be a party." !d., at 382. ''We think a 
case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cogni-
zable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." 
!d., at 383. "[W]e think that the judicial power, as originally given, ex-
tends to all cases arising under the constitution or a law of the United 
States, whoever may be the parties." I d., at 392. It is worth noting that 
the Court has often given a broad reading to Marshall's statements in the 
Virginia ratification convention, interpreting those statements to express 
Marshall's view that a constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity 
in federal courts was an element of the original understanding of Article 
III. See, e. g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890); Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U. S., at 324. The Chief Justice's discussion in Cohens, how-
ever, demonstrates that it may be prudent to give his earlier statements 
the less expansive interpretation suggested supra, at - . 
.. 
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Marshall then went on to consider the applicability of the 
Eleventh Amendment. Mter holding that a criminal de-
fendant's petition for a writ of error is not properly under-
stood to be a suit "commenced" or "prosecuted" by an individ-
ual against a state, Marshall stated an alternative holding: 
"~ut should we in this be mistaken, the error does not 
affect the case now before the Court. If this writ of 
error be a suit in the sense of the 11th amendment, it is 
not a suit commenced or prosecuted 'by a citizen of an-
other State, or by a citizen, or subject of any foreign 
State.' It is not then within the amendment, but is gov-
erned entirely by the constitution as originally framed, 
and we have already seen, that in its or·igin, the judicial 
power was extended to all cases arising under the con-
stitution or laws of the United States, without respect to 
parties." I d., at 412. 51 
Thus, the Marshall Court in Cohens squarely confronted the 
issue of the extent to which the Eleventh Amendment en-
croached on federal question jurisdiction, and concluded that 
it made no encroachment at all. This result is not distin-
guishable on the ground that it concerned only the exercise of 
51 Marshall's statement is of course consistent with the view that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars federal question jurisdiction over suits that are 
prosecuted against states by noncitizens or aliens, but does not bar federal 
jurisdiction over suits by citizens of the state being sued. But it is flatly 
inconsistent with the Court's current position that the Amendment, de-
spite its language and history, should be interpreted as constitutionalizing 
a broad sovereign immunity principle. Like the discussion earlier in Co-
hens, it evinces the Marshall Court's understanding that the Eleventh 
Amendment was to be construed narrowly to accomplish the purpose for 
which it was adopted. It is worth noting that, when the troublesome case 
hypothesized in c ohens-in which a writ of error was taken by a noncitizen 
of a state-arose ten years later, the Marshall Court reached the merits of 
the claim without even discussing any possible Eleventh Amendment bar. 
See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832). Although the Court in 
Worcester did not discuss the Eleventh Amendment issue, the issue was 
raised by the appellant. See id., at 533-534 . 
. . 
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appellate, and not original, federal question jurisdiction. As 
was made clear three years later in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824): 
"In tho.se cases in which original jurisdiction is given to 
the Supreme Court, the judicial power of the United 
$tates cannot be exercised in its appellate form. In 
every other case, the power is to be exercised in its origi-
nal or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of Congress 
may direct. With the exception of these cases, in which 
original jurisdiction is given to this Court, there is none 
to which the judicial power extends, from which the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the inferior Courts is excluded by the 
constitution. Original jurisdiction, so far as the con-
stitution gives a rule, is co-extensive with the judicial 
power. We find, in the. constitution, no prohibition to 
its exercise, in every case in which the judicial power can 
be exercised." I d., at 821. 
The Court continued, speaking of federal question jurisdic-
tion: "It would be a very bold construction to say, that [the 
judicial] power could be applied in its appellate form only, to 
the most important class of cases to which it is applicable." 
Ibid. 
Osborn itself involved several important Eleventh Amend-
ment issues. The State of Ohio had seized bank notes and 
specie of the Bank of the United States pursuant to a statute 
imposing a tax on the Bank. The statute was evidently un-
constitutional under the Court's holding in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). The Bank, which was 
treated as a private corporation and not a division of the fed-
eral government for purposes of the suit, obtained an injunc-
tion in federal court prohibiting the state from enforcing the 
tax and requiring the return of the seized funds. The State 
of Ohio appealed to the Supreme Court, relying in part on the 
Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the proceedings. 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court carefully ex-
plains that the sovereign immunity principles of the Eleventh 
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Amendment have no application where the state is not a 
party of record: 
"It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of 
no exception, that, in all cases where jurisdiction de-
pends on the party, it is the party named in the record. 
Consequently, the 11th amendment, which restrains the 
jtirisdiction granted by the Constitution over suits 
against States, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in 
which a State is a party on the record." 9 Wheat., at 
857. 
Technically, this principle does not address the question 
whether a suit may be brought against a state, but rather the 
question whether a suit is indeed to be understood as a suit 
against a State.~ Nonethele~s, it represents a narrow, tech-
nical construction of the Eleventh Amendment, and is thus of 
a piece with the immediately following language: 
"The amendment has its full effect, if the constitution be 
construed as it would have been construed, had the juris-
diction of the Court never been extended to suits 
brought against a State, by the citizens of another State 
or by aliens." /d., at 857-858. 
The restatement of the principle of Cohens demonstrates 
Marshall's understanding that neither Article III nor the 
Eleventh Amendment limits the ability of the federal courts 
to hear the full range of cases· arising under federal law. 
The lack of original federal question jurisdiction, combined 
with the paucity of admiralty actions against the states, de-
privedthe Marshall Court of the opportunity to rule often on 
the affect of the Eleventh Amendment on state sovereign im-
51 This conclusion is in some tension with the Court's holding in Governor 
of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828). See supra, at-. It has 
been suggested that the distinction between the cases is that there was no 
cause of action available under federal or admiralty law against the Gover-
nor personally in Madrazo, while the contrary was the case here. See 
Fletcher, at 1086-1087; Jacobs, at-. 
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munity in federal court. Moreover, the Court's rulings dem-
onstrate a certain reluctance squarely to decide the extent to 
which the states were suable in federal court. This was per-
haps a result of the Court's. sensitivity to the unpopular deci-
sion in Chisholm v. Georgia, the lack of effective govern-
mental power to enforce its decisions, and the centripetal 
forces~that were driving the nation toward civil war. None-
theless, a careful reading of the Marshall Court's precedents 
indicates that the Marshall Court consistently adopted nar-
row and technical readings of the Amendment's import and 
thus carefully retained the full measure of federal question 
and admiralty jursdiction. 
IV 
The Marshall Court's precedents, and the original under-
standing of the Eleventh Amendment, survived until near 
the end of the nineteenth century. In 1875, Congress gave 
the federal courts general original federal question jurisdic-
tion. 18 Stat. 470. For the first time, suits could now be 
brought against states in federal court based on the existence 
of a federal cause of action. In Hans v. Lousiana, 134 U. S. 
1 (1890), a citizen of Louisiana sued his state for payment on 
some bonds that the state government had repudiated. The 
plaintiff claimed a violation of the Contracts Clause. The 
Court held in favor of the State and ordered the suit 
dismissed. 
Hans has been taken to stand for the proposition that the 
Eleventh Amendment, despite its terms, bars the federal 
courts from hearing federal question suits by citizens against 
their own State. 53 As I have argued before, the Court's 
ambiguous opinion need not be interpreted in this way. See 
Employees v. Dep't of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U. S. 
279, 313-315 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The Hans 
111 For example, the Court today states that in Hans, "the Court held 
that the [Eleventh] Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit 
against his own State in federal court, even though the expres terms of the 
Amendment do not so provide." Ante, at 3 . 
. . 
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Court relied on Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, which 
as noted above, supra·, at --, rested on the absence of a 
statutory cause of action for Mr. Chisholm against the State 
of Georgia and reserved the qu~stion of the constitutional 
status of state sovereign immunity. See Hans, 134 U. S., at 
18-19. The Court further noted the "presumption that no 
anomalous and unheard-of proceedings or suits were in-
tended to be raised up by this Constitution-anomalous and 
unheard of when the Constitution was adopted." I d., at 18. 
The opinion can thus sensibly be read to have dismissed the 
suit before it on the ground that no federal cause of action 
supported the plaintiff's suit and that state-law causes of ac-
tion would of course be subject to the ancient common-law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Whether the Court's departure from a sound interpreta-. 
tion of the Eleventh Amendment occurred in Hans or only in 
later cases that misread Hans, however, is relatively un-
important. If Hans is a constitutional holding, it rests by its 
own terms on two premises. 
First, the opinion cites the comments by Madison, Mar-
shall, and Hamilton in the ratification debates. I d., at 
12-14. 'Ple Court concludes that permitting suits against 
states would be "startling and unexpected," id., at 11, and 
would "strain the Constitution and the law to a construction 
never imagined or dreamed of." I d., at 15. The historical 
record outlined above demonstrates that the Court's history 
was plainly mistaken. Numerous individuals at the time of 
the Constitution's ratification believed that it would have ex-
actly the effect the Hans Court found unimaginable. More-
over, even the comments of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton 
need not be taken to advocate a constitutional doctrine of 
state sovereign immunity. Read literally and in context, all 
three were explicitly addressed to the particular problem of 
the state-citizen diversity clause. All three were vitally con-
cerned with the constitutionally unauthorized displacement 
of the state law of creditors' rights and remedies that would 
.. 
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be worked by an incorrect reading of the state-citizen diver-
sity clause. All three are fully consistent with a recognition 
that Constitution neither abrogated nor instituted state sov-
ereign immunity, but rather left the ancient doctrine as it 
found it: a state-law defense available instate-law causes of . 
action prosecuted in federal court. 
Second, the opinion relies heavily on the supposedly 
"anomaious" result that, if the Eleventh Amendment were 
read literally: 
''in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts 
by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like 
cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a for-
eign state." Id., at 10. 
Even if such an "anomaly'' eXisted, it would not justify judi-
. cial rewriting of the Eleventh Amendment and Article III 
and the wholesale disregard of precedents. But in any event 
a close look at the historical record reveals that the "anom-
aly'' can easily be avoided without a general expansion of a 
constitutionalized sovereign immunity doctrine. The Elev-
enth Amendment can and should be interpreted in accord-
ance with its original purpose to re-establish the ancient ~oc­
trine of sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action 
based on the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses; in 
such a state-law action, the identity of the parties is not alone 
sufficient to permit federal jurisdiction. If federal jurisdic-
tion is based on the existence of a federal question or some 
other clause of Article III, however, the Eleventh Amend-
ment has no relevance. There is thus no Article III limita-
tion on otherwise proper suits against states by citizens, non-
citizens, or aliens, and no "anomaly'' that requires such 
drastic "correction." 
The Court has repeatedly relied on Hans as establishing a 
broad principle of state immunity from suit in federal court. 54 
Min E:c Parte New York, No.1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), the Court even 
extended Hans (or its view of Hans) to admiralty jurisdiction, thus over-
.. 
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The historical record demonstrates that, if Hans was a con-
stitutional holding, it rested on misconceived history and mis-
guided logic. 56 
The doctrine that has thus been cr·eated is pernicious. In 
an era when sovereign immunity has been generally recog-
nized by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and un-
necessary remnant of a feudal legal system, see, e. g., Great 
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 57 (1944) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Muskopf v. Corning Hospital 
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. Rpts. 89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961); 
W. Prosser, Handbood of The Law of Torts, at 984-987 (4th 
ed. 1971), the Court has aggressively expanded its scope. If 
this doctrine were required to enhance the liberty of our peo-
ple in accordance with the Constitution's protections, I could 
accept it. If the doctrinewe.re required by the structure of 
the federal system created by the Framers, I could accept it. 
Yet the current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty 
under law by protecting the States from the consequences of 
their illegal conduct. And the decision obstructs the sound 
operation of our federal system by limiting the ability of Con-
gress to take steps it deems necessary and proper to achieve 
national goals within its constitutional authority. 
I respectfully dissent. 
'ruling Justice Washington's 110-year-old holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not apply to admiralty actions. See United States v. 
Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (1809) (No. 14,647), discussed supra, at-. 
51 If Hans was not a constitutional holding, however, its use of the Madi-
son, Marshall, and Hamilton comments would be substantially more justifi-
able; the relevance of this material was simply to show that the common 
law did not recognize a cause of action on a debt against a sovereign. 
Since Congress had not created any such action, the Court justifiably re-
fused to do so itself . 
.. 
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I JUSTICE BRENNAN, ·with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. 
If the Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine were 
grounded on principles essential to the structure of our fed-
eral system or necessary to protect the cherished constitu-
tional liberties of our people, the doctrine might be unobjec-
tionable; the interpretation of the text of the Constitution in 
light of changed circumstances and unforeseen events-and 
with full regard for the purposes underlying the text-has al-
ways been the unique role of this Court. But the Court's 
Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text and his-
tory virtually without regard to underlying purposes or genu-
inely fundamental interests. In consequence, the Court has 
put the federal judiciary in the unseemly position of exempt-
ing the States from compliance with laws that bind every 
other legal actor in our nation. Because I believe that the 
doctrine rests on flawed premises, misguided history, and an 
untenable vision of the needs of the federal system it pur-
ports to protect, I believe that the Court should take advan-
tage of the opportunity provided by this case to re-examine 
the doctrine's historical and jurisprudential foundations. 
Such an inquiry would reveal that the Court, in Professor 
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Shapiro's words, has taken a wrong turn. 1 Because the 
Court today follows this mistaken path, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
I first address the Court's holding that Congress did not 
succeed in abrogating the States' sovereign immunity when it 
enacted § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U. S. C. § 794. If 
this holding resulted from the Court's examination of the 
statute and its legislative history to determine whether Con-
gress intended in § 504 to impose an obligation on the states 
enforceable in federal court, I would confine my dissent to 
the indisputable evidence to the contrary in the language and 
history of § 504. 
Section 504 imposes an obligation not to discriminate 
against the handicapped in "any program or activity receiv-
ing Federal financial assistance." This language is general 
and unqualified, and contains no indication whatsoever that 
an exemption for the States was intended. Moreover, state 
governmental programs and activities are undoubtedly the 
recipients of a large percentage of federal funds. 2 Given this 
widespread state dependence on federal funds, it is quite in-
credible to assume that Congress did not intend that the 
states should be fully subject to the strictures of§ 504. 
The legislative history confirms that the States were 
among the primary targets of § 504. In introducing the 
predecessor of § 504 as an amendment to Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. §2000d, Rep. Vanik clearly 
indicated that governments would be among the primary tar-
gets of the legislation: "Our Governments tax [handicapped] 
'See Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Penn-
hurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 (1984). 
r For instance, in 1972-1973, the year in which Congress was consider-
ing § 504, state governments received over $31 billion in revenue from the 
federal government. By 1981-1982, this had grown to $66 billion. Bu-
reau of the Census, Historical Statistics on Governmental Finances and 
Employment, at 34 (1982). 
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people, their parents and relatives, but fail to provide serv-
ices for them .... The opportunities provided by the Govern-
ment almost always exclude the handicapped." 117 Cong. 
Rec. 45,974 (1971). He further referred approvingly to a 
federal court suit against the State of Pennsylvania raising 
the issue of educational opportunities for the handicapped. 
See 117 Cong. Rec. 45,974-45,975 (citing Pennsylvania 
Assoc. for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 
279 (ED Pa 1972), and characterizing it as a "suit against the 
State"). Two months later, Rep. Vanik noted the range of 
state actions that could disadvantage the handicapped. He 
said that state governments "lack funds and facilities" for 
medical care for handicapped children and "favor the higher 
income families" in tuition funding. 118 Cong. Rec. 4341 
(1972). He pointed out that "the States are unable to de-
fine and deal with" the illnesses of the handicapped child, and 
that "(e]xclusion of handicapped children [from public 
schools] is illegal in some States, but the States plead lack of 
funds." ld. Similarly, Senator Humphrey, the bill's spon-
sor in the Senate, focused particularly on a suit against a 
state-operated insitution for the mentally retarded as demon-
strating the need for the bill. See 118 Cong. Rec. 9495, 9501 
(1972). 
The language used in the statute ("any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance") long been used to im-
pose obligations on the States under other statutory 
schemes. For example, Title VI, enacted in 1964, bans dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color or national origin by 
"any program or activity receiving Federal financial assist-
ance." 42 U. S. C. §2000d. Soon after its enactment, 
seven agencies promulgated regulations that defined a recipi-
ent of federal financial assistance to include "any State, politi-
cal subdivision of any State or instrumentality of any State or 
political subdivision." See, e. g., 29 Fed. Reg. 16274, 
§ 15.2(e) (1964). See generally Guardians Assn. v. Civil 
Service Comm'n, 463 U. S. 582, 618 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., 
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dissenting). Over forty federal agencies and every Cabinet 
department adopted similar regulations. I d., at 619. As 
Senator Javits remarked in the debate on Title VI, "[w)e are 
primarily trying to reach units of government, not individ-
uals." 110 Cong. Rec. 13700 (1964). 
Similarly Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 
20 U. S. C. § 1681(a), prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex by "any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." The regulations governing Title IX 
use the same definition of "recipient"-which explicitly in-
cludes the States-as do the Title VI regulations. See 34 
CFR § 106.2(h). The Congress that enacted § 504 had the 
examples of Titles VI and IX before it, and plainly knew that 
that the language of the statute would include. the States. 3 
Implementing regulations promulgated for § 504 included 
the same definition of "recipient" that had previously been 
used to implement Title VI and Title IX. See 45 CFR 
§ 84.3(f). In 1977, Congress held hearings on the implemen-
tation of § 504, and subsequently produced amendments to 
the statute enacted in 1978. Pub. L. 95-602, § 505(a)(2), 29 
U. S. C. § 794a. The Senate Report accompanying the 
amendments explicitly approved the implementing regula-
tions. S. Rep. No. 85-890, at 19. No member of Congress 
questioned the reach of the regulations. In describing an-
other section of the 1978 amendments which brought the 
Federal Government within the reach of§ 504, Rep. Jeffords 
noted that the section "applies 504 to the Federal Govern-
ment as well as State and local recipients of Federal dollars." 
' The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1974, a year after its original 
enactment. Pub. L. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). The Senate Report 
that accompanied the amendment acknowledged that "Section 504 was pat-
terned after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of 
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ... and section 901 of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1974 [sic]." S. Rep. No. 93-1297, at 39-40. These 
amendments and their history "clarified the scope of§ 504" and "shed sig-
nificant light on the intent with which § 504 was enacted." Alexander v. 
Choate,- U. S. -, -, n. 27 (1985). 
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124 Cong. Rec. 13, 901 (1978). 4 Rep. Sarasin emphasized 
that "[n]o one should discriminate against an individual be-
cause he or she suffers from a handicap-not private employ-
ers, not State and local governments, and most certainly, not 
the Federal Government." 124 Cong. Rec. 38,552 (1978). 
The 1978 amendments also addressed the remedies for vi-
olations of § 504: 
"The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title 
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[, 42 U.S. C. §2000d 
et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any 
act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assist-
ance or Federal provider of such assistance under section 
794 of this title." 29 U. S. C. § 794a. 
Again, the amendment referred in general and unqualified 
terms to "any recipient of Federal assistance." An addi-
tional provision of the 1978 amendments made available at-
torney's fees to prevailing parties in actions brought to en-
force § 504. Discussing these two provisions, Senator 
Cranston presupposed that States would be subject to suit 
under this section: 
"[W)ith respect to State and local bodies or State and 
local officials, attorney's fees, similar to other items of 
cost, would be collected from the official, in his official 
capacity; from funds of his or her agency or under his or 
her control; or from the State or local government-re-
gardless of whether such agency or Government is a 
named party." 124 Cong. Rec. 30,346-30,347 (1978) 
Given the unequivocal legislative history, the Court's con-
clusion that Congress did not abrogate the States' sovereign 
immunity when it enacted § 504 obviously cannot rest on an 
analysis of what Congress intended to do or on what Con-
• Rep. Jeffords also noted that ''it did not seem right to me that the Fed-
eral G<lvernment should require States and localities to eliminate dis-
crimination wherever it exists and remain exempt themselves." 124 
Cong. Rec. 38,551 (1978). 
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gress thought it was doing. Congress intended to impose a 
legal obligation on the States not to discriminate against the 
handicapped. In addition, Congress fully intended that 
whatever remedies were available against other entities-in-
cluding the Federal Government itself after the 1978 amend-
ments-be equally available against the States. There is 
simply not a shred of evidence to the contrary. 
II 
Rather than an interpretation of the intent of Congress, 
the Court's decision rests on the Court's current doctrine of 
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, which holds that 
"the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the 
grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitution. 
Pennhurst, at --. Despite the presence of the most 
clearly lawless behavior by the State government, the 
Court's doctrine holds that the judicial authority of the 
United States does not extend to suits by an individual 
against a state in federal court. 
The Court acknowledges that the supposed lack of judicial 
power may be remedied, either by the state's consent, 5 or by 
' The "stringent ," see ante, at 5, test that the Court applies to pur-
ported State waivers of sovereign immunity is a mirror image of the test it 
applies to congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity. Just as 
the Court today decides that Congres>-, if it desires effectively to abrogate 
a state's sovereign immunity, must do so expressly in the statutory lan-
guage, so the Court similarly decides that a State's waiver, to be effective , 
must be "specifically applicable to federal court jurisdiction." Ante, at 6. 
In the Court's words, "Although a State's general waiver of sovereign im-
munity may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive the 
immunity guaranteed by the Elevent~ Amendment. " Ante, at--. Or-
dinarily, a federal court is expected faithfully to decide state-law questions 
before it as the courts of a state would. I would think that a federal court 
deciding the scope of a state waiver of sovereign immunity should attempt 
to construe the state law of sovereign immunity as a state court would, 
making use of relevant legislative history and legal precedents. Yet, de-
spite the absence of any identifiable federal interest that would justify a 
departure from state law, the Court eschews any effort to construe Califor-
nia's constitutional waiver requirement in accordance with California law. 
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express congressional abrogation pursuant the Civil War 
Amendments, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976); 
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156 (1980), or per-
haps pursuant to other congressional powers. But the Court 
has raised formidable obstacles to congressional efforts to ab-
rogate the States' immunity; the Court has put in place a se-
ries of special rules of statutory draftsmanship that Congress 
must obey before the Court will accord recognition to its act. 
Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 
(1973), held that Congress must make its intention "clear" if 
it sought to lift the States' sovereign immunity conditional on 
their participation in a federal program. Id., at 285. 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1973), made it still more 
difficult for Congress to act, stating that "we will find waiver 
only where stated by the most express language or by such 
overwhelming implications from the text as will leave no 
room for any other reasonable construction." I d., at 673. 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, --
V. S. -- (1984), required "an unequivocal expression of 
congressional intent." I d., at --. Finally, the Court 
today tightens the noose by requiring "that Congress must 
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in 
unmistakable language in the statute itself." Ante, at --
(emphasis added). 
These special rules of statutory drafting are not justified 
(nor are they justifiable) as efforts to determine the genuine 
intent of Congress; no reason has been advanced why ordi-
See, e. g., Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 11 Cal. 
Rpts. 89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961) (abrogating state sovereign immunity for all 
tort cases and holding it to be an "anachronism, without rational basis, and 
exist[ing] only by the force of inertia"). Instead, the Court seems to be-
lieve that the Eleventh Amendment justifies the Court in imposing on the 
state legislatures, as well as Congress, special rules of statutory drafts-
manship if they would make a waiver of state sovereign immunity in fed-
eral court successful. Apparently, even states that want to make a federal 
forum available for the fair adjudication of grievances arising under federal 
law ought to be deterred from doing so. 
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nary canons of statutory construction would be inadequate to 
ascertain the intent of Congress. Rather, the special rules 
are designed as hurdles to keep the disfavored suits out of the 
federal court. In the Court's words, the test flows from 
need to maintain "the usual constitutional balance between 
the States and Federal Government." Ante, at --.6 The 
doctrine is thus based on a fundamental policy decision, 
vaguely attributed to the framers of Article III or the Elev-
enth Amendment, that the federal courts ought not to hear 
suits brought by individuals against states. This Court exe-
cutes the policy by making it difficult, but not impossible, for 
Congress to create private rights of action against the 
States.i 
Reliance on this supposed constitutional policy reverses 
the ordinary role of the federal courts in federal question 
6 See also Pennhurst , supra , at -- ("Our reluctance to infer that a 
State's immunit~· from suit in the federal courts has been negated stems 
from recognition of the vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 
our federal system"). 
; In this case, the Court 's decision relentlessly to apply its clear state-
ment rule demonstrates how that rule serves no purpose other than ob-
structing the will of Congress. When Congress enacted § 504 , it could 
have had no idea that it must obey the extreme clear statement rule 
adopted by the Court for the first time today. The roots of that rule are 
found in Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept ., 411 U. S. 279 (1973), 
which was decided on April 18, 1973. Cf. Parden v. Terminal Railway, 
377 U. S. 184 (1964). The Employees case, of course, did not itself lay 
down the extreme rule adopted today. In any event, the bill which be-
came § 504 had been first enacted six months previously. See 118 Cong. 
Rec. 32279 (September 26, 1972) (enactment of bill by Senate); 118 Cong. 
Rec. 36409 (October 14, 1979) (enactment of bill by House). It was then 
vetoed by the President and reenacted in February, 1973. See 118 Cong. 
Rec. 5901 (Feb. 15, 1973) (Senate); 118 Cong. Rec. 7139 (Feb. 28, 1973) 
(House). Another veto followed, and the legislation was finally signed 
into Jaw on September 26, 1973. See 119 Cong. Rec. 29,633 (Sept. 13, 
1973) (Senate enactment of final bill); 119 Cong. Rec. 30,151 (Sept. 18, 
1973) (House enactment of final bill). Given this chronology, for the Court 
now to hold that Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity because it 
did not "unequivocally express this intention in the statutory language" is 
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cases. Federal courts are instruments of the national gov-
ernment, seeing to it that constitutional limitations are 
obeyed while interpreting the will of Congress in enforcing 
the federal laws. In the Eleventh Amendment context, 
however, the Court instead relies on a supposed constitu-
tional policy disfavoring suits against States as justification 
for ignoring the will of Congress; the goal seems to be to ob-
struct the ability of Congress to achieve ends that are other-
wise constitutionally unexceptionable and well within the 
reach of its Article I powers. 
The Court's sovereign immunity doctrine has other unfor-
tunate results. Because the doctrine is inconsistent with the 
essential function of the federal courts-to provide a fair and 
impartial forum for the uniform interpretation and enforce-
ment of the supreme law of the land-it has led to the devel-
opment of a complex body of technical rules made necessary 
by the need to circumvent the intolerable constriction of fed-
eral jurisdiction that would otherwise occur. Under the rule 
of Ex Parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 (1908), a State may be re-
quired to obey federal law, so long as the plaintiff remembers 
to name a state official rather than the State itself as defend-
ant, see Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U. S. 781 (1978), and so long 
as the relief sought is prospective rather than retrospective. 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651 (1974)! These intricate 
to change the rules for lawmaking after Congress has already acted. Con-
gress, like other officials, "cannot be expected to predict the future course 
of constitutional law." Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978). 
8 There are other rules created specifically to permit suits that would 
appear to be barred by any thoroughgoing interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment as a bar to exercise of the federal judicial power in suits 
against states. For instance, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529, 
530 (1890), established that the Eleventh Amendment is not a bar to suits 
against local governmental units. In addition, it seems to have been a 
longstanding, though unarticulated, rule that the Eleventh Amendment 
does not limit exercise of otherwise proper federal appellate jurisdiction 
over suits from state courts. For instance, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. 
Dias,- U. S.- (1984), we adjudicated a taxpayer's appeal from an 
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rules often create manifest injustices, while failing to respond 
to any legitimate needs of the States. A damage award may 
often be the only practical remedy available to the plaintiff, 9 
and the threat of a damage award may be the only effective 
deterrent to a defendant's willful violation of federal law. 
l Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 691-692 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). While the prohibition of damage awards 
thus imposes substantial costs on plaintiffs and on members 
of a class Congress sought to protect, the injunctive relief 
that is permitted can often be more intrusive-and more ex-
pensive-than a simple damage award would be. 10 
The Court's doctrine itself has been unstable. As I shall 
discuss below, the doctrine lacks a textual anchor, a firm his-
torical foundation, or a clear rationale. As a result, it has 
unfavorable judgment in a suit against state officials for refund of taxes. 
Cf. Edelma n v. Jordan , 415 U. S. 651 (1974). Compare Martinez v. Ca li-
forn ia, 444 U. S. 277 (1980) (adjudicating appeal of § 1983 action brought 
against State in state court ) \\ith Quern v. Jordan , 440 U. S. 332 (1978) 
(holding that § 1983 does not abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal 
court). See also William s \'. Vermont , -- U. S. -- (1985); Summa 
Corp . v. Cal~(orn ia , -- U. S. -- (1984); Aloha A irlines v. Dir . of Ta :r-
ation, -- U. S. -- (1983); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U. S. 707 
(1981 ); Bonell i Cattle Co. \'. Arizona , 414 U. S. 313 (1974). 
' In this case, for instance, damages may well be the only practical relief 
available for the respondent. He originally brought suit in 1979 alleging 
that the State had improperly denied him employment as a graduate stu-
dent assistant recreational therapist. Even if he had brought suit against 
state officials as well as the State itself, it is reasonable to suppose that 
now-six years later-he has attained his degree and would obtain no ben-
efit from an injunction ordering the end of discrimination against the handi-
capped in hiring graduate student assistants. "For people in [Scanlon's] 
shoes, it is damages or nothing." Bivens v. Six Unkrwum Federal Narcot-
ics Agents, 403 U. S. 388, 410 (1971). 
1° Congress, of course, may decide in a given case that a remedial scheme 
should be limited to either damages or injunctive relief. Cf. 42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000a-3(a) (statute limiting remedy to ''preventive" relief against all de-
fendants). Our role in such a case is to interpret the will of Congress with 
respect to the scope of the permissible relief. In the Eleventh Amend-
ment context, however, the Court seems to have decided that the supposed 
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been impossible to determine to what extent the principle of 
state accountability to the rule of law can or should be accom-
modated within the competing framework of state non-
accountability put into place by the Court's sovereign immu-
nity doctrine. For this reason, we have been unable to 
agree on the content of the special "rules" we have applied to 
acts of Congress to determine whether they abrogate state 
sovereign immunity. Compare Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 
377 U. S. 184 (1964) with Employees v. Missouri Dept. of 
Public Health, 411 U. S. 279 (1973). Whatever rule is de-
l cided upon at a given time is then applied retroactively to ac-
tions taken by Congress. See n. 7, supra. Finally, in the 
absence of any plausible limiting principles, ·the Court has 
overruled and ignored past cases that seemed to stand in the 
way of vindication of the doubtful States' right the Court has 
created. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman,-- U. S. --, --, n. 50 (1984). 
I might tolerate all of these results-the unprecedented in-
trusion on Congress' lawmaking power and consequent in-
crease in the power of the courts, the development of a com-
plex set of rules to circumvent the obviously untenable 
results that would otherwise ensue, the lack of respect for 
f precedent and the lessons of the past evident in Pennhursfr-
if the Court's sovereign immunity doctrine derived from es-
sential constitutional values protecting the freedom of our 
people or the structure of our federal system. But that is 
sadly not the case. Instead, the paradoxical effect of the 
Court's doctrine is to require the federal courts to protect 
States that violate federal law from the legal consequences of 
their conduct. 
III 
Since the Court began over a decade ago aggressively to 
expand its doctrine of Eleventh Amendment sovereign im-
constitutional policy disfavoring suits against States justifies limiting the 
scope of relief regardless of the apparent will of Congress. 
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munity , see Employees v. Missouri Public Health Dept. , 411 
U. S. 279 (1973), modern scholars and legal historians have 
taken a critical look at the historical record that is said to sup-
port the Court's result. 11 Recent research has discovered 
and collated substantial evidence that the Court's constitu-
tional doctrine of state sovereign immunity has rested on a 
mistaken historical premise. The flawed underpinning is the 
premise that either the Constitution or the Eleventh Amend-
ment embodied a principle of state sovereign immunity as a 
limit on the federal judicial power. New evidence concern-
ing the drafting and ratification of the original Constitution 
indicates that the Framers never intended to constitutional-
ize the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. Consequently, 
the Eleventh Amendment could not have been, as the Court 
has occasionally suggested, an effort to reestablish a limita-
tion on the federal judicial power granted in Article III. 
Nor, given the limited terms in which it was written, could 
the Amendment's narrow and technical language be under-
stood to have instituted a sweeping new limitation on the fed-
eral judicial power whenever an individual attempts to sue a 
State. A close examination of the historical records reveals 
a rather different status for the doctrine of state sovereign 
" See, e. g., Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdic-
tion Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 
(19&'3) (hereinafter Fletcher); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and 
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, &'3 Colum. L. Rev. 1889 
(19&'3) (hereinafter Gibbons); C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and 
Sovereign Immunity (1972) (hereinafter Jacobs); Field, The Eleventh 
Amendment and Other Immunity Doctrines, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 1203 
(1978) (hereinafter Field); Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to 
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the 
Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 (1975); 
Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case 
Study of Judicial Power, 19&'3 U. Ill. L. Rev. 423; Shapiro, Wrong Turns: 
The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 61 
(1984); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental 
Wrongs, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1972). 
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immunity in federal court. There simply is no constitutional 
principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally 
mandated policy of excluding suits against States from fed-
eral court. 
A 
In Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court stated 
that to permit a citizen to bring a suit against a State in fed-
eral court would be "an attempt to strain the Constitution 
and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of." 
I d., at 15. The text of the Constitution, of course, contains 
no explicit adoption of a principle of state sovereign immu-
nity. The passage from Hans thus implies that everyone in-
volved in the framing or ratification of the Constitution be-
lieved that Article III included a tacit prohibition on the 
exercise of the judicial power when a State was being sued in 
federal court. The early history of the Constitution reveals, 
however, that the Court in Hans was mistaken. The 
unamended Article III was often read to the contrary to pro-
hibit not the exercise of the judicial power, but the assertion 
of state sovereign immunity as a defense, even in cases aris-
ing solely under state law. 
It is useful to begin with the text of Article III. Section 2 
provides: 
"The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their authority; to all Cases affecting Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; to all 
Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Con-
troversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to 
Controversies between two or more States; between a 
State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of 
different States; between Citizens of the same State 
claiming Lands under the Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign 
States, Citizens or Subjects." 
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The judicial power of the federal courts thus extends only to 
certain types of cases, identified either by subject matter or 
parties. The subject-matter heads of jurisdiction include 
federal questions ("all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made") and admiralty ("all Cases of admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction"). The party-based heads of jurisdic-
tion include what might be called ordinary diversity ("Con-
troversies ... between Citizens of different States"), state-
citizen diversity ("between a State and Citizens of another 
State"), and state-alien diversity ("between a State .. . and 
foreign ... Citizens"). It is the latter two clauses, provid-
ing for state-citizen and state-alien diversity, that were at 
the focus of the Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia , 2 
Dall. 419 (1793) , and the subsequent ratification of the Elev-
enth Amendment. 
To understand the dispute concerning the state-citizen and 
state-alien diversity clauses, it is crucial to understand the 
relationship between the party-based and subject-matter 
heads of jurisdiction. The grants of jurisdiction in Article 
III are to be read disjunctively. The federal judicial power 
may extends to a case if it falls within any of the enumerated 
jurisdictional heads. Thus, a federal court can hear a federal 
question case even if the parties are citizens of the same 
state; it can exercise jurisdiction over cases between citizens 
of different states even where the case does not arise under 
federal law. Most important for present purposes, the lan-
guage of the unamended Article III alone would permit the 
federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over suits in which a 
noncitizen or alien is suing a state on a claim of a violation of 
state law. 
This standard interpretation of Article III gave a special 
importance to the interpretation of the state-citizen and 
state-alien diversity clauses. The clauses by their terms 
permitted federal jurisdiction over any suit between a state 
and a noncitizen or a state and an alien, and in particular over 
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suits in which the plaintiff was the noncitizen or alien and the 
defendant was the state. Yet in most of the States in 1789, 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity formally forbade the 
maintenance of suits against States in state courts, although 
the actual effect of this bar in frustrating legal claims against 
the state was unclear. 12 Thus, the question left open by the 
terms of the two clauses was whether the state law of sover-
eign immunity barred the exercise of the federal judicial 
power. 
A plaintiff seeking federal jurisdiction against a State 
under the state-citizen or state-alien diversity clauses would 
be asserting a cause of action based on state law, since a fed-
eral question or admiralty claim would provide an independ-
ent basis for jurisdiction that did not depend on the identity 
of the parties. To read the two clauses to abrogate the 
state-law sovereign immunity defense would be to find in Ar-
ticle III a substantive federal limitation on state law. Al-
though a State previously could create a cause of action to 
which it would not itself be liable, this same cause of action 
now could be used (at least by citizens of other States or 
aliens) in federal courts to sue the State itself. This was a 
particularly troublesome prospect to the States that had in-
curred debts, some of which dated back to the Revolutionary 
War. The debts would naturally find their way into the 
hands of noncitizens and aliens, who at the first sign of de-
fault could be expected promptly to sue the State in federal 
court. The State's effort to retain its sovereign immunity in 
its own courts would turn out to be futile. Moreover, there-
sulting abrogation of sovereign immunity would operate ret-
12 Professor Jaffe has explained that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
in English practice prior to 1789 rarely was a bar to effective relief for 
those who had legitimate claims against the government. See Jaffe, Suits 
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 
1 (1963). Judge Gibbons' recent essay similarly points out that the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in the colonies may also have had a very lim-
ited scope. See Gibbons, at 1895-1899. 
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roactively; even debts incurred years before the Constitution 
was adopted-and before either of the contracting parties ex-
pected that a judicial remedy against the State would be 
available-would become the basis for causes of action 
brought under the two clauses in federal court. 
In short, the danger of the state-citizen and state-alien di-
versity clauses was that, if read to permit suits against 
States, they would have the effect of limiting state law in a 
way not otherwise provided for in the Constitution. The 
original Constitution prior to the Bill of Rights contained only 
a few express limitations on state power. Yet the States 
would now find in Article III itself a further limit on state ac-
tion: Despite the fact that the State as sovereign had created 
a given cause of action, Article III would have made it impos-
sible for the State effectively to assert a sovereign immunity 
defense to that action. 
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not reveal 
any substantial controversy concerning the state-citizen and 
state-alien diversity clauses. 13 The language of Article III, 14 
which provides one guide to its meaning, is undoubtedly con-
sistent with suits against States under both subject-matter 
13 See Fletcher, at 1045-1046; Jacobs , at 14-20. 
"As reported by the Committee on Detail, the original draft provided 
that "[t)he jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend ... to such 
other cases, as the national legislature may assign, as involving the na-
tional peace and harmony, in the collection of the revenue[,) in disputes be-
tween citizens of different states[,) in disputes between a State and a Citi-
zen or Citizens of another State[.) in disputes between different states; and 
in disputes, in which subjects or citizens of other countries are concerned[,) 
and in Cases of admiralty Jurisdiction." 2 The Records of the Federal 
Convention of 1787, at 146-147 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (hereinafter 
Farrand). This jurisdiction was to be appellate only, "except in ... those 
instances, in which the legislature shall make it original." /d. Interest-
ingly, the Committee's draft of Article III was in James Wilson's handwrit-
ing, but the state-citizen diversity clause was written in the margin by an-
other Committee member, John Rutledge of South Carolina. See 
Putnam, How the Federal Courts were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 
Cornell L. Q. 460, 467 (1925) (facsimile of original document). 
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heads of jurisdiction (for example, a suit arising out of federal 
law brought by a citizen against a State) and party-based 
heads of jurisdiction (for example, a suit brought under the 
state-citizen diversity clause itself). However, a federal 
question suit against a State does not threaten to displace a 
prior state-law defense of sovereign immunity, because state-
law defenses would not of their own force be applicable to 
federal causes of action. On the other hand, a state-citizen 
suit against a State does, as suggested above, threaten to dis-
place any extant state-law sovereign immunity defense. 
An examination of the debates surrounding the state rati-
fication conventions proves more productive. The various 
references to state sovereign immunity all appear in discus-
sions of the state-citizen diversity clause. Virtually all of the 
comments were addressed to the problem created by state 
debts that predated the Constitution, when the State's credi-
tors may often have had meager judicial remedies in the case 
of default. Yet, even in this sensitive context, a number of 
participants in the debates welcomed the abrogation of sover-
eign immunity that they thought followed from the state-citi-
zen and state-alien clauses. The debates do not directly ad-
dress the question of suits against States in admiralty or 
federal question cases, where federal law and not state law 
would govern. Nonetheless, the apparent willingness of 
many delegates to read the state-citizen clause as abrogating 
sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action suggests 
that they would have been even more willing to permit suits 
against States in federal question cases, where Congress had 
authorized such suits in the exercise of its Article I or other 
powers. 
The Virginia debates included the most detailed discussion 
of the state-citizen diversity clause. 16 The first to mention 
16 A number of possible grounds for state liability existed in Virginia on 
the eve of that State's ratification convention. Aside from the problem of 
debts owed by the State, the Treaty of Paris of 1783, 8 Stat. 80, between 
Britain and the United States included a number of provisions that could 
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the clause explicitly was George Mason, an opponent of the 
new Constitution. After quoting the clause, he referred to a 
dispute about Virginia's confiscation of property belonging to 
Lord Fairfax. 16 He asserted: 
"Claims respecting those lands, every liquidated ac-
count, or other claim against this state, will be tried be-
fore the federal court. Is not this disgraceful? Is this 
state to be brought to the bar of justice like a delinquent 
individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be ar-
raigned like a culprit, or private offender? Will the 
states undergo this mortification? I think this power 
perfectly unnecessary. But let us pursue this subject 
farther. What is to be done if a judgment be obtained 
against a state? Will you issue aji.erifacias? It would 
be ludicrous to say that you could put the state's body in 
jail. How is the judgment, then, to be enforced? A 
power which cannot be executed ought not to be 
granted." 3 Elliot's Debates, at 526-527. 
Mason thus believed that the state-citizen diversity clause 
provided federal jurisdiction for suits against the States and 
would have the effect of abrogating the state's sovereign im-
munity defense in state-law causes of action for debt that 
would be brought in federal court. 
Madison responded the next day: 
subject the States to liability to British creditors. Article V of the Treaty 
recognized completed State confiscations, or escheats, of British property. 
Article VI , however, prohibited escheats that had not yet been completed. 
Virginia, like other states, had provided for the confiscation of debts owed 
to British creditors or the discharge of such debts by payment into the 
state Treasury. See Gibbons, at 1903. The Treaty thus potentially sub-
jected Virginia to substantial liability to British creditors trying to collect 
these debts, although enforcement of the Treaty's provisions was largely 
impossible under the Articles of Confederation. See generally Gibbons, at 
1899-1902, 1903-1908. 
16 See also 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adop-
tion of the Federal Constitution, at 529 (Elliot ed. 1891) (hereinafter 
Elliot's Debates) (further discussion of problem of land confiscation). 
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"[Federal] jurisdiction in controversies between a state 
and citizens of another state is much objected to, and 
perhaps without reason. It is not in the power of indi-
viduals to call any state into court. The only operation 
it can have, is that, if a state should wish to bring a suit 
against a citizen, it must be brought before the federal 
court. This will give satisfaction to individuals, as it 
will prevent citizens, on whom a state may have a claim, 
being dissatisfied with the state courts." I d., at 533. 
Madison seems to have believed that the Article III judicial 
power, at least under the state-citizen diversity clause, was 
limited to cases in which the states were plaintiffs. Al-
though he does deny that "[i]t is in the power of individuals to 
call any state into court," this remark could be understood as 
an explication of current state law which he believed would 
not be displaced by the state-citizen diversity clause. His 
remarks certainly do not suggest that Congress, acting under 
its enumerated powers elsewhere in the Constitution, could 
not "call a state into court," or, again acting within its own 
granted powers, provide a citizen with the power to sue a 
State in federal court. 
At any rate, the delegates were not wholly satisfied with 
Madison's explanation. Patrick Henry, an opponent of rati-
fication, was the next speaker. Referring to Mason, he said: 
"My honorable friend's remarks were right, with respect to 
incarcerating a state. It would ease my mind, if the honor-
able gentleman would tell me that manner in which money 
should be paid, if, in a suit between a state and individuals, 
the state were cast." ld., at 542. Returning to the attack 
on Madison, Henry had no doubt concerning the meaning of 
the state-citizen diversity clause: 
"As to controversies between a state and the citizens of 
another state, his construction of it is to me perfectly in-
comprehensible. He says it will seldom happen that a 
state has such demands on individuals. There is nothing 
to warrant such an assertion. But he says that the state 
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may be plaintiff only. If gentlemen pervert the most 
clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language 
of the people, there is an end of all argument. What 
says that paper? That it shall have cognizance of con-
troversies between a state and citizens of another state, 
without discriminating between plaintiff and defendant. 
What says the honorable gentleman? The contrary-
that the state can only be plaintiff. When the state is 
debtor, there is no reciprocity. It seems to me that gen-
tlemen may put what construction they please on it. 
What! is justice to be done to one party, and not to the 
other?" /d., at 543. 
Edmund Pendleton, the President of the Virginia conven-
tion and the next speaker, supported ratification but seems 
to have agreed with Henry that the state-citizen diversity 
clause would subject the States to suit in federal court. He 
said that "[t]he impossibility of calling a sovereign state be-
fore the jurisdiction of another sovereign state, shows the 
propriety and necessity of vesting this tribunal with the deci-
sion of controversies to which a state shall be a party." I d., 
at 549. 
John Marshall next took up the debate: 
''With respect to disputes between a state and the citi-
zens of another state, its jurisdiction has been decried 
with unusual vehemence. I hope that no gentleman will 
think that a state will be called at the bar of the federal 
court. Is there no such case at present? Are there not 
many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a 
party, and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to 
suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged be-
fore a court. The intent is, to enable states to recover 
claims of individuals residing in other states. I contend 
this contruction is warranted by the words. But, say 
they, there will be a partiality in it if a state cannot be 
defendant-if an individual cannot proceed to obtain 
judgment against a state, though he may be sued by a 
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state. It is necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. 
I see a difficulty in making a state defendant, which does 
not prevent its being plaintiff. If this be only what can-
not be avoided, why object to the system on that ac-
count? If an individual has a just claim against any par-
ticular state, is it to be presumed that, on application to 
its legislature, he will not obtain satisfaction? But how 
could a state recover any claim from a citizen of another 
state, without the establishment of these tribunals?" 
ld., at 555-556. 
Marshall's remarks, like Madison's, appear to suggest that 
the state-citizen diversity clause could not be used to make an 
unwilling state a defendant in federal court. The reason 
seems to be that "it is not rational to suppose that the sover-
eign power should be dragged before a court." Of course, 
where the cause of action is based on state-law, as it would be 
in a suit under the state-citizen diversity clause, the "sover-
eign power" whose law governed would be the state, and 
Marshall is consequently correct that it would be "irrational" 
to suppose that the sovereign could be forced to abrogate the 
sovereign immunity defense that its own law had created. 
However, where the cause of action is based on a federal law 
enacted pursuant to Congress' Article I powers, it would be 
far less clear that Marshall would have concluded that the 
state still retained the relevant "sovereignty"; in such a case, 
there is nothing "irrational" about supposing that the rele-
vant sovereign-in this case, Congress-had subjected the 
state to suit. 17 
Marshall's observations did not go unanswered. Edmund 
Randolph, a member of the Committee of Detail at the Con-
stitutional Convention and a proponent of the Constitution, 
referred back to Mason's remarks: 
17 To interpret Marshall's remarks to endorse a principle of wholesale 
state immunity from suit on any cause of action-State or Federal-in fed-
eral court would render them inconsistent with the views he later ex-
pressed as Chief Justice. See infra, at---. 
22 
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"An honorable gentleman has asked, Will you put the 
body of the state in prison? How is it between inde-
pendent states? If a government refuses to do justice to 
individuals, war is the consequence. Is this the bloody 
alternative to which we are referred. . . . I think, 
whatever the law of nations may say, that any doubt re-
specting the construction that a state may be plaintiff, 
and not defendant, is taken away by the words where a 
state shall be a party. !d., at 573. 
Randolph was convinced that a state could be made a party 
defendant. Discussing some disputed land claims, he re-
marked that "[o]ne thing is certain-that .. the remedy will 
not be sought against the settlers, but the state of Virginia. 
The court of equity ·will direct a compensation to be made by 
the state." !d., at 574. Finally, he concluded his discus-
sion: "I ask the Convention of the free people of Virginia if 
there can be honesty in rejecting the government because 
justice is to be done by it? . . . Are we to say that we shall 
discard this government because it would make us all hon-
est?" !d., at 575. 1" One of the purposes of Article III was to 
vest in the federal courts the power to settle disputes that 
might threaten the peace and unity of the nation. 19 Ran-
dolph saw the danger of just this kind of internecine strife 
when a state reneges on debts owed to citizens of another 
state, and consequently applauded the extension of federal 
jurisdiction to avoid these consequences. 
18 Before the discussion of the state-citizen clause initiated by Mason, 
Randolph had earlier made much the same point while summarizing his 
views of the Constitution: "I admire that part which forces Virginia to pay 
her debts." 3 Elliot's Debates, at 207. 
1
' For example the draft of the Constitution referred to the Committee 
on Detail at the Convention had provided "[t)hat the jurisdiction of the na-
tional Judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by the gen-
eral Legislature, and to such other questions as involve the National peace 
and harmony." 2 Farrand, at 39. 
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The Virginia Convention ratified the Constitution. The 
Madison and Marshall remarks have been cited as evidence of 
an inherent limitation on Article III jurisdiction. See, e. g., 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 660, n. 9; Monaco v. Mis-
sissippi, 392 U. S. 313, 323-325 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 
134 U. S., at 14. Even if this adequately characterized the 
substance of their views, they were a minority of those given 
at the convention. Mason, Henry, Pendleton, and Randolph 
all took an opposing position. 20 Equally important, the en-
tire discussion focused on the question of Virginia's liability 
for debts and land claims that predated the Constitution and 
clearly arose under Virginia law. The question that excited 
such interest was whether the state-citizen diversity clause 
itself abrogated the sovereign immunity defense that would 
be available to the State in a suit concerning these issues in 
state court. 21 The same issue arose in a few other state con-
20 It has been suggested that the remarks of the opponents of the Con-
stitution should be giYen less weight. However, the same argument could 
be made concerning the remarks of Madison and Marshall, especially in 
light of Marshall 's later interpretation of Article III as Chief Justice. See 
infra , at--. Their fervent desire for ratification could have led them to 
do\o\'Tiplay the features of the new document that were arousing contro-
versy. See Field , at 534. 
2
' The only element of the debate that suggests a broader concern is the 
repeated reference to the problem of enforcing a judgment against the 
state. Of course, even these statements were made in the context of the 
discussion of the state-citizen diversity clause, and the participants in the 
debate may well not have had their attention directed to the need, ulti-
mately vindicated by the Civil War, to enforce federal law against the 
States, regardless of the means necessary for enforcement. In any event, 
the Court has categorically rejected the difficulty of enforcing judgments 
against the States as ground for permitting States to avoid their obliga-
tions. It has long been established that a State may not claim sovereign 
immunity when it is sued by another State under the Article III State-
State clause, see South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U. S. 286 (1904), or 
when it is sued by the United States. See United States v. Texas, 143 
U. S. 621, 642-646 (1882). Moreover, the prospective and injunctive relief 
that is pennitted in actions pleaded against a state official, see Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, may raise enforcement problems as difficult as 
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ventions, but did not receive the detailed attention that it did 
in Virginia. 22 
The debate in the press sheds further light on the effect of 
the Constitution on state sovereign immunity. A number of 
influential anti-Federalist publications sounded the alarm at 
what they saw as the unwarranted extension of the federal 
judicial power worked by the state-citizen diversity clause. 
The "Federal Farmer," commonly identified as Richard 
Henry Lee of Virginia, was one influential and widely pub-
lished anti-Federalist. He objected that: 
"There are some powers proposed to be lodged in the 
general government in the judicial department, I think 
very unnecessarily, I mean powers respecting questions 
arising upon the internal laws of the respective states . 
It is proper the federal judiciary should have powers co-
extensive ·with the federal legislature-that is, the 
power of deciding finally on the laws of the union. By 
Art. 3. Sect. 2. the powers of the federal judiciary are 
extended (among other things) to all cases between a 
state and citizens of another state-between citizens of 
different states-between a state or the citizens thereof, 
and foreign states, citizens of subjects. Actions in all 
these cases, except against a state government, are now 
brought and finally determined in the law courts of the 
states respectively; and as there are no words to exclude 
these courts of their jurisdiction in these cases, they will 
have concurrent jurisdiction with the inferior federal 
those raised by a judgment for damages in a suit against a State. Cf. Coo-
per v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1 (1958). 
22 For discussion of the state-citizen clause in other conventions, see Gib-
bons, at 1902-1903 (Pennsylvania), 1912-1914 (North Carolina); Fletcher, 
at 1050-1051; Jacobs, at 27-40 (Pennsylvania). In the Pennsylvania con-
vention, for instance, James Wilson approved of the state-citizen clause 
that had been drafted in his own Committee on Detail: "When a citizen has 
a controversy with another state, there ought to be a tribunal where both 
parties may stand on a just and equal footing." 2 Elliot's Debates, at 491. 
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courts in them." 14 The Documentary History of the 
Ratification of the Constitution, at 40 (Kaminski & 
Saladino, eds., 1983) (hereinafter Documentary History) 
(emphasis added). 23 
Later in the same essay, which was published and circulated 
in 1787 and 1788, see id ., at 14-17, the author becomes even 
more explicit: 
"How far it may be proper to admit a foreigner or the 
citizen of another state to bring actions against state 
governments, which have failed in performing so many 
promises during the war, is doubtful: How far it may be 
proper so to humble a state, as to bring it to answer to an 
individual in a court of law is worthy of consideration; 
the states are now subject to no such actions; and this 
new jurisdiction will subject the states, and many de-
fendants to actions, and processes, which were not in the 
contemplation of the parties, when the contract was 
made; all engagements existing between citizens of dif-
ferent states, citizens and foreigners, states and foreign-
ers; and states and citizens of other states were made the 
parties contemplating the remedies then existing on the 
laws of the states-and the new remedy proposed to be 
given in the federal courts, can be founded on no princi-
ple whatever." ld., at 41-42. 
This discussion undoubtedly presupposes that States would 
be parties defendant in suits on state-law causes of action 
under the state-citizen diversity clause; the author objects to 
barring sovereign immunity defenses in cases "arising upon 
the internal laws of the several states." However, the anti-
Federalist author plainly also believes that the powers of the 
federal courts are to be coextensive with the powers of Con-
gress. Thus, the deficiency of state-citizen diversity juris-
22 The essay cited here can also be found at 2 The Complete Anti-Feder-
alist 245 (H. Storing ed. 1981). Professor Storing has questioned its at-
tribution to Richard Henry Lee. ld., at 214-216. 
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diction is not that it permits the federal courts to hear suits 
against States based on federal causes of action, but that it 
permits the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction beyond the 
lawmaking powers of Congress: it provides new remedies for 
state creditors "which were not in the contemplation of the 
parties, when the contract was made." 
Another noted anti-Federalist writer who published under 
the pseudonym "Brutus" also attacked what he saw as the 
untoward implications of the state-citizen diversity clause: 
"I conceive the clause which extends the power of the ju-
dicial to controversies arising between a state and citi-
zens of another state, improper in itself, and ·will, in its 
exercise, prove most pernicious and destructive. 
It is improper, because it subjects a state to answer in 
a court of law, to the suit of an individual. This is hu-
miliating and degrading to a government, and, what I 
believe, the supreme authority of no state ever submit-
ted to. 
Every state in the union is largely indebted to individ-
uals. For the payment of these debts they have given 
notes payable to the bearer. At least this is the case in 
this state. Whenever a citizen of another state becomes 
possessed of one of these notes, he may commence an ac-
tion in the supreme court of the general government; and 
I cannot see any way in which he can be prevented from 
recovering. 
If the power of the judicial under this clause will ex-
tend to the cases above stated, it will, if executed, 
produce the utmost confusion, and in its progress, will 
crush the states beneath its weight. And if it does not 
extend to these cases, I confess myself utterly at a loss 
to give it any meaning." 2 The Complete Anti-Federal-
ist, at 429-431 (H. Storing ed. 1981). 
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Other materials, from proponents and opponents of ratifica-
tion, similarly view Article III jurisdiction as extending to 
suits against states. 24 Timothy Pickering, a Pennsylvania 
landowner who supported ratification and attended the Penn-
sylvania convention, wrote: 
"The federal farmer, and other objectors, say the causes 
between a state and citizens of another state-between 
citizens of different states-and between a state, or the 
citizens thereof, and the citizens of subjects of foreign 
states, should be left, as they now are, to the decision of 
the particular state courts. The other cases enumer-
ated in the constitution, seem to be admitted as properly 
cognizable in the federal courts. With respect to all the 
former, it may be said generally, that as the local laws of 
the several states may differ from each other-as par-
ticular states may pass laws unjust in their nature, or 
partially unjust as they regard foreigners and the citi-
zens of other states, it seems to be a wise provision, 
which puts it in the power of such foreigners and citizens 
to resort to a court where they may reasonably expect to 
obtain impartial justice. . . . But there is a particular 
and very cogent reason for securing to foreigners a trial, 
24 See, e. g ., J . Main, The Antifederalists 157 (1961) (quoting 1788 letter 
raising question whether state-citizen diversity clause would not "expose 
every State to be sued in the New Court , on their public securities holden 
by Citizens of other States"); 13 Documentary History, at 434 (widely re-
printed essay by Federalist Tench Coxe) ("[W]hen a trial is to be had be-
tween the citizens of any state and those of another, or the government of 
another, the private citizen wil not be obliged to go into a court constituted 
by the state, with which, or with the citizens of which, his dispute is. He 
can appeal to a disinterestedfoederal court."); 14 Documentary History, at 
72 (pro-Federalist pamphlet published in Philadelphia and reprinted else-
where) ("[States] will indeed have the privilege of oppressing their own cit-
izens by bad laws or bad administration; but the moment the mischief ex-
tends beyond their own State, and begins to affect the citizens of other 
States strangers, or the national welfare,-the salutary controul of the su-
preme power will check the evil , and restore strength and security, as well 
as honesty and right, to the offending state"). 
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either in the first instance, or by appeal, in a federal 
court. With respect to foreigners, all the states form 
but one nation. This nation is responsible for the con-
duct of all its members toward foreign nations, their citi-
zens and subjects; and therefore ought to possess the 
power of doing justice to the latter. Without this 
power, a single state, or one of its citizens, might em-
broil the whole union in a foreign war." 14 Documen-
tary History, at 204. 
Pickering's comments are particularly revealing because, un-
like the previous comments, they do not focus on the problem 
caused by the abrogation of sovereign immunity in state-law 
causes of action. In fact, his views seem to . be consistent 
with the view that a federal court adjudicating a state-law 
claim should apply an applicable state-law sovereign immu-
nity defense. Pickering justifies the existence of state-citi-
zen diversity jurisdiction in part as a remedy for state laws 
that are unjust or unfair to noncitizens. Such laws would, of 
course, implicate the interests protected by the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause of Article IV. His comments, like 
those of the "Federal Farmer," thus suggest the recognized 
need for a federal forum to adjudicate cases implicating the 
guarantees of the federal constitution-even those cases in 
which a State is the defendant. 
The Federalist Papers were written to influence the rati-
fication debate in New York. In No. 81, Hamilton discussed 
the issue of state sovereign immunity in plain terms: 
"I shall take occasion to mention here a supposition 
which has excited some alarm upon very mistaken 
grounds. It has been suggested that an assignment of 
the public securities of one State to the citizens of an-
other, would enable them to prosecute that State in the 
federal courts for the amount of those securities; a sug-
gestion which the following considerations prove to be 
without foundation. 
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It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. 
This is the general sense, and the general practice of 
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of 
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every 
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it 
will remain with the States, and the danger intimated 
must be merely ideal. The circumstances which are 
necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty 
were discussed in considering the article of taxation and 
need not be repeated here. A recurrence to the princi-
ples there established will satisfy us, that there is no 
color to pretend that the State governments would, by 
the adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of 
paying their own debts in their own way, free from 
every constraint but that which flows from the obliga-
tions of good faith. The contracts between a nation and 
individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sov-
ereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. 
They confer no right of action independent of the sover-
eign will. To what purpose would it be to authorize suits 
against States for the debts they owe? How could re-
coveries be enforced? It is evident, that it could not be 
done without waging war against the contracting State; 
and to ascribe to the federal courts, by mere implication, 
and in destruction of a pre-existing right of the State 
governments, a power which would involve such a conse-
quence, would be altogether forced and unwarrantable." 
The Federalist, at 511-512 (Wright ed. 1961) (emphasis 
in original). 
Hamilton believed that the states could not be held to their 
debts in federal court under the state-citizen diversity clause. 
The Court has often cited the passage as support for its view 
that the Constitution, even before the Eleventh Amendment, 
gave the federal courts no authority to hear any case, under 
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any head of jurisdiction, in which a State was an 
unconsenting defendant. See, e. g., Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U. S., at 661; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S., at 12-13. 
A careful reading of this passage, however, in the context of 
Hamilton's views elsewhere in The Federalist, demonstrates 
precisely the opposite. In the cases arising under state law 
that would find their way into federal court under the state-
citizen diversity clause, a defense of state sovereign immu-
nity would be as valid in federal court as it would be in state 
court. The States retained their full sovereign authority 
over state-created causes of action, as they did over their tra-
ditional sources of revenue. See Federalist No. 32 (discuss-
ing taxation). On the other hand, where the Federal Gov-
ernment, in the "plan of the convention," 25 had substantive 
2.1 Hamilton used the phrase "plan of the convention" frequently as a syn-
onym for the Constitution. See The Federalist Concordance, at 403-404 
(Engeman , Erler, Hofeller, eds. 1980). In No. 32, the discussion of tax-
ation to which Hamilton adverted in No. 81 , Hamilton had said that "as the 
plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or consolidation , the 
State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which 
they before had , and which were not , by that act , exclusively delegated to 
the United States." The Federalist, No. 32, at 241 (Wright ed. 1961) (em-
phasis in original). The Constitution had not delegated to the national 
government the general power to define defenses to state-law causes of ac-
tion; consequently, nothing in Article III abrogated state sovereign immu-
nity in state-law causes of action in federal or state courts. On the other 
hand , the Constitution had delegated to the national government a series 
of enumerated powers, and had made federal laws enacted pursuant 
thereto the supreme law of the land. Therefore, the States had surren-
dered their immunity from suit on federal causes of action when the Con-
stitution was ratified. 
In No. 80, Hamilton discussed the need for the federal question 
jurisdiction: 
''What, for instance, would avail restrictions on the authority of the State 
legislatures, without some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance 
of them? The States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from 
doing a variety of things , some of which are incompatible with the interests 
of the Union, and others with the principles of good government." 
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lawmaking authority, the states no longer retained their full 
sovereignty and could be subject to suit in federal court. 26 In 
these areas, in which the Federal Government had substan-
tive lawmaking authority, Article III's federal question grant 
of jurisdiction gave the federal courts power that extended 
just as far as the legislative power of Congresss; as Hamilton 
had said in discussing the judicial power, "every government 
ought to possess the means of executing its own provisions by 
its own authority," No. 80, at 502 (emphasis in original). 27 
To interpret Article III to impose an independent limit on the 
lawmaking power of Congress would be to turn the "plan of 
the convention" on its head.~ 
/d., at 500. The constitutional mode for enforcing the federal laws, ac-
cording to Hamilton, was the federal judiciary. /d . Again, insofar as the 
states have thus given up powers to the federal government in the "plan of 
the convention," they are no longer full sovereigns and may be subjected to 
suit. 
2<; A number of scholars have noted comments by Hamilton elsewhere in 
the Federalist Papers that strongly suggest that he foresaw the necessity 
for suits against states in federal court. See Fletcher, at 1048; Gibbons, at 
1908-1912; Field, at 534-535. 
:r. The view that the power of the federal courts under federal question 
jurisdiction had to be congruent with the power of Congress to legislate 
under Article I is strongly supported by other writings of Hamilton, as well 
as by other comments made in defense of Article III. See, e. g., The Fed-
1 
eralist, No. 80, at 500 ("If there are such things as political axioms, the 
propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with its 
legislative, may be ranked among the number"); 3 Elliot's Debates, at 532 
(remarks of Madison) (''With respect to the Jaws of the Union, it is so nec-
essary and expedient that the judicial power should correspond with the 
legislative, that it has not been objected to"). 
20 One final piece of evidence concerning the meaning of the original Arti-
cle III comes from the amendments proposed by the various state ratifica-
tion conventions. The New York convention submitted an amendment to 
the First Congress "that nothing in the Constitution now under consider-
ation contained, is to be construed to authorize any suit to be brought 
against any state, in any manner whatever." 2 Elliot's Debates, at 409. 
This suggests at least that the New York delegates did not agree with 
Hamilton's reading of the state-citizen diversity clause. Virginia, North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire also proposed 
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A sober assessment of the ratification debates thus shows 
that there was no firm consensus concerning the extent to 
which the judicial power of the United States extended to 
suits against States. Certain opponents of ratification, like 
Mason, Henry, and the "Federal Farmer," believed that the 
state-citizen diversity clause abrogated state sovereign im-
munity on state causes of action and predicted dire conse-
quences as a result. On the other hand, certain proponents 
ofthe Constitution, like Pendleton, Randolph, and Pickering, 
agreed concerning the interpretation of Article III but be-
lieved that this constituted an argument in favor of the new 
Constitution. Finally, Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton be-
lieved that a State could not be made a defendant in federal 
court in a state-citizen diversity suit. The majority of the 
recorded comments on the question contravene the Court's 
statement in Hans, see supra, at --, that suits against 
States in federal court were inconceivable. 29 
Granted that most of the comments thus expressed a belief 
that state sovereign immunity would not be a defense to suit 
in federal court in state-citizen diversity cases, the question 
remains whether the debates evince a contemporary under-
standing concerning the amenability of States to suit under 
federal question or other subject-matter grants of jurisdic-
tion. Although this question received little direct attention, 
the debates permit some conclusions to be drawn. First, the 
belief that the state-citizen diversity clause abrogated state 
sovereign immunity in federal court implies that the federal 
question and admiralty clauses would have the same effect. 
It would be curious indeed if Article III abrogated a State's 
amendments that would have modified or eliminated the state-citizen di-
versity clause. See Fletcher, at 1051-1052. The felt need for such 
amendments suggests that the delegates to these conventions did not find 
such a limitation in Article III itself. 
29 Indeed, recent scholarship seems unanimously to agree that the 
weight of the evidence is against the Court's statement in Hans. See Ja-
cobs, at 40; Field, at 531; Gibbons, at 1913-1914; Fletcher, at 1054. 
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immunity on causes of action that arose under the State's 
O\Vn laws and over which the federal government had no leg-
islative authority, but gave a State an absolute right to a sov-
ereign immunity defense when it was charged with a viola-
tion of federal law. Second, even Hamilton, who believed 
that the state-citizen clause did not abrogate state sovereign 
immunity in federal court, also left substantial room for suits 
against States when "the plan of the convention" required 
this result. Given the Supremacy Clause and the enumera-
tion of congressional powers in Article I, "the plan of the con-
vention" requires States to answer in federal courts for viola-
tions of duties lawfully imposed on them by Congress in the 
exercise of its Article I powers. Third, the repeated refer-
ences by Hamilton and others to the need for the federal 
courts to be able to exercise jurisdiction that is as extensive 
as Congress' powers to legislate suggests that, if Congress 
had the substantive power under Article I to enact legislation 
providing rights of action against the States, the federal 
courts under Article III could be given jurisdiction to hear 
such cases. 
B 
After the ratification of the Constitution, Congress pro-
vided in Section 13 of the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, 80, 
that "the Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, 
except between a state and its citizens; and except also be-
tween a state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which 
latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdic-
tion." The Act did not provide the federal courts with origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction, although it did in section 25 
provide the Supreme Court with considerable jurisdiction 
over appeals in federal question cases from state courts. 
Despite the controversy over the suability of the states, the 
provision of the Act giving the Supreme Court original juris-
diction under the state-citizen and state-alien diversity 
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clauses surprisingly aroused little or no debate in Congress. 
See Fletcher, at 1053-1054. 30 
Those with disputes against States had no doubt that state-
citizen diversity jurisdiction gave them a remedy in federal 
court. The first case docketed in this Court was 
Vanstophorst v. Maryland, 2 Dall. 401 (1791), a suit by 
Dutch creditors who sought judgments to recover principal 
and interest on Revolutionary War loans to the State of 
Maryland. Although a number of other cases were brought 
against States prior to the passage of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, 31 the most significant of course was Chisholm v. Geor-
gia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). Chisholm was an action in assumpsit 
by a citizen of South Carolina for the price of military goods 
sold to Georgia in 1777. 32 The case squarely presented the 
question whether a State could be sued in federal court. 
80 The First Judiciary Act itself may well suggest Congress' understand-
ing that States would be suable in federal court under the state-citizen di-
versity clause. Although section 13 of the Act did not differentiate be-
tween States as plaintiffs and States as defendants, the same section 
provided that the Supreme Court "shall have exclusively all such jurisdic-
tion of suits or proceedings against ambassadors ... as a court of law can 
have or exercise consistently \\;th the law of nations." If Congress had 
thought that States could not, or ought not , be suable in federal court 
under the state-citizen diversity clause, it easily could have provided that 
the Supreme Court shall exercise such jurisdiction against a state "as a 
court can have or exercise consistently with that state's law." In addition, 
elsewhere in the Act, Congress assigned jurisdiction over cases in which 
the United States was the plaintif. See § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (district court ju-
risdiction of "all suits at common law where the United State sue" subject 
to jurisdictional amount) ; § 11 , 1 Stat. 78 (circuit court jurisdiction of all 
civil suits where $500 or more is in dispute "and the United States are 
plaintiffs, or petitioners"). Congress exercised no such discrimination in 
assigning jurisdiction in cases "between a state and citizens of another 
state." 
1' See Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 
2 Ga. L. Rev. 207, 215-230 (1968) (discussing cases); Jacobs, at 41-47, 
57-64 (same). 
12 The precise facts of Chisholm have been the subject of some scholarly 
dispute. Compare 1 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States His-
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The Court held that federal jurisdiction extended to suits 
against States under the state-citizen diversity clause. Each 
of the five sitting Justices delivered an opinion; only Justice 
Iredell was in dissent. Several features of Chisholm are 
crucial to an understanding of the meaning of the Eleventh 
Amendment. First, two members of the Committee on De-
tail that had drafted Article III at the Convention were in-
volved in the Chisholm case. Both believed that a State 
could be sued in federal court. Edmund Randolph, Wash-
ington's attorney general who had previously represented 
the plaintiff in Vanstophorst v. Maryland, supra, repre-
sented the Chis holm plaintiff and argued strongly that a 
State must be amenable to suit in federal court as a result of 
the plain words of Article III, 2 Dall., at 421, the necessity 
for enforcing the constitutional prohibitions on the States, 
id., at 422, and the implicit consent to suit that occurred on 
ratification of the Constitution, id., at 423. Justice James 
Wilson, another of the drafters of Article III, delivered a 
lengthy opinion in which he urged that sovereign immunity 
had no proper application within the new Republic. I d., at 
453-466. 
Second, Chisholm was not a federal question case. Al-
though the case involved a contract, it was brought pursuant 
to the state-citizen diversity clause and not directly under the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. See 2 Dall., at 420 (ar-
gument of counsel). 33 The case thus squarely raised the issue 
tory 93, n. 1 (1922) (plaintiff in ChisMlm was executor asserting claim on 
behalf of estate of British citizen) with Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: 
Adoption and Interpretation, 2 Ga. L. Rev. 207, 217-218 (1968) (plaintiff in 
Chisholm was executor of estate of South Carolina citizen). The tradi-
tional account, in which the plaintiff was identified as acting on behalf of a 
British citizen, may explain why the Eleventh Amendment modified the 
state-alien diversity clause as well as the state-citizen diversity clause. 
• Most likely, C hish.Qlm could not have been brought directly under the 
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Prior to Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 
87 (1810), it was not at all clear that the Contracts Clause applied to con-
tracts to which a state was a party. Moreover, the case involved a simple 
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whether a suit against a State based on a state-law cause of 
action that was not maintainable in state court could be 
brought in federal court pursuant to the state-citizen diver-
sity clause. The case did not present the question whether a 
state could be sued in federal court where the cause of action 
arose under federal law. 
Third, even Justice Iredell's dissent did not go so far as to 
argue that a state could never be sued in federal court. He 
sketched his argument as follows: 
"I have now, I think, established the following particu-
lars.-1st. That the Constitution, so far as it respects 
the judicial authority, can only be carried into effect by 
acts of the Legislature appointing Courts, and prescrib-
ing their methods of proceeding. 2d. That Congress 
has provided no new law in regard to this case, but ex-
pressly referred us to the old. 3d. That there are no 
principles of the old law, to which we must have re-
course, that in any manner authorize the present suit, 
either by precedent or by analogy." Id., at 449. 
He thus accurately perceived that the question presented 
was whether Article III itself created a cause of action in fed-
eral court to displace state law where a state was being sued. 
Because he believed that it did not, and because he found no 
other source of law on which the state could be held liable in 
the case, he believed that the suit could not be maintained. 34 
breach of contract, not a "law impairing the obligation of the contract" to 
which the Clause would have applied. See Shawnee Sewerage & Drainage 
Co. v. Stearns , 220 U. S. 462, 471 (1911); Brown v. Colorado, 106 U. S. 95, 
98 (1882). Finally, it was certainly not clear at the time of Chisholm that 
the Contracts Clause provided a plaintiff with a private right of action for 
damages. Chisholm was thus a suit on a state-law cause of action in as-
sumpsit against the State of Georgia pursuant to the state-citizen diversity 
clause. 
14 Justice Iredell added, in what he conceded to be dicta: "So much, how-
ever, has been said on the Constitution, that it may not be improper to inti-
mate that my present opinion is strongly against any construction of it, 
which will admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a 
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The decision in Chisholm was handed dovm on February 
18, 1793. On February 19, a resolution was introduced in 
the House of Representatives stating: 
"that no State shall be liable to be made a party defend-
ant in any of the Judicial Courts established or to be es-
tablished under the authority of the United States, at 
the suit of any person or persons, citizens or foreigners, 
or of any body politic or corporate whether within or 
without the United States." 1 C. Warren, The Supreme 
Court in United States History 101 (rev. ed. 1937). 35 
Another resolution was introduced in the Senate on February 
20. That resolution provided: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not ex-
tend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prose-
cuted against one of the United States by citizens of an-
other State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
State. " 3 Annals of Cong. 651-652 (1793) . 
Congress then recessed on March 4, 1793 without taking any 
action on the proposed Amendment. 
By the time Congress reconvened in December, 1793, a 
suit had been brought against Massachusetts in the Supreme 
Court by a British Loyalist whose properties had been confis-
cated. Vassal v. Massachusetts. 36 Georgia had responded 
angrily to the decision in Chisholm, and the Massachusetts 
legislature reacted to the suit against it by enacting a resolu-
tion calling for "the most speedy and effectual measures" to 
State for the recovery of money." 2 Dall., at 449. He emphasized, how-
ever, that he need not decide this broader question: "This opinion I hold , 
however, with all the reserve proper for one, which, according to my senti-
ments in this case, may be deemed in some measure extra-judicial. " ld., 
at 450. 
16 The resolution was not reported in the Annals of Congress, but was 
reported in contemporary newspaper accounts. See Gibbons, at 1926, 
n. 186. 
•The case is unreported, but is discussed in 1 J. Goebel, History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, at 734-735 (1971). 
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obtain a constitutional amendment, including a constitutional 
convention. Resolves of Massachusetts, at 28 (1793) 
(No. 45). Virginia followed with a similar resolution. 1793 
Va. Acts 52. The issue had thus come to a head, and the 
Federalists who controlled Congress no doubt felt consider-
able pressure to act to avoid an open-ended constitutional 
convention. a; 
On January 2, 1794, a resolution was introduced by a Sena-
tor whose identity is not now knov.rn with the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment as it was ultimately enacted: 
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States 
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of 
any foreign State." 4 Annals of Cong. 25 (1794) (empha-
sis added). 
This differed from the original February 20 resolution only in 
the addition of the three italicized words. Senator Gallatin 
moved to amend the resolution to add the words "except in 
cases arising under treaties made under the authority of the 
United States" after "The Judicial power of the United 
States." I d., at 30. After rejecting Gallatin's proposal, the 
Senate then rejected an amendment offered by an unknown 
Senator that would have forbidden suits against states only 
"where the cause of action shall have arisen before the rati-
fication of this amendment." Ibid .38 The Senate ultimately 
voted 23-2 in favor of the Amendment. Ibid. 
3
' For a more detailed explanation of the political situation facing the 
Washington Administration and the Congress at the time, see Gibbons, at 
1927-1932. 
18 The amendment read in full: 
"The Judicial power of the United States extends to all cases in law and 
equity in which one of the United States is a party; but no suit shall be 
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or 
by citizens of subjects of a foreign State, where the cause of action shall 
have arisen before the ratification of this amendment." 
. . 
84-351-DISSENT 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v .. SCANLON 39 
In the House of Representatives, there was only one at-
tempt to amend the resolution. The amendment would have 
added at the end of the Senate version the following lan-
guage: "[ w ]here such State shall have previously made provi-
sion in their own Courts, whereby such suit may be prose-
cuted to effect." 4 Annals of Cong. 476 (1794). This 
resolution, of course, would have ratified the Chisholm result 
that States could be sued under the state-citizen diversity 
clause, but would have given the States an opportunity to 
shift the litigation into their own courts. It was rejected, 
77-8, and the House proceeded to ratify the Amendment by a 
vote of 81-9 on March 4, 1794. 4 Annals of Cong. 476-478 
(1794). Although the chronology of ratification is somewhat 
unclear, 39 President Adams certified that it had been ratified 
four years later on January 8, 1798. 
Those who have argued that the Eleventh Amendment was 
intended to constitutionalize a broad principle of state sover-
eign immunity have always elided the question of why Con-
gress would have chosen the language of the Amendment as 
enacted to state such a broad principle. As shown above, 
there was-to say the least-no consensus at the time of the 
Constitution's ratification as to whether the doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity would have any application in federal 
court. Even if there had been such a consensus, however, 
the Eleventh Amendment would represent a particularly 
cryptic way to embody that consensus in the Constitution. 
Had Congress desired to enshrine state sovereign immunity 
in federal courts for all cases, for instance, it could easily 
have adopted the first resolution introduced on February 19, 
1793 in the House. Alternatively, a strong sovereign immu-
nity principle could have been derived from an Amendment 
that merely omitted the last fourteen words of the enacted 
resolution. See Gibbons, at 1927. However, it does not 
take a particularly close reading of the Eleventh Amendment 
•See Jacobs, at 67, nn. 95-99. 
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to see that it stops far short of that. Article III had pro-
vided "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies 
. . . between a State and Citizens of another State" and "be-
tween a State . . . and foreign . . . Citizens or Subjects." 
The Eleventh Amendment used the identical language in 
stating the the judicial power did not extend to "any suit in 
law or equity ... against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens of Subjects of any For-
eign State." The congruence of language suggests that the 
Amendment was intended simply to adopt the narrow view of 
the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses; henceforth, 
a State could not be sued in federal court where the basis of 
jurisdiction was that the plaintiff was a citizen of another 
State or an alien. 40 
"'It might be argued that, because Congress rejected Senator Gallatin's 
proposal , which would have exempted treaty-based causes of action from 
the operation of the Amendment , Congress intended to leave intact no part 
of the federal question jurisdiction that would potentially have left the 
states open to suit. This argument, however, is untenable. First, it ig-
nores the language of the Amendment. If Congress were generally con-
cerned with suits against States under all Article Ill heads of jurisdiction, 
it would have had no rational reason to direct the Eleventh Amendment 
only against suits by noncitizens or foreigners . Second, Congress may 
well have rejected Gallatin's proposal precisely because to adopt that pro-
posal would have have implied some limitation on the ability of the federal 
courts to hear non-treaty based federal question claims. Thus, Congress' 
rejection of the proposal may well have been based on its desire to pre-
serve the full contours of Article III federal question jurisdiction, rather 
than on a desire to limit it. Third, the federal courts had no general origi-
nal federal question jurisdiction under the First Judiciary Act, although 
the Supreme Court did have substantial appellate federal question jurisdic-
tion over cases originating in state courts. In refusing in the First Judi-
ciary Act to grant original federal question jurisdiction to the federal 
courts, Congress had evidently decided that federal question cases, even 
those arising out of the Treaty of Paris, should be heard in the first in-
stance in state court. In deciding to enact the Eleventh Amendment to 
overrule Chisholm, Congress had decided that the state-citizen and state-
alien clauses ought not permit suits against states in federal court. Given 
these two decisions, Congress had little reason to make an exception to 
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It may be argued that the true intentions of the Second 
Congress were revealed by its use of the words "shall not be 
construed" in the text of the Amendment. According to this 
argument, Congress intended not merely to qualify the state-
citizen and state-alien diversity clauses, but also to establish 
a rule of construction barring exercise of the federal jurisdic-
tion in any case-even one otherwise maintainable under the 
subject-matter heads of jurisdiction-in which a noncitizen or 
alien was suing a State. This view at least is consistent ·with 
the language of the Amendment, and would lead to the con-
clusion that suits by noncitizens or aliens against a State are 
never permitted, while suits by a citizen are permissible. 41 
Recent scholarship, however, suggests strongly that this 
view is incorrect. In particular, two other explanations for 
the use of these terms have been advanced. Some have ar-
gued that the words were a natural means for Congress to 
rebuke the Supreme Court for its construction of the words 
"between a State and citizens of another State" in Chisholm; 
no longer should those words be construed to extend federal 
jurisdiction to suits brought under that clause in which the 
state was defendant. See, e. g., Fletcher, at 1061-1062. 
Others have argued that the words were added to assure the 
retrospective application of the Eleventh Amendment. See, 
e. g., Jacobs, at 68-69. Of course, if the latter meaning were 
both decisions for suits that arose out of the Treaty. Finally, the case of 
Vassal v. Massachusetts , in which a British Loyalist had brought a chal-
lenge under the state-alien clause to the State's confiscation of his prop-
erty, had triggered a movement for a constitutional convention. See 
supra, at -. By rejecting the Gallatin proposal, which would have au-
thorized the Vassal suit, Congress no doubt acted in part to squelch the 
movement for an open-ended constitutional convention. 
41 When the Court is prepared to embark on a defensible interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment consistent with its history and purposes, the 
question whether the Amendment bars federal-question or admiralty suits 
by a noncitizen or alien against a State would be open. At the current 
time, as the text states, the commentators' arguments against this inter-
pretation seem to me quite plausible. 
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intended, the words had their intended effect, for the Court 
dismissed cases pending on its docket under the state-citizen 
diversity clause when the Amendment was ratified. E. g., 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798). 42 
The language of the Eleventh Amendment, its legislative 
history, and the attendant historical circumstances all 
strongly suggest that the Amendment was intended to rem-
edy an interpretation of the Constitution that would have had 
the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses of Article 
III abrogating the state law of sovereign immunity on state-
law causes of action brought in federal courts. The economy 
of this explanation, which accounts for the rather legalistic 
terms in which the Amendment and Article III were written, 
does not require extravagant assumptions about the unex-
pressed intent of Congress and the state legislatures, and is 
itself a strong point in its favor. The original Constitution 
did not embody a principle of sovereign immunity as a limit 
on the federal judicial power. There is simply no reason to 
believe that the Eleventh Amendment established such a 
broad principle for the first time. 
The historical record in fact confirms that, far from cor-
recting the error made in Chislwlm, the Court's interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment makes a similar mistake. 
The C hislwl?n Court had interpreted the state-citizen clause 
of Article III to work a major substantive change in state 
law, or at least in those cases arising under state law that 
found their way to federal court. The Eleventh Amendment 
corrected that error, and henceforth required that the party-
based heads of jurisdiction in Article III be construed not to 
work this kind of drastic modification of state law. The 
Court's current interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment 
makes the opposite mistake, construing the Eleventh 
Amendment to work a major substantive change in federal 
42 In any event, I find it much more plausible to leave the construction of 
these words somewhat unclear, than to leave the construction of much of 
the Amendment a superfluity, as the Court's construction would do. 
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law. According to the Court, the Eleventh Amendment im-
poses a substantive limit on the Necessary and Proper Clause 
of Article I, limiting the remedies that Congress may author-
ize for State violations of federal law. This construction suf-
fers from the same defect as that of Chis holm: both construe 
the enumeration of heads of jurisdiction to impose substan-
tive limits on lawmaking authority. 
Article III grants a federal question jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts that is as broad as is the lawmaking authority of 
Congress. If Congress acting within its Article I or other 
powers creates a legal right and remedy, and if neither the 
right nor the remedy violate any provision of the Constitu-
tion outside Article III, then Congress may entrust adjudica-
tion of claims based on the newly created right to the federal 
courts-even if the defendant is a State. Neither Article III 
nor the Eleventh Amendment impose an independent limit on 
the lawmaking authority of Congresss. This view makes 
sense of the language, history, and purposes of Article III 
and of the Eleventh Amendment. It is also the view that 
was adopted in the earliest interpretations of the Amend-
ment by the Marshall Court. 
c 
After the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, the 
number of suits against States in the federal courts was 
largely curtailed. The Amendment itself had eliminated the 
constitutional basis for the provisions of the First Judiciary 
Act granting the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over 
suits against States by an alien or noncitizen. Because there 
was no general statutory grant of original federal question ju-
risdiction to the federal courts, 43 suits against States would 
43 The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 89, did grant general federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to the federal circuit courts, but that grant was repealed 
one year later. 2 Stat. 132, 156 (1802). 
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not arise under that head of jurisdiction. 44 Nonetheless, the 
Marshall Court did have a number of opportunities to con-
front the issue of state sovereign immunity. The Court's de-
cisions reflect a consistent understanding of the limited effect 
of the Amendment on the structure of federal jurisdiction 
outside the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses. 
Because the Justices on the Marshall Court lived through the 
ratification of the Constitution, the decision in Chislwlm v. 
Georgia , and the subsequent enactment of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the Marshall Court's views on the meaning of 
the Amendment should take on particular importance. 
(1) 
Admiralty was perhaps the most significant head of federal 
jurisdiction in the early nineteenth century. As Hamilton 
noted in a much-quoted pasage from the Federalist Papers: 
"The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus 
far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cog-
nizance of maritime causes." The Federalist No. 80, at 502 
(Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961). Although few admiralty 
cases could be expected to arise in which the states were de-
fendants, the Marshall Court in the few instances in which it 
confronted the issue showed a strong reluctance to construe 
the Eleventh Amendment to interfere with the admiralty ju-
risdiction of the federal courts. 
In United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (1809), the Court 
adjudicated a controversy over whether certain funds, pro-
ceeds of an admiralty prize sale dating from the 1770's, be-
longed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or to a private 
claimant. ld., at 136-139. The Commonwealth claimed the 
money as the result of a state court judgment in its favor, 
while the private claimant's claim was based on a judgment 
received from a national prize court established under the 
" Nor coule a suit against a state be brought under diversity jurisdic-
tion, because a state is not a citizen of itself for such purposes. See Postal 
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U. S. 482 (1894). 
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Articles of Confederation. The money claimed by the Com-
monwealth had been held by the state treasurer, who had 
since died. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, 
held that the Eleventh Amendment did not interfere with the 
traditional common law suit against a state official for recov-
ery of funds held with notice of an adverse claim. According 
to Marshall, the suit could be maintained against the state of-
ficial, even though the relief sought was a recovery of funds. 
Marshall carefully avoided deciding whether the Eleventh 
Amendment would have barred the action if it had been nec-
essary to bring it against the State itself: "If these proceeds 
had been the actual property of Pennsylvania, however 
wrongfully acquired, the disclosure of that fact would have 
presented a case on which it was unnecessary to give an opin-
ion." !d., at 139. Nonetheless, Marshall's construction of 
the Eleventh Amendment by preserving the essential rem-
edy of a money judgment that, in effect, ran against the 
state, left federal admiralty jurisdiction intact. 
Later that same year, Justice Bushrod Washington, who 
had sat on the Peters Court, heard a sequel to Peters that 
arose when the state resisted the execution of the Peters 
judgment. United States v. Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (1809) 
(No. 14,647). After agreeing with the Peters Court that the 
state treasurer could be sued for the funds in his private ca-
pacity, he went on to note that the Eleventh Amendment in 
terms applies only to suits "in law or equity." Because the 
Framers of the Amendment did not add the words "or to 
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," id., at 1236, 
the Amendment should not be construed to extend to admi-
ralty cases. 45 Washington thus did not read the Amendment 
.. Justice Washington explained the exclusion of admiralty jurisdiction in 
part on the ground that admiralty proceedings are often in rem and that a 
judgment could thus be enforced without implicating the "delicate" ques-
tion of how to execute a judgment against a State. United States v. 
Bright, 24 Fed. Cas., at 1236. Although this concern echoed some of the 
difficulties raised in the debate over ratification of the Constitution, the dif-
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to require a broad constitutional prohibition of suits against 
States in federal court. Moreover, given the importance of 
admiralty jurisdiction at the time, Congress' failure to in-
clude admiralty suits in the express terms of the statute was 
unlikely to have been an oversight. 
The Marshall Court again refused to hold that the Elev-
enth Amendment barred suits in admiralty against States in 
Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828). On ap-
peal from a federal circuit court decision, a clamant alleged 
that he, and not the State of Georgia, was entitled to the pro-
ceeds of a prize sale. Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the 
Court, held that the suit was in reality a suit against the 
State. Although the governor was named as defendant, 
there was no allegation that he had violated any federal or 
state law, and thus "no case is made which justifies a decree 
against him personally." I d., at 124. The Court then dis-
missed the case because the circuit court had no jurisdiction 
over it: "if the 11th amendment to the Constitution, does not 
extend to proceedings in admiralty, it was a case for the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." I d., at 124.46 
Writing in 1833, Justice Joseph Story noted: 
"It has been doubted, whether this amendment extends 
to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where 
the proceeding is in rem and not in personam. There, 
the jurisdiction of the court is founded upon the posses-
sion of the thing; and if the state should interpose a claim 
for the property, it does not act merely in the character 
ficulty of executing a judgment against a State was ultimately rejected by 
the Courtas a ground to expand state sovereign immunity in federal court. 
See infra, at - . 
.. In 1833, the Court dismissed an original action brought by Madrazo 
based on the same claim. Ex Parte Madrazzo, 7 Pet. 627 (1833). The 
Court's one-paragraph opinion apparently dismissed the case on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds because it "is a mere personal suit against a state to 
recover proceeds in its possession." /d., at 632. This was the only case 
dismissed by the Supreme Court on Eleventh Amendment grounds be-
tween Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (1798) and the Civil War. 
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of a defendant, but as an actor. Besides the language of 
the amendment is, that 'the judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law 
or equity.' But a suit in the admiralty is not, correctly 
speaking, a suit in law, or in equity; but is often spoken 
of in contradistinction to both." 3 J. Story, Commentar-
ies on the Constitution of the United States, at 560-561 
(1833). 47 
As Justice Story pointed out, the result of the early admi-
ralty cases was that the Eleventh Amendment was not seen 
as an obstacle to the exercise of otherwise legitimate federal 
admiralty jurisdiction. 
(2) 
Until1875, Congress did not endow the federal courts with 
general federal question jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the Su-
preme Court had several opportunities to decide federal 
question cases against States. In some of these, suit was 
brought against a State in state court and an appeal was 
taken to the Supreme Court. If the Eleventh Amendment 
had constitutionalized state sovereign immunity as a limit to 
the Article III federal judicial power, it would have operated 
as a limit on both original and appellate federal question ju-
risdiction, for nothing in the text or subsequent interpreta-
tions of Article III suggests that the federal judicial power 
extends more broadly to hear appeals than to decide original 
cases. 48 Although the Court has largely ignored this conse-
quence of its constitutional sovereign immunity doctrine, 49 it 
was a consequence that the Marshall Court squarely faced. 
•• Justice Story cited Peters, Bright , and Madrazo in support of his 
statement. 
<~~See Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (Article Ill 
limits on federal jurisdiction apply to appeal of case from New Jersey state 
courts). 
• Cf. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 445 (1900) (state may consent to 
suit in its own courts "subject always to the condition, arising out of the 
supremacy of the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in 
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In Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821), Chief Justice 
Marshall addressed the question of the effect of the Eleventh 
Amendment on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to 
review a criminal conviction obtained in a Virginia state 
court. Counsel for the State argued that either the original 
Constitution or the Eleventh Amendment denied the federal 
courts the power to hear such an appeal, in which a State was 
being "sued" for a ·writ of error in the Supreme Court. Mar-
shall noted at the outset of his opinion for the Court that Ar-
ticle III provides federal jurisdiction "to all the cases de-
scribed, without making in its terms any exception whatever, 
and without any exception whatever, and ·without any regard 
to the condition of the party." I d., at 378. After repeating 
this principle several times, 50 the Chief Justice stated: "We 
think, then, that, as the constitution originally stood, the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of this Court, in all cases arising under the 
pursuance thereof, that the final judgment of the highest court of the State 
in any action brought against it with its consent may be reviewed or re-
examined, as prescribed by the act of Congress, if it denies to the plaintiff 
any right , title, privilege or immunity secured to him and specially claimed 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States"). 
60 The repetitions of this principle make the point unmistakably. He 
states that the judicial department "is authorized to decide all cases of 
every description, arising under the constitution or laws of the United 
States. From this general grant of jurisdiction, no exception is made of 
those cases in which a State may be a party." Jd., at 382. "We think a 
case arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, is cogni-
zable in the Courts of the Union, whoever may be the parties to that case." 
ld., at 383. "[W)e think that the judicial power, as originally given, ex-
tends to all cases arising under the constitution or a law of the United 
States, whoever may be the parties." Jd., at 392. It is worth noting that 
the Court has often given a broad reading to Marshall's statements in the 
Virginia ratification convention, interpreting those statements to express 
Marshall's view that a constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity 
in federal courts was an element of the original understanding of Article 
III. See, e. g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890); Monaco v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U. S., at 324. The Chief Justice's discussion in Cohens, how-
ever, demonstrates that it may be prudent to give his earlier statements 
the less expansive interpretation suggested supra, at --. 
84-351-DISSENT 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL t·. SCANLON 49 
constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, was not 
arrested by the circumstance that a State was a party." !d., 
at 405. 
Marshall then went on to consider the applicability of the 
Eleventh Amendment. After holding that a criminal de-
fendant's petition for a writ of error is not properly under-
stood to be a suit "commenced" or "prosecuted" by an individ-
ual against a state, Marshall stated an alternative holding: 
"But should we in this be mistaken, the error does not 
affect the case now before the Court. If this writ of 
error be a suit in the sense of the 11th amendment, it is 
not a suit commenced or prosecuted 'by a citizen of an-
other State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign 
State.' It is not then within the amendment, but is gov-
erned entirely by the constitution as originally framed, 
and we have already seen, that in its origin, the judicial 
power was extended to all cases arising under the con-
stitution or laws of the United States, without respect to 
parties." ld., at 412. 51 
Thus, the Marshall Court in Cohens squarely confronted the 
issue of the extent to which the Eleventh Amendment en-
s' Marshall 's statement is of course consistent with the view that the 
Eleventh Amendment bars federal question jurisdiction over suits that are 
prosecuted against States by noncitizens or aliens, but does not bar federal 
jurisdiction over suits by citizens of the State being sued. But it is flatly 
inconsistent with the Court's current position that the Amendment, de-
spite its language and history, should be interpreted as constitutionalizing 
a broad sovereign immunity principle. Like the discussion earlier in Co-
hens, it evinces the Marshall Court's understanding that the Eleventh 
Amendment was to be construed narrowly to accomplish the purpose for 
which it was adopted. It is worth noting that, when the troublesome case 
hypothesized in Cohens-in which a writ of error was taken by a noncitizen 
of a state-arose ten years later, the Marshall Court reached the merits of 
the claim without even discussing any possible Eleventh Amendment bar. 
See Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (1832). Although the Court in 
Worcester did not discuss the Eleventh Amendment issue, the issue was 
raised by the appellant. See id., at 533-534. 
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croached on federal question jurisdiction, and concluded that 
it made no encroachment at all. This result is not distin-
guishable on the ground that it concerned only the exercise of 
appellate, and not original, federal question jurisdiction. As 
was made clear three years later in Osborn v. Bank of the 
United States , 9 Wheat. 738 (1824): 
"In those cases in which original jurisdiction is given to 
the Supreme Court, the judicial power of the United 
States cannot be exercised in its appellate form. In 
every other case, the power is to be exercised in its origi-
nal or appellate form, or both, as the wisdom of Congress 
may direct. With the exception of these cases, in which 
original jurisdiction is given to this Court, there is none 
to which the judicial power extends, from which the orig-
inal jurisdiction of the inferior Courts is excluded by the 
constitution. Original jurisdiction, so far as the con-
stitution gives a rule, is co-extensive with the judicial 
power. We find , in the constitution, no prohibition to 
its exercise, in every case in which the judicial power can 
be exercised." !d., at 821. 
The Court continued, speaking of federal question jurisdic-
tion: "It would be a very bold construction to say, that [the 
judicial] power could be applied in its appellate form only, to 
the most important class of cases to which it is applicable." 
Ibid. 
Osborn itself involved several important Eleventh Amend-
ment issues. The State of Ohio had seized bank notes and 
specie of the Bank of the United States pursuant to a statute 
imposing a tax on the Bank. The statute was evidently un-
constitutional under the Court's holding in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). The Bank, which was 
treated as a private corporation and not a division of the fed-
eral government for purposes of the suit, obtained an injunc-
tion in federal court prohibiting the state from enforcing the 
tax and requiring the return of the seized funds. The State 
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of Ohio appealed to the Supreme Court, relying in part on the 
Eleventh Amendment as a bar to the proceedings. 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court carefully ex-
plains that the sovereign immunity principles of the Eleventh 
Amendment have no application where the State is not a 
party of record: 
"It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of 
no exception, that, in all cases where jurisdiction de-
pends on the party, it is the party named in the record. 
Consequently, the 11th amendment, which restrains the 
jurisdiction granted by the constitution over suits 
against States, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in 
which a State is a party on the record." 9 Wheat., at 
857. 
Technically, this principle does not address the question 
whether a suit may be brought against a state, but rather the 
question whether a suit is indeed to be understood as a suit 
against a State. 52 Nonetheless, it represents a narrow, tech-
nical construction of the Eleventh Amendment, and is thus of 
a piece with the immediately following language: 
"The amendment has its full effect, if the constitution be 
construed as it would have been construed, had the juris-
diction of the Court never been extended to suits 
brought against a State, by the citizens of another State, 
or by aliens." Id., at 857-858. 
The restatement of the principle of Cohens demonstrates 
Marshall's understanding that neither Article III nor the 
Eleventh Amendment limits the ability of the federal courts 
to hear the full range of cases arising under federal law. 
112 This conclusion is in some tension with the Court's holding in Governor 
of Georgia v. Madrazo, 1 Pet. 110 (1828), discussed supra, at-. But 
see id., at 122-123. It has been suggested that the distinction between 
the cases is that there was no cause of action available under federal or 
admiralty law against the Governor personally in Madrazo, while the con-
trary was the case here. See Fletcher, at 1086-1087; Jacobs, at-. 
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The lack of original federal question jurisdiction, combined 
with the paucity of admiralty actions against the states, de-
prived the Marshall Court of the opportunity to rule often on 
the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on state sovereign im-
munity in federal court. Moreover, the Court's rulings dem-
onstrate a certain reluctance squarely to decide the extent to 
which the States were suable in federal court. This was per-
haps a result of the Court's sensitivity to the unpopular deci-
sion in Chisholm v. Georgia, the lack of effective govern-
mental power to enforce its decisions, and the centripetal 
forces that were driving the nation toward civil war. None-
theless, a careful reading of the Marshall Court's precedents 
indicates that the Marshall Court consistently adopted nar-
row and technical readings of the Amendment's import and 
thus carefully retained the full measure of federal question 
and admiralty jursdiction. 
IV 
The Marshall Court's precedents, and the original under-
standing of the Eleventh Amendment, survived until near 
the end of the nineteenth century. In 1875, Congress gave 
the federal courts general original federal question jurisdic-
tion. 18 Stat. 470. For the first time, suits could now be 
brought against States in federal court based on the exist-
ence of a federal cause of action. In Hans v. Lousiana, 134 
U. S. 1 (1890), a citizen of Louisiana sued his State for pay-
ment on some bonds that the state government had repudi-
ated. The plaintiff claimed a violation of the Contracts 
Clause. The Court held in favor of the State and ordered the 
suit dismissed. 
Hans has been taken to stand for the proposition that the 
Eleventh Amendment, despite its tenns, bars the federal 
courts from hearing federal question suits by citizens against 
their own State. 53 As I have argued before, the Court's 
63 For example, the Court today states that in Hans, ''the Court held 
that the [Eleventh] Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit 
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ambiguous opinion need not be interpreted in this way. See 
Employees v. Dep't of Public Health & Welfare, 411 U. S. 
279, 313-315 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). The Hans 
Court relied on Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm, which 
as noted above, supra, at --, rested on the absence of a 
statutory cause of action for Mr. Chisholm against the State 
of Georgia and reserved the question of the constitutional 
status of state sovereign immunity. See Hans, 134 U. S., at 
18-19. The Court further noted the "presumption that no 
anomalous and unheard-of proceedings or suits were in-
tended to be raised up by this Constitution-anomalous and 
unheard of when the Constitution was adopted." I d., at 18. 
The opinion can thus sensibly be read to have dismissed the 
suit before it on the ground that no federal cause of action 
supported the plaintiff's suit and that state-law causes of ac-
tion would of course be subject to the ancient common-law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Whether the Court's departure from a sound interpreta-
tion of the Eleventh Amendment occurred in Hans or only in 
later cases that misread Hans, however, is relatively un-
important. If Hans is a constitutional holding, it rests by its 
own terms on two premises. 
First, the opinion cites the comments by Madison, Mar-
shall, and Hamilton in the ratification debates. I d., at 
12-14. The Court concludes that permitting suits against 
States would be "startling and unexpected," id., at 11, and 
would "strain the Constitution and the law to a construction 
never imagined or dreamed of." I d., at 15. The historical 
record outlined above demonstrates that the Court's history 
was plainly mistaken. Numerous individuals at the time of 
the Constitution's ratification believed that it would have ex-
actly the effect the Hans Court found unimaginable. More-
over, even the comments of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton 
need not be taken to advocate a constitutional doctrine of 
against his own State in federal court, even though the expres tenns of the 
Amendment do not so provide." Ante, at 3. 
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state sovereign immunity. Read literally and in context, all 
three were explicitly addressed to the particular problem of 
the state-citizen diversity clause. All three were vitally con-
cerned with the constitutionally unauthorized displacement 
of the state law of creditors' rights and remedies that would 
be worked by an incorrect reading of the state-citizen diver-
sity clause. All three are fully consistent with a recognition 
that Constitution neither abrogated nor instituted state sov-
ereign immunity, but rather left the ancient doctrine as it 
found it: a state-law defense available in state-law causes of 
action prosecuted in federal court. 
Second, the opinion relies heavily on the supposedly 
"anomalous" result that, if the Eleventh Amendment were 
read literally: 
"in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
United States, a State may be sued in the federal courts 
by its own citizens, though it cannot be sued for a like 
cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a for-
eign state." /d ., at 10. 
Even if such an "anomaly" existed, it would not justify judi-
cial re·writing of the Eleventh Amendment and Article III 
and the wholesale disregard of precedents. But in any event 
a close look at the historical record reveals that the "anom-
aly" can easily be avoided without a general expansion of a 
constitutionalized sovereign immunity doctrine. The Elev-
enth Amendment can and should be interpreted in accord-
ance with its original purpose to re-establish the ancient doc-
trine of sovereign immunity in state-law causes of action 
based on the state-citizen and state-alien diversity clauses; in 
such a state-law action, the identity of the parties is not alone 
sufficient to permit federal jurisdiction. If federal jurisdic-
tion is based on the existence of a federal question or some 
other clause of Article III, however, the Eleventh Amend-
ment has no relevance. There is thus no Article III limita-
tion on otherwise proper suits against States by citizens, non-
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citizens, or aliens , and no "anomaly" that requires such 
drastic "correction." 
The Court has repeatedly relied on Hans as establishing a 
broad principle of state immunity from suit in federal court. 54 
The historical record demonstrates that, if Hans was a con-
stitutional holding, it rested on misconceived history and mis-
guided logic. 65 
The doctrine that has thus been created is pernicious. In 
an era when sovereign immunity has been generally recog-
nized by courts and legislatures as an anachronistic and un-
necessary remnant of a feudal legal system, see, e. g., Great 
Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 57 (1944) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Muskopf v. Corning Hospital 
Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211 , 11 Cal. Rpts. 89, 359 P. 2d 457 (1961); 
W. Prosser, Handbook of The Law of Torts, at 984-987 (4th 
ed. 1971), the Court has aggressively expanded its scope. If 
this doctrine were required to enhance the liberty of our peo-
ple in accordance ·with the Constitution's protections, I could 
accept it. If the doctrine were required by the structure of 
the federal system created by the Framers, I could accept it. 
Yet the current doctrine intrudes on the ideal of liberty 
under law by protecting the States from the consequences of 
their illegal conduct. And the decision obstructs the sound 
operation of our federal system by limiting the ability of Con-
gress to take steps it deems necessary and proper to achieve 
national goals within its constitutional authority. 
I respectfully dissent. 
114 ln Ex Parte New York , No . 1, 256 U. S. 490 (1921), the Court even 
extended Hans (or its view of Hans) to admiralty jurisdiction, thus over-
ruling Justice Washington's 110-year-old holding that the Eleventh 
Amendment did not apply to admiralty actions. See United States v. 
Bright, 24 Fed. Cas. 1232 (1809) (No. 14,647), discussed supra, at-. 
66 If Hans was not a constitutional holding, however, its use of the Madi-
son, Marshall, and Hamilton comments would be substantially more justifi-
able; the relevance of this material was simply to show that the common 
law did not recognize a cause of action on a debt against a sovereign. 
Since Congress had not created any such action, the Court justifiably re-
fused to do so itself. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November, 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hospi-
tal and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, alleging that in 1978 the Hospital denied ·him 
employment as a graduate student assistant recreational 
therapist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respond-
ent charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire 
him violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U. S. C. § 794, (the Act) and certain state fair employment 
laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunctive, and de-
clarative relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal 
court from entertaining respondent's claims. Alternatively, 
~~~~ 
- 84-351-0PINION 2 ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
petitioners argued that a suit for employment discrimination 
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege 
that the primary objective of the federal assistance received 
by the defendants is to provide employment, and that re-
spondent's case should be dismissed because he did not so 
allege. In January, 1980, the District Court granted peti-
tioners' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
respondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It did not reach the question 
whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respondent's 
suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the ground 
that respondent failed to allege an essential element of a 
claim under § 504, namely that a primary objective of the 
federal funds received by the defendants was to provide 
employment. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in 
light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, -- U. S. --
(1984), 104 S. Ct. 1248, in which we held that § 504's bar on 
employment discrimination is not limited to programs that 
receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing 
employment. 104 S. Ct., at 1254. On remand, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It 
held that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respond-
ent's] action because the state, if it has participated in and 
received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, 
has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 
U. S. C. § 794." J. A., at A-5. Although noting that the 
Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a 
State's consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from 
its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court 
based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, 
procedures, and rights against "any recipient of Federal 
84-351-0PINION 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 3 
assistance" and regulations expressly defining the class of 
recipients to include the States. Citing our decision in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974), the court 
determined that the "threshold fact of congressional authori-
zation to sue a class of defendants which literally includes the 
states" was present in this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the courts of appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Mass. Rehabilitation Commn., 718 F. 2d 1 (CAl 
1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CAS), cert denied, 
459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to resolve this 
conflict, and we now reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 
- U.S. -, - (1984), 104 S. Ct. 900, 906 (1984). 
Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court 
held that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a 
suit against his own State in federal court, even though the 
express terms of the Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 377 (1883). 1 
1 A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise consenting to suit 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation," the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). As 
a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment without the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the federal Govern-
ment and the States, this Court consistently has held that 
these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions 
are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to 
have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by the most 
express language or by such overwhelming implications from 
the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable con-
struction."' Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974), 
quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 
(1909). Likewise, in determining whether Congress in ex-
ercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have re-
quired "an unequivocal expression of congressional intent 'to 
overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the 
several States."' Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 907 (1984), quoting Quern v. Jor-
dan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Mis-
souri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279 (1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to 
federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974), 
"[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the sur-
render of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
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Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
108 U. S. 436 (1883). Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of 
the California Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be 
brought against the State in such manner and in such courts 
as shall be directed by law." In respondent's view, unless 
the California legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign 
immunity, the State is potentially subject to suit in any court, 
federal as well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to 
be waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981). As we explained just last 
Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity encom-
passes not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may 
be sued." Pennhurst, supra,-- U. S., at-- (1984), 104 
S. Ct., at 907. Thus, in order for a state statute or constitu-
tional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to sub-
ject itself to suit in federal court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 
U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. 
Read, 322 U. S. 47,54 (1944). In view of these principles, 
we do not believe that Art. III, § 5 of the California Constitu-
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tion constitutes waiver of the State's constitutional immu-
nity. This provision does not specifically indicate the State's 
willingness to be sued in federal court. Indeed, the provi-
sion appears simply to authorize the legislature to waive the 
State's sovereign immunity. In the absence of an unequivo-
cal waiver specifically applicable to federal court jurisdiction, 
we decline to find that California has waived its constitutional 
immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, well-established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, -- U.S., at--; Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U. S. 332 (1979). We decline to do, and reaffirm the princi-
ple that Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally 
secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making 
its intention unmistakeably clear in the language of the stat-
ute. The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by 
the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion. 
Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,-- U. S. --, 27 (1985). The "constitutionally 
mandated balance of power" between the States and the fed-
eral government was adopted by the framers to ensure the 
protection of "our fundamental liberties." I d., at 16 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of 
the States against suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amend-
ment serves to maintain this balance. "Our reluctance to 
infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts 
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has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system." 
Pennhurst, supra, 104 S. Ct., at 907. 
Congress' power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
means that in certain circumstances, the usual constitutional 
balance between the States and federal government does not 
obtain. "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate 
legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against 
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissi-
ble in other contexts." Fitzpatrick, supra, 427 U. S., at 456. 
In view of this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to 
be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law 
overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The 
requirement that Congress unequivocally express this inten-
tion in the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts must decide whether their own jurisdiction has 
been expanded. Although it is of course the duty of this 
Court "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only on 
the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpreta-
t . ") wn ... . 
For these reasons, we reiterate the view-made clear in 
Quern, Edelman, and Pennhurst II,-that Congress must 
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in 
unmistakeable language in the statute itself. 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Section 504 of the Re-
2 Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
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habilitation Act of 1973 (the Act) provides in pertinent part: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency of 
the United States Postal Service." 29 U. S. C. § 794." 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes 
the remedies available under the Act, including the provi-
sions pertinent to this case: 
"(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000d et seq] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, 
the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In any case, we think the legislative 
history makes clear that the Act was adopted under Congress' Fourteenth 
Amendment power. See, e. g., S. Rep. 93-1297, at 38; 118 Cong. Rec. 35, 
841 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Stafford); 117 Cong. Rec. 45, 974, 1595 (1972) 
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aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not 
the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses 
to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, supra, citing Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332. Accordingly, we hold that the Rehabilitation 
Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits 
against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the ss>urt of 
!ppeals, that the State has waived its immunity in tnis case 
oy its acceptance of funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 
-- F. 2d --, --. The court belie¥ed that-mere tha~ 
" 
"the extensive provisions [of the Act] under 
which states are the express intended recipients of federal 
assistance." Id., at--, citing 29 U. S. C. 720 et seq. In 
view of these provisions, the court concluded that "[i]f the 
states receive federal assistance under the statute, they 
plainly fall within the defined class of potential defendants." 
Ibid. 
The court properly recognized that mere receipt of federal 
funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in 
federal court. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981); Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U. S., at 673. The court erred, however, in concluding 
that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation Act are 
addressed to the States, e. g., 29 U.S. C. §720, a State nec-
essarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in 
programs funded under the statute. As we have decided 
today, the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistake-
able congressional purpose to abrogate the States' constitu-
tional immunity. Thus, the States hardly could be put on 
notice that their acceptance of funds under the Act entailed 
constructive consent to suit in federal court. In view of this 




10 ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
eral jurisdiction as a condition of participation in programs 
under the Act. 
VI 
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of 
expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the 
State of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in 
federal court. In view of these determinations, the judg-
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November, 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hospi-
tal and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, alleging that in 1978 the Hospital denied him employ-
ment as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist 
solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent 
charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire him 
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, and certain state fair em-
ployment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc-
tive, and declarative relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal 
court from entertaining respondent's claims. Alternatively, 
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petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimina-
tion under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance re-
ceived by the defendants is to provide employment, and that 
respondent's case should be dismissed because he did not so 
allege. In January, 1980, the District Court granted petition-
ers' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that re-
spondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 677 
F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the question whether the 
Eleventh Amendment proscribed respondent's suit. Rather 
it affirmed the District Court on the ground that respondent 
failed to allege an essential element of a claim under § 504, 
namely that a primary objective of the federal funds received 
by the defendants was to provide employment. I d., at 1272. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in 
light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, -- U. S. --
(1984), in which we held that § 504's bar on employment dis-
crimination is not limited to programs that receive federal aid 
for the primary purpose of providing employment. I d., at 
--. On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the District Court. It held that "the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar [respondent's] action because the 
state, if it has participated in and received funds from pro-
grams under the Rehabilitation Act, has implicitly consented 
to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d 
359, 362 (1984). Although noting that the Rehabilitation Act 
did not expressly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, the court reasoned that a State's consent to suit in 
federal court could be inferred from its participation in pro-
grams funded by the Act. The court based its view on the 
fact that the Act provided remedies, procedures, and rights 
against "any recipient of Federal assistance" and regulations 
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expressly defining the class of recipients to include the 
States. Quoting our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U. S. 651, 673 (1974), the court determined that the "thresh-
old fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of de-
fendants which literally includes [the] states" was present in 
this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the courts of appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F. 2d 
1 (CAl 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CA8), cert 
denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to re-
solve this conflict, and we now reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any For~ign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1984) (Pennhurst 11) . Thus, in Hans 
v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the 
Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his 
own State in federal court, even though the express terms of 
the Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 477 (1883). 1 
'A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immu-
nity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce by ap-
propriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 
456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment without the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States, this Court consistently has held that 
these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions 
are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to 
have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by the most 
express language or by such overwhelming implications from 
the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable con-
struction."' Edelman v. Jordan, supra, quoting Murray v. 
Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). Likewise, 
in determining whether Congress in exercising its Four-
teenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity, we have required "an unequivo-
cal expression of congressional intent to 'overturn the 
constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.'" 
Pennhurst II,-- U.S., at--, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Missouri 
Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to 
consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 
(1974), "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with 
the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
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waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
supra. Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of the California 
Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be brought against 
the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be di-
rected by law." In respondent's view, unless the California 
legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immunity, the 
State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as 
well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive 
the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 
U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just last 
Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity encom-
passes not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may 
be sued." Pennhurst II, supra, at--. Thus, in order for a 
state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a 
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify 
the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court. 
See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900); Great North-
ern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944). In 
view of these principles, we do not believe that Art. III, § 5 of 
the California Constitution constitutes a waiver of the State's 
constitutional immunity. This provision does not specifically 
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indicate the State's willingness to be sued in federal court. 
Indeed, the provision appears simply to authorize the legisla-
ture to waive the State's sovereign immunity. In the ab-
sence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to fed-
eral court jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has 
waived its constitutional immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, well-established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, -- U. S., at --; Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U. S. 332, 342-345 (1979). We decline to do so, and affirm 
that Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally se-
cured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its 
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. 
The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the 
Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion. 
Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
.... " Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity,-- U. S. --, -- (1985). The "constitutionally man-
dated balance of power" between the States and the federal 
government was adopted by the framers to ensure the pro-
tection of "our fundamental liberties." I d., at -- (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of 
the States against suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amend-
ment serves to maintain this balance. "Our reluctance to 
infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts 
has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of 
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system." 
Pennhurst II, supra, at --. 
Congress' power to abrogate a State's immunity means 
that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance 
between the States and Federal Government does not obtain. 
"Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States 
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in 
other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of 
this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain 
of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides 
the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The require-
ment that Congress unequivocally express this intention in 
the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts themselves must decide whether their own juris-
diction has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty 
of this Court "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Mad is on, 
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only 
on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpreta-
t . ") lOll ...• 
For these reasons, we hold- consistent with Quern, 
Edelman, and Pennhurst JI,-that Congress must express 
its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmis-
takable language in the statute itself. 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act provides in pertinent part: 
2 Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
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"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or 
by the United States Postal Service." 87 Stat. 394, as 
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794. 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes 
the available remedies under the Act, including the provi-
sions pertinent to this case: 
"(a) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000d et seq] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 92 Stat. 2982, 29 U. S. C. § 794a 
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In any case, we think the legislative 
history makes clear that the Act was adopted under Congress' Fourteenth 
Amendment power. See, e. g. , S. Rep. 93-1297, at 38; 117 Cong. Rec. 
45,974, 1595 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Yanik). See also Alexander v. 
Choate , - U. S. - (1985). When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it may subject unconsenting States to federal 
court jurisdiction. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). 
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aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, the 
States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid. 
A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the 
kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to sub-
ject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, supra, citing Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332. Accordingly, we hold that the Rehabilitation 
Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits 
against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by 
accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 3 735 F. 2d 
359, 361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on "the extensive provisions [of the Act] under 
which the states are the express intended recipients of fed-
eral assistance." It reasoned that "this is a case in which a 
'congressional enactment . . . by its terms authorized suit by 
designated plaintiffs against a general class of defendants 
which literally included States or state instrumentalities,' 
and 'the State by its participation in the program authorized 
by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that 
immunity,"' citing Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of 
Appeals thus concluded that if the State "has participated in 
and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation 
Act, [it] has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient 
under 29 U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of fed-
eral funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit 
in federal court. 735 F. 2d, at 362, citing Florida Dept. of 
Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 
3 Although the Court of Appeals seemed to recognize that the Rehabili-
tation Act was adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
focusing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged 
in analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments. 
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(1981); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673. The d ourt erred, 
however, in concluding that because various profi~ions of the 
Rehabilitation Act are addressed to the States, a State neces-
sarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in 
prog" ms funded under the statute. We have decided today 
that the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistakable 
congressional purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. The Act likewise falls far short of 
manifesting a clear intent to condition paf icipation in the pro-
grams funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its 
constitutional immunity. Thus, if this statute is viewed as an 
enactment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, see 
supra note 2, we would hold that there was no indication that 
the State of California consented to federal jurisdiction. 
VI 
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of ex-
pressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State 
of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in fed-
eral court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
Reversed. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November, 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hospi-
tal and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, alleging that in 1978 the Hospital denied ·him 
employment as a graduate student assistant recreational 
therapist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respond-
ent charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire 
him violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 
U. S. C. § 794, (the Act) and certain state fair employment 
laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunctive, and de-
clarative relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal 
court from entertaining respondent's claims. Alternatively, 
~~~~ 
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petitioners argued that a suit for employment discrimination 
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege 
that the primary objective of the federal assistance received 
by the defendants is to provide employment, and that re-
spondent's case should be dismissed because he did not so 
allege. In January, 1980, the District Court granted peti-
tioners' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
respondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It did not reach the question 
whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respondent's 
suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the ground 
that respondent failed to allege an essential element of a 
claim under § 504, namely that a primary objective of the 
federal funds received by the defendants was to provide 
employment. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in 
light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, -- U. S. --
(1984), 104 S. Ct. 1248, in which we held that § 504's bar on 
employment discrimination is not limited to programs that 
receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing 
employment. 104 S. Ct., at 1254. On remand, the Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It 
held that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respond-
ent's] action because the state, if it has participated in and 
received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, 
has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 
U. S. C. § 794." J. A., at A-5. Although noting that the 
Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a 
State's consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from 
its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court 
based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, 
procedures, and rights against "any recipient of Federal 
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assistance" and regulations expressly defining the class of 
recipients to include the States. Citing our decision in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974), the court 
determined that the "threshold fact of congressional authori-
zation to sue a class of defendants which literally includes the 
states" was present in this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the courts of appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Mass. Rehabilitation Commn., 718 F. 2d 1 (CAl 
1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CAS), cert denied, 
459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to resolve this 
conflict, and we now reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 
- U.S. -, - (1984), 104 S. Ct. 900, 906 (1984). 
Thus, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court 
held that the Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a 
suit against his own State in federal court, even though the 
express terms of the Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 377 (1883). 1 
1 A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise consenting to suit 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation," the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 456 (1976). As 
a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Eleventh Amend-
ment without the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the federal Govern-
ment and the States, this Court consistently has held that 
these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions 
are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to 
have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by the most 
express language or by such overwhelming implications from 
the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable con-
struction."' Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 (1974), 
quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 
(1909). Likewise, in determining whether Congress in ex-
ercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have re-
quired "an unequivocal expression of congressional intent 'to 
overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the 
several States."' Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 907 (1984), quoting Quern v. Jor-
dan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Mis-
souri Public Health Dep't, 411 U. S. 279 (1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to consent to 
federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974), 
"[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the sur-
render of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
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Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
108 U. S. 436 (1883). Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of 
the California Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be 
brought against the State in such manner and in such courts 
as shall be directed by law." In respondent's view, unless 
the California legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign 
immunity, the State is potentially subject to suit in any court, 
federal as well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to 
be waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home 
Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981). As we explained just last 
Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity encom-
passes not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may 
be sued." Pennhurst, supra,-- U. S., at-- (1984), 104 
S. Ct., at 907. Thus, in order for a state statute or constitu-
tional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity, it must specify the State's intention to sub-
ject itself to suit in federal court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 
U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. 
Read, 322 U. S. 47,54 (1944). In view of these principles, 
we do not believe that Art. III, § 5 of the California Constitu-
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tion constitutes waiver of the State's constitutional immu-
nity. This provision does not specifically indicate the State's 
willingness to be sued in federal court. Indeed, the provi-
sion appears simply to authorize the legislature to waive the 
State's sovereign immunity. In the absence of an unequivo-
cal waiver specifically applicable to federal court jurisdiction, 
we decline to find that California has waived its constitutional 
immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, well-established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, -- U.S., at--; Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U. S. 332 (1979). We decline to do, and reaffirm the princi-
ple that Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally 
secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making 
its intention unmistakeably clear in the language of the stat-
ute. The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by 
the Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion. 
Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority,-- U. S. --, 27 (1985). The "constitutionally 
mandated balance of power" between the States and the fed-
eral government was adopted by the framers to ensure the 
protection of "our fundamental liberties." I d., at 16 (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of 
the States against suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amend-
ment serves to maintain this balance. "Our reluctance to 
infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts 
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has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of 
the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system." 
Pennhurst, supra, 104 S. Ct., at 907. 
Congress' power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
means that in certain circumstances, the usual constitutional 
balance between the States and federal government does not 
obtain. "Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate 
legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against 
States or state officials which are constitutionally impermissi-
ble in other contexts." Fitzpatrick, supra, 427 U. S., at 456. 
In view of this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to 
be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law 
overrides the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The 
requirement that Congress unequivocally express this inten-
tion in the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts must decide whether their own jurisdiction has 
been expanded. Although it is of course the duty of this 
Court "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 1 
Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only on 
the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpreta-
t . ") wn ... . 
For these reasons, we reiterate the view-made clear in 
Quern, Edelman, and Pennhurst II,-that Congress must 
express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in 
unmistakeable language in the statute itself. 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Section 504 of the Re-
2 Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
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habilitation Act of 1973 (the Act) provides in pertinent part: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency of 
the United States Postal Service." 29 U. S. C. § 794." 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes 
the remedies available under the Act, including the provi-
sions pertinent to this case: 
"(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000d et seq] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, 
the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In any case, we think the legislative 
history makes clear that the Act was adopted under Congress' Fourteenth 
Amendment power. See, e. g., S. Rep. 93-1297, at 38; 118 Cong. Rec. 35, 
841 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Stafford); 117 Cong. Rec. 45, 974, 1595 (1972) 




 ~ 7A.LJI- -L~ 
/-o ~~~c~t 
£v.-L_ ~H.,_ 
a---t- ~ ·~ j{J-~; 
84-351-0PINION ~ . J~ P ~ ~1 . ~ ;5 ~ 
q:r .1) -L-tc,r~-
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON ~ ~ 
aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not 
the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses 
to subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, supra, citing Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332. Accordingly, we hold that the Rehabilitation 
Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits 
against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the ss>urt of 
!ppeals, that the State has waived its immunity in tnis case 
oy its acceptance of funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 
-- F. 2d --, --. The court belie¥ed that-mere tha~ 
" 
"the extensive provisions [of the Act] under 
which states are the express intended recipients of federal 
assistance." Id., at--, citing 29 U. S. C. 720 et seq. In 
view of these provisions, the court concluded that "[i]f the 
states receive federal assistance under the statute, they 
plainly fall within the defined class of potential defendants." 
Ibid. 
The court properly recognized that mere receipt of federal 
funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in 
federal court. Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing 
Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 (1981); Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U. S., at 673. The court erred, however, in concluding 
that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation Act are 
addressed to the States, e. g., 29 U.S. C. §720, a State nec-
essarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in 
programs funded under the statute. As we have decided 
today, the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistake-
able congressional purpose to abrogate the States' constitu-
tional immunity. Thus, the States hardly could be put on 
notice that their acceptance of funds under the Act entailed 
constructive consent to suit in federal court. In view of this 
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eral jurisdiction as a condition of participation in programs 
under the Act. 
VI 
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of 
expressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the 
State of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in 
federal court. In view of these determinations, the judg-
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November, 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hospi-
tal and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia, alleging that in 1978 the Hospital denied him employ-
ment as a graduate student assistant recreational therapist 
solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent 
charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire him 
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, and certain state fair em-
ployment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc-
tive, and declarative relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal 
court from entertaining respondent's claims. Alternatively, 
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petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimina-
tion under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance re-
ceived by the defendants is to provide employment, and that 
respondent's case should be dismissed because he did not so 
allege. In January, 1980, the District Court granted petition-
ers' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that re-
spondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State Hospital, 677 
F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the question whether the 
Eleventh Amendment proscribed respondent's suit. Rather 
it affirmed the District Court on the ground that respondent 
failed to allege an essential element of a claim under § 504, 
namely that a primary objective of the federal funds received 
by the defendants was to provide employment. I d., at 1272. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in 
light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, -- U. S. --
(1984), in which we held that § 504's bar on employment dis-
crimination is not limited to programs that receive federal aid 
for the primary purpose of providing employment. I d., at 
--. On remand, the Court of Appeals reversed the judg-
ment of the District Court. It held that "the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar [respondent's] action because the 
state, if it has participated in and received funds from pro-
grams under the Rehabilitation Act, has implicitly consented 
to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d 
359, 362 (1984). Although noting that the Rehabilitation Act 
did not expressly abrogate the States' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, the court reasoned that a State's consent to suit in 
federal court could be inferred from its participation in pro-
grams funded by the Act. The court based its view on the 
fact that the Act provided remedies, procedures, and rights 
against "any recipient of Federal assistance" and regulations 
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expressly defining the class of recipients to include the 
States. Quoting our decision in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U. S. 651, 673 (1974), the court determined that the "thresh-
old fact of congressional authorization to sue a class of de-
fendants which literally includes [the] states" was present in 
this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the courts of appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F. 2d 
1 (CAl 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CA8), cert 
denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to re-
solve this conflict, and we now reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any For~ign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 
-- U. S. --, -- (1984) (Pennhurst 11) . Thus, in Hans 
v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the 
Amendment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his 
own State in federal court, even though the express terms of 
the Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 477 (1883). 1 
'A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immu-
nity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce by ap-
propriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 
456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment without the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States, this Court consistently has held that 
these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions 
are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to 
have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by the most 
express language or by such overwhelming implications from 
the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable con-
struction."' Edelman v. Jordan, supra, quoting Murray v. 
Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). Likewise, 
in determining whether Congress in exercising its Four-
teenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States' Elev-
enth Amendment immunity, we have required "an unequivo-
cal expression of congressional intent to 'overturn the 
constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.'" 
Pennhurst II,-- U.S., at--, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Missouri 
Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to 
consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 
(1974), "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with 
the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
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waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
supra. Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of the California 
Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be brought against 
the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be di-
rected by law." In respondent's view, unless the California 
legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immunity, the 
State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as 
well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive 
the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 
U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just last 
Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity encom-
passes not merely whether it may be sued, but where it may 
be sued." Pennhurst II, supra, at--. Thus, in order for a 
state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a 
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify 
the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal court. 
See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900); Great North-
ern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 (1944). In 
view of these principles, we do not believe that Art. III, § 5 of 
the California Constitution constitutes a waiver of the State's 
constitutional immunity. This provision does not specifically 
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indicate the State's willingness to be sued in federal court. 
Indeed, the provision appears simply to authorize the legisla-
ture to waive the State's sovereign immunity. In the ab-
sence of an unequivocal waiver specifically applicable to fed-
eral court jurisdiction, we decline to find that California has 
waived its constitutional immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, well-established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, -- U. S., at --; Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U. S. 332, 342-345 (1979). We decline to do so, and affirm 
that Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally se-
cured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its 
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute. 
The fundamental nature of the interests implicated by the 
Eleventh Amendment dictates this conclusion. 
Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
.... " Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity,-- U. S. --, -- (1985). The "constitutionally man-
dated balance of power" between the States and the federal 
government was adopted by the framers to ensure the pro-
tection of "our fundamental liberties." I d., at -- (POWELL, 
J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign immunity of 
the States against suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amend-
ment serves to maintain this balance. "Our reluctance to 
infer that a State's immunity from suit in the federal courts 
has been negated stems from recognition of the vital role of 
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system." 
Pennhurst II, supra, at --. 
Congress' power to abrogate a State's immunity means 
that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance 
between the States and Federal Government does not obtain. 
"Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States 
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in 
other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of 
this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain 
of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides 
the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The require-
ment that Congress unequivocally express this intention in 
the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts themselves must decide whether their own juris-
diction has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty 
of this Court "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Mad is on, 
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only 
on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpreta-
t . ") lOll ...• 
For these reasons, we hold- consistent with Quern, 
Edelman, and Pennhurst JI,-that Congress must express 
its intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmis-
takable language in the statute itself. 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act provides in pertinent part: 
2 Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
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"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or 
by the United States Postal Service." 87 Stat. 394, as 
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794. 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes 
the available remedies under the Act, including the provi-
sions pertinent to this case: 
"(a) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in 
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 
§ 2000d et seq] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 92 Stat. 2982, 29 U. S. C. § 794a 
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In any case, we think the legislative 
history makes clear that the Act was adopted under Congress' Fourteenth 
Amendment power. See, e. g. , S. Rep. 93-1297, at 38; 117 Cong. Rec. 
45,974, 1595 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Yanik). See also Alexander v. 
Choate , - U. S. - (1985). When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it may subject unconsenting States to federal 
court jurisdiction. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). 
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aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, the 
States are not like any other class of recipients of federal aid. 
A general authorization for suit in federal court is not the 
kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abrogate 
the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to sub-
ject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, supra, citing Quern v. Jordan, 
440 U. S. 332. Accordingly, we hold that the Rehabilitation 
Act does not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment bar to suits 
against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by 
accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 3 735 F. 2d 
359, 361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Ap-
peals relied on "the extensive provisions [of the Act] under 
which the states are the express intended recipients of fed-
eral assistance." It reasoned that "this is a case in which a 
'congressional enactment . . . by its terms authorized suit by 
designated plaintiffs against a general class of defendants 
which literally included States or state instrumentalities,' 
and 'the State by its participation in the program authorized 
by Congress had in effect consented to the abrogation of that 
immunity,"' citing Edelman v. Jordan, supra. The Court of 
Appeals thus concluded that if the State "has participated in 
and received funds from programs under the Rehabilitation 
Act, [it] has implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient 
under 29 U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of fed-
eral funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit 
in federal court. 735 F. 2d, at 362, citing Florida Dept. of 
Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S. 147, 150 
3 Although the Court of Appeals seemed to recognize that the Rehabili-
tation Act was adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
focusing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged 
in analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments. 
84-351-0PINION 
10 ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
(1981); Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673. The d ourt erred, 
however, in concluding that because various profi~ions of the 
Rehabilitation Act are addressed to the States, a State neces-
sarily consents to suit in federal court by participating in 
prog" ms funded under the statute. We have decided today 
that the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an unmistakable 
congressional purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts. The Act likewise falls far short of 
manifesting a clear intent to condition paf icipation in the pro-
grams funded under the Act on a State's consent to waive its 
constitutional immunity. Thus, if this statute is viewed as an 
enactment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, see 
supra note 2, we would hold that there was no indication that 
the State of California consented to federal jurisdiction. 
VI 
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of ex-
pressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State 
of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in fed-
eral court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
Reversed. 
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From: Justice Powell 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-351 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL AND CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PETITIONERS 
v. DOUGLAS JAMES SCANLON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hos-
pital and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, alleging that in 1978 the Hospital denied him em-
ployment as a graduate student assistant recreational thera-
pist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent 
charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire him 
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 
as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and certain state fair em-
ployment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc-
tive, and declaratory relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal 
court from entertaining respondent's claims·. Alternatively, 
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petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimina-
tion under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance 
received by the defendants is to provide employment, and 
that respondent's case should be dismissed because he did not 
so allege. In January 1980, the District Court granted peti-
tioners' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
respondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh AmeJ?.d-
ment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State 
Hospital, 677 F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the ques-
tion whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respond-
ent's suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the 
ground that respondent failed to allege an essential element 
of a claim under § 504, namely that a primary objective of the 
federal funds received by the defendants was to provide em-
ployment. I d., at 1272. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, 465 U. S. -- (1984), vacated the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Darrone, 465 U. S. -- (1984), in which we held that§ 504's 
bar on employment discrimination is not limited to programs 
that receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing 
employment. I d., at --. On remand, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It held 
that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respondent's] 
action because the state, if it has participated in and received 
funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, has im-
plicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794." 735 F. 2d 359, 362 (1984). Although noting that the 
Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a 
State's consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from 
its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court 
based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, 
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procedures, and rights against "any recipient of Federal 
assistance" and regulations expressly defining the class of 
recipients to include the States. Quoting our decision in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 672 (1974), the court de-
termined that the "threshold fact of congressional authoriza-
tion to sue a class of defendants which literally includes [the] 
States" was present in this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F. 2d 
1 (CAl 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CAS), 
cert.denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to 
resolve this conflict, 469 U. S. -- (1984), and we now 
reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental princiule of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 
U. S. 89, -- (1984) (Pennhurst II). Thus, in Hans v. Lou-
isiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the Amend-
ment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own 
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the 
Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 477 (1883). 1 
1 A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 
456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment without the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States, this Court consistently has held that 
these exceptions apply only when certain specific conditions 
are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be deemed to 
have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by the most 
express language or by such overwhelming implication from 
the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable 
construction."' Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673, quoting 
Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 (1909). 
Likewise, in determining whether Congress in exercising its 
Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have required "an un-
equivocal expression of congressional intent to 'overturn the 
constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several States.'" 
Pennhurst II, supra, at--, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 
U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Employees v. Missouri Pub-
lic Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 (1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immu-
nity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these 
situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to 
consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 
(1974), "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with 
the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
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three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
supra. Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of the California 
Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be brought against 
the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be di-: 
rected by law." In respondent's view, unless the California 
Legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immuiJ.ity, the 
State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as 
well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive 
the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 
U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just 
last Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity 
encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it 
may be sued." Pennhurst II, supra, at --. Thus, in 
order for a state statute or constitutional provision to consti-
tute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must 
specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal 
court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great 
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 
(1944). In view of these principles, we do not believe that 
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Art. III, § 5 of the California Constitution constitutes a 
waiver of the State's constitutional immunity. This provi-
sion does not specifically indicate the State's willingness to be 
sued in federal court. Indeed, the provision appears simply 
to authorize the legislature to waive the State's sovereign im-
munity. In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically 
applicable to federal court jurisdiction, we decline to find that 
California has waived its constitutional immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, well established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at--; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 
342-345. We decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may 
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from 
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistak-
ably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental 
nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amend-
ment dictates this conclusion. 
Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority, 469 U. S. --, -- (1985). The "constitutionally 
mandated balance of power" between the States and the Fed-
eral Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the 
protection of "our fundamental liberties." I d., at --
(POWELL, J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign 
immunity of the States against suit in federal court, the Elev-
enth Amendment serves to maintain this balance. "Our re-
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luctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the fed-
eral courts has been negated stems from recognition of the 
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal 
system." Pennhurst II, supra, at--. 
Congress' power to abrogate a State's immunity means 
that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance 
between the States and Federal Government does not obtain. 
"Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States 
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in 
other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of 
this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain 
of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides 
the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The require-
ment that Congress unequivocally express this intention in 
the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts themselves must decide whether their own juris-
diction has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty 
of this Court "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only 
on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co . v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial inter-
pretation ... "). 
For these reasons, we hold consistent with Quern, Edel-
man, and Pennhurst II,-that Congress must express its in-
tention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistak-
able language in the statute itself. 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
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ride the Eleventh Amendment. 2 Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act provides in pertinent part: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) ·of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or 
by the United States Postal Service." 87 Stat. 394, as 
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794. 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes, 
as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794a, the available remedies 
under the Act, including the provisions pertinent to this case: 
"(a)(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth 
in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 
2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
"(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter' the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 
2 Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we first analyze § 504 in light 
of Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject uncon-
senting States to federal court jurisdiction. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U. S. 445 (1976). In Part V, infra, at 9, we address the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals and conclude that by accepting funds under the Act, the 
State did not "implicitly consent [ ] to be sued .... " 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
84-351-0PINION 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 9 
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, 
the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal 
aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not 
the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to 
subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at--, citing Quern 
v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that 
the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by 
accepting funds unde~ the Rehabilitation Act. 3 735 F. 2d, at 
361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
relied on "the extensive provisions [of the Act] under which 
the states are the express intended recipients of federal as-
sistance." Id., at 360. It reasoned that "this is a case in 
which a 'congressional enactment . . . by its terms authorized 
suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defend-
ants which literally included States or state instrumental-
ities,' and 'the State by its participation in the program au-
thorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abro-
gation of that immunity,'" id., at 361; citing Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672. The Court of Appeals thus con-
cluded that if the State "has participated in and received 
funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, [it] has 
3 Although the Court of Appeals seemed to state that the Rehabilitation 
Act was adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by focus-
ing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged in 
analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments. 
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implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 
U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of fed-
eral funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit 
in federal court. Ibid., citing Florida Dept. of Health v. 
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S., at 150; Edelman v. 
Jordan, supra, at 673. The court erred, however, in con-
cluding that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation 
Act are addressed to the States, a State. necessarily consents 
to suit in federal court by participating in programs funded 
under the statute. We have decided today that the Rehabili-
tation Act does not evince an unmistakable congressional 
purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. The Act likewise falls far short of manifesting a 
clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded 
under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional { 
immunity. Thus, were we to view this statute as an enact-
ment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, see n. 2, 
supra, we would hold that there was no indication that the 
State of California consented to federal jurisdiction. 
VI 
The provisions of the Reha~ilitation Act fall far short of ex-
pressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State 
of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in fed-
eral court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-351 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL AND CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PETITIONERS 
v. DOUGLAS JAMES SCANLON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1985] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hos-
pital and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, allegingthat in 1978 the Hospital denied him em-
ployment as a graduate student assistant recreational thera-
pist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent 
charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire him 
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 
as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and certain state fair em-
ployment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc-
tive, and declaratory relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal 
court from entertaining respondent's claims. Alternatively, 
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petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimina-
tion under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance 
re·ceived by the defendants is to provide employment, and 
. that respondent's case should be dismissed because he did not 
so allege. In January 1980, the District Court granted peti-
tioners' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
respondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State 
Hospital, 677 F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the ques-
tion whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respond-
ent's suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the 
ground that respondent failed to allege an essential element 
of a claim under § 504, namely that a primary objective of the 
federal funds received by the defendants was to provide em-
ployment. I d., at 1272. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, 465 ·u. S. -- (1984), vacated the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Darrone, 465 U. S. --· (1984), in which we held that§ 504's 
bar on employment discrimination is not limited to programs 
that receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing 
employment. I d., at --. On remand, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It held 
that "the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respondent's] 
action because the state, if it has participated in and received 
funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, has im-
plicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. 
§794." 735 F. 2d 359,362 (1984). Although noting that the 
Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a 
State's consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from 
its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court 
based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, 
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procedures, and rights against "any recipient of Federal 
assistance" and regulations expressly defining the class of 
recipients to include the States. Quoting our decision in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 672 (1974), the court de-
termined that the "threshold fact of congressional authoriza-
tion to sue a class of defendants which literally includes [the] 
States" was present in this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F. 2d 
1 (CAl 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CA8), 
cert.denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to 
resolve this conflict, 469 U. S. -- (1984), and we now 
reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or .by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 
U. S. 89,-- (1984) (Pennhurst II). Thus, in Hans v. Lou-
isiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the Amend-
ment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own 
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the 
Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and ·consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 477 (1883). 1 
'A State may effectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
84-351-0PINION 
4 ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL v. SCANLON 
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 
456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment without the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States, 2 this Court consistently has held 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immu-
nity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these 
situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to 
consent to federal jurisdiction that otherwise would be barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 
(1974), "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with 
the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
2 JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent repeatedly asserts that established Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine is not "grounded on principles essential to the 
structure of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished con-
stitutional liberties of our people .... " Post, at--; see also id., at 
--, --. We believe, however, that our estaelistred Eleventh Amend- --6 
ment doctrine is necessary to support the view of the federal system held 
by the Framers of the Constitution. See n. 3, infra. The Framers be-
lieved that the States played a vital role in our system and that strong 
state governments were essential to serve as a "counterpoise" to the power 
of the federal government. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 17, p. 107 
(J. Cooke ed. 1961); The Federalist No. 46, p. 316. The "new evidence," 
discovered by the dissent in The Federalist and in the records of the state 
ratifying conventions, has been available to historians and Justices of this 
Court for almost two centuries. Viewed in isolation, some of it is subject 
to varying interpretations. But none of the Framers questioned that the 
Constitution created a federal system with some authority expressly 
granted the federal government and the remainder retained by the several 
States. See, e. g., The Federalist Nos. 39, 45. The Constitution never 
would have been ratified if the States and their courts were to be stripped 
of their sovereign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitu-
tion itself. 
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that thes~ exceptions apply only when certain specific condi-
tions are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be 
deemed to have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by 
the most express language or by such overwhelming implica-
tion from the text as [will] leave no room for any other rea-
sonable construction."' Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673, 
quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 
(1909). Likewise, in determining whether Congress in ex-
ercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrog:;:tted 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have re-
The principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the 
sovereign immunity of the States "is, without question, a reflection of con-
cern for the sovereignty of the States .... " Employees v. Missouri Pub-
lic Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., con-
curring in the result). As the Court explained almost 65 years ago: 
"That a State may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of 
jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the 
Constitution of the United States that it has become established by re-
peated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the 
Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by pri-
vate parties against the State without consent given: not one brought by 
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, be-
cause of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own 
citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an 
exemplification." Ex Parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U. S. 490, 497 
(1921) (citations omitted). 
See also cases cited in n. 3 infra. 
The dissent also argues that in the absence of jurisdiction in the federal 
courts, the States are "exempt[] ... from compliance with laws that bind 
every other legal actor in our nation." Post, at--. This claim wholly 
misconceives our federal system. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has noted, 
"the issue is not the general immunity of the States from private suit . . . o-f 
but merely the susceptibility J;(r the States to suit before federal tribunals." 
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., supra, at 293-294 ..1\ 
(MARSHALL, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added). It denigrates 
our brethren who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not 
enforce the supreme law of the land. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 
Wheat. 304, 341-344 (1816). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 493, 
n. 35 (1976), and post, at --, n. 8. 
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quired "an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to 
'overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity. of the 
several States."' Pennhurst II, supra, at --, quoting 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Em-
ployees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 
(1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
supra. Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of the California 
Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be brought against 
the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be di-
rected by law." In respondent's view, unless the California 
Legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immunity, the 
State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as 
well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive 
the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 
U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just 
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last Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity 
encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it 
may be sued." Pennhurst II, supra, at --. Thus, in 
order for a state statute or constitutional provision to C<?.nsti-
tute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must 
specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal 
court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great 
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 
(1944). In view of these principles, we do not believe that 
Art. III, § 5 of the California Constitution constitutes a 
waiver of the State's cbnstitutional immunity. This provi-
sion does not specifically indicate the State's willingness to be 
sued in federal court. Indeed, the provision appears simply 
to authorize the legislature to waive the State's sovereign im-
munity. In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically 
applicable to federal court jurisdiction, we decline to find that 
California has waived its constitutional immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, well established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at--; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 
342-345. We decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may 
abrogate the ·States' constitutionally secured immunity from 
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistak-
ably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental 
nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amend-
ment dictates this conclusion. · 
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Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
thority, 469 U. S. --, -- (1985). The "constitutionally 
mandated balance of power" between the States and the Fed-
eral Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the 
protection of "our fundamental liberties." I d., at --
(POWELL, J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign 
immunity of the States against suit in federal court, the Elev-
enth Amendment serves to maintain this balance. "Our re-
luctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the fed-
eral courts has been negated stems from recognition of the 
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal 
system." Pennhurst II, supra, at--. 
Congress' power to abrogate a State's immunity means 
that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance 
between the States and Federal Government does not obtain. 
"Congress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States 
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in 
other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of 
this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain 
of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides 
the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The require-
ment that Congress unequivocally express this intention in 
the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts themselves must decide whether their own juris-
diction has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty 
of this Court "to say what the law is," Marbury v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only 
on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) ("The jurisdiction of the federal courts 
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is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial inter-
pretation ... "). 
For these reasons, we hold consistent with Quern, Edel-
man, and Pennhurst II,-that Congress must express its in-
tention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistak-
able language in the statute itself. 3 
In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
3 In a remarkable view of stare decisis, the dissent states that our deci-
sion today evinces a "lack of respect for precedent." Post, at--. Not a 
single authority is cited for this claim. In fact, adoption of the dissent's 
position would require us to overrule numerous decisions of this Court. 
However one may view the merits of the dissent's historical argument, the 
principle of Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), that "the fundamental 
. principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in 
Art. III," Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,-- U. S. 
--,-- (1984), has been affirmed time 'and time again, up to the present 
day. E. g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. 
McGhee, 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell v. Mississippi, 177 U. S. 693 
(1900); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 446 (1900); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 
U. S. 32, 34 (1918); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U. S. 311, 313 (1920); Ex 
Parte New York, 256 U. S. at 497; Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U. S. 18, 26 
(1933); Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 51 (1944); 
Ford Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 464 (1945); Geor-
gia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 304, n. 13 (1952); 
Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 (1964); United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); Employees v. Missouri Public 
Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279,280 (1973); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 
U. S. 651, 662-663 (1974); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, supra. JUSTICE BRENNAN, the author of today's dissent, 
long has maintained that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, as estab-
lished in the holdings and reasoning of the above cited cases, is wrong. 
See, e. g., County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, --
U. S. --,-- (1985) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting in part); Pennhurst State 
School & Hospital v. Halderman,-- U.S. --,--(BRENNAN, J., 
dissenting); Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 
U. S., at 298 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 
687 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is a view, of course, that he is entitled 
to hold. But the Court has never accepted it, and we see no reason to 
make a further response to the scholarly, fifty-five page elaboration of it 
today. 
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gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. 4 Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act provides in pertinent part: 
"No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or 
by the United States Postal Service." 87 Stat. 394, as 
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794. 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes, 
as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794a, the available remedies 
under the Act, including the provisions pertinent to this case: 
"(a)(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth 
in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ 42 U. S. C. 
2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
"(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 
4 Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we first analyze § 504 in light 
of Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject uncon-
senting States to federal court jurisdiction. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U. S. 445 (1976). In Part V, infra, at 9, we address the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals and conclude that by accepting funds under the Act, the 
State did not "implicitly consent [ ] to be sued .... " 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
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The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, 
the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal 
aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not 
the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to 
subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at--, citing Quern 
v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that 
the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by 
accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 5 735 F. 2d, at 
361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
relied on "the extensive provisions [of the Act] under which 
the states are the express intended recipients of federal as-
-sistance." ld., at 360. It reasoned that "this is a case in 
which a 'congressional enactment ... by its terms authorized 
suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defend-
ants which literally included States or state instrumental-
ities,' and 'the State by its participation in the program au-
thorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abro-
gation of that immunity,"' id., at 361; citing Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S. , at 672. The Court of Appeals thus con-
cluded that if the State "has participated in and received 
funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, [it] has 
5 Although the Court of Appeals seemed to state that the Rehabilitation 
Act was adopted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by focus-
ing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged in 
analysis relevant to Spending Clause enactments. 
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ities,' and 'the State by its participation in the program au-
thorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abro-
gation of that immunity,"' id., at 361; citing Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672. The Court of Appeals thus con-
cluded that if the State "has participated in and received 
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implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 
U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of fed-
eral funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit 
in federal court. Ibid., citing Florida Dept. of Health v. 
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S., at 150; Edelman v. 
Jordan, supra, at 673. The court erred, however, in con-
cluding that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation 
Act are addressed to the States, a State necessarily consents 
to suit in federal court by participating in programs funded 
under the statute. We have decided today that the Rehabili-
tation Act does not evince an unmistakable congressional 
purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. The Act likewise falls far short of manifesting a 
clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded 
under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional 
immunity. Thus, were we to view this statute as an enact-
ment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, see n. 2, 
supra, we would hold that there was no indication that the 
State of California consented to federal jurisdiction. 
VI 
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of ex-
pressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State 
of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in fed-
eral court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
To: Tr e trn'ie:t il1i {{ 
Jus·dce Brennan 





NOTICE: Thi~ opinion i~ subject to fonnal re\;sion before publication in the 
prelirninar\' print of the United States Reports . Readers~ requested to 
notify the keporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash 
ington , D. C. 20543. of any typognphical or other fonnal errors, in order f'f 
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 4.: 
1 
~ 1 
Ff't.Jl.l ... , ~c.l.l;;Ld: ---
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-351 
ATASCADERO STATE HOSPITAL AND CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, PETITIONERS 
v. DOUGLAS JAMES SCANLON 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[June 28, 1985) 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether States and state 
agencies are subject to suit in federal court by litigants seek-
ing retroactive monetary relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, or whether such suits are 
proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
I 
Respondent, Douglas James Scanlon, suffers from diabetes 
mellitus and has no sight in one eye. In November 1979, he 
filed this action against petitioners, Atascadero State Hos-
pital and the California Department of Mental Health, in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, alleging that in 1978 the Hospital denied him em-
ployment as a graduate student assistant recreational thera-
pist solely because of his physical handicaps. Respondent 
charged that the Hospital's discriminatory refusal to hire him 
violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, 
as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794, and certain state fair em-
ployment laws. Respondent sought compensatory, injunc- " 
tive, and declaratory relief. 
Petitioners moved for dismissal of the complaint on the 
ground that the Eleventh Amendment barred the federal -' 
court from entertaining respondent's claims. Alternatively, 
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petitioners argued that in a suit for employment discrimina-
tion under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must 
allege that the primary objective of the federal assistance 
received by the defendants is to provide employment, and 
that respondent's case should be dismissed because he did not 
so allege. In January 1980, the District Court granted peti-
tioners' motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that 
respondent's claims were barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Scanlon v. Atascadero State 
Hospital, 677 F. 2d 1271 (1982). It did not reach the ques-
tion whether the Eleventh Amendment proscribed respond-
ent's suit. Rather it affirmed the District Court on the 
ground that respondent failed to allege an essential element 
of a claim under § 504, namely that a primary objective of the 
federal funds received by the defendants was to provide em-
ployment. ld., at 1272. 
Respondent then sought review by this Court. We 
granted certiorari, 465 U. S. -- (1984), vacated the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for fur-
ther consideration in light of Consolidated Rail Corp. v. 
Darrone, 465 U. S. - (1984), in which we held that § 504's 
bar on employment discrimination is not limited to programs 
that receive federal aid for the primary purpose of providing 
employment. ld., at--. On remand, the Court of Ap-
peals reversed the judgment of the District Court. It held 
that ''the Eleventh Amendment does not bar [respondent's] 
action because the state, if it has participated in and received 
funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, has im-
plicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 U. S. C. 
§ 794." 735 F. 2d 359, 362 (1984). Although noting that the 
Rehabilitation Act did not expressly abrogate the States' 
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court reasoned that a 
State's consent to suit in federal court could be inferred from 
its participation in programs funded by the Act. The court 
based its view on the fact that the Act provided remedies, 
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procedures, and rights against "any recipient of Federal 
assistance" and regulations expressly defining the class of 
recipients to include the States. Quoting our decision in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 672 (1974), the court de-
termined that the "threshold fact of congressional authoriza-
tion to sue a class of defendants which literally includes [the] 
States" was present in this case. 
The court's decision in this case is in conflict with those of 
the Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits. See 
Ciampa v. Massachusetts Rehabilitation Comm'n, 718 F. 2d 
1 (CAl 1983); Miener v. Missouri, 673 F. 2d 969 (CAB), 
cert.denied, 459 U. S. 909 (1982). We granted certiorari to 
resolve this conflict, 469 U. S. -- (1984), and we now 
reverse. 
II 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of 
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State." As we have recognized, 
the significance of this Amendment "lies in its affirmation 
that the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits 
the grant of judicial authority in Article III" of the Constitu-
tion. Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 
U. S. 89,- (1984) (Pennhurst II). Thus, in Hans v. Lou-
isiana, 134 U. S. 1 (1890), the Court held that the Amend-
ment barred a citizen from bringing a suit against his own 
State in federal court, even though the express terms of the 
Amendment do not so provide. 
There are, however, certain well-established exceptions to 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment. For example, if a 
State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal 
court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action. 
See, e. g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 477 (1883). 1 
1 A State may efl'ectuate a waiver of its constitutional immunity by a 
/ 
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Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment is "necessarily limited 
by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment," that is, by Congress' power "to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the substantive provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445, 
456 (1976). As a result, when acting pursuant to § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress can abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment vdthout the States' consent. Ibid. 
But because the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fun-
damental constitutional balance between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the States, 2 this Court consistently has held 
state statute or constitutional provision, or by otherwise waiving its immu-
nity to suit in the context of a particular federal program. In each of these 
situations, we require an unequivocal indication that the State intends to 
consent to federal jurisdiction that othel"\\'ise would be barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment. As we said in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 673 
(1974), "[c)onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated \\'ith 
the surrender of constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here." 
'JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent repeatedly asserts that established Elev-
enth Amendment doctrine is not "grounded on principles essential to the 
structure of our federal system or necessary to protect the cherished con-
stitutional liberties of our people .... " Post, at--; see also id., at 
--, --. We believe, however, that our Eleventh Amendment doctrine 
is necessary to support the view of the federal system held by the Framers 
of the Constitution. See n. 3, infra. The Framers believed that the 
States played a vital role in our system and that strong state governments 
were essential to serve as a "counterpoise" to the power of the federal gov-
ernment. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 17, p. 107 (J. Cooke ed. 1961); 
The Federalist No. 46, p. 816. The "new evidence," discovered by the 
dissent in The Federalist and in the records of the state ratifying conven-
tions, has been available to historians and Justices of this Court for almost 
two centuries. Viewed in isolation, some of it is subject to varying inter-
pretations. But none of the Framers questioned that the Constitution cre-
ated a federal system with some authority expressly granted the federal 
government and the remainder retained by the several States. See, e. g., 
The Federalist Nos. 39, 45. The Constitution never would have been rati-
fied if the States and their eourta were to be stripped of their sovereign 
authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself. 
The principle that the jurisdiction of the federal eourta is limited by the 
sovereign immunity of the States "is, without question, a reflection of eon-
/ 
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that these exceptions apply only when certain specific condi-
tions are met. Thus, we have held that a State will be 
deemed to have waived its immunity "only where stated 'by 
the most express language or by such overwhelming implica-
tion from the text as [will] leave no room for any other rea-
sonable construction."' Edelman v. Jordan, supra, at 673, 
quoting Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U. S. 151, 171 
(1909). Like\\ise, in detennining whether Congress in ex-
ercising its Fourteenth Amendment powers has abrogated 
the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, we have re-
quired "an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to 
'overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the 
cern for the sovereignty of the States .... " Employees v. Missouri Pup-
lie Health & We{fare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 293 (1973) (MARSHALL, J., con-
curring in the result). As the Court explained almost 65 years ago: 
"That a State may not be sued vlithout its consent is a fundamental rule of 
jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the 
Constitution of the United States that it has become established by re-
peated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the 
Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by pri-
vate parties against the State ·without consent given: not one brought by 
citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, be-
cause of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its O\\'ll 
citizens, because ofthe fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an 
exemplification." Ex Parte State of New York No.1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 
(1921) (citations omitted). 
See also cases cited in n. 3 infra. 
JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent also argues that in the absence of jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts, the States are "exempt[) ... from compliance 
with laws that bind every other legal actor in our nation." Post, at --. 
This claim wholly misconceives our federal system. As JUSTICE MAR-
SHALL has noted, "the issue is not the general immunity of the States from 
private suit . . . but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit before 
federal tribunals." Employees v. Mi8Bouri Pttblic Health & Welfare 
Dept., mpra, at 293-294 (MARsHALL, J., concurring in the result) (empha-
sis added). It denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to sug-
gest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land. See Martin v. 
Hu:nhr'B lMBee, 1 Wheat. 804, 341-844 (1816). See also Stone v. Powell, 
428 U. S. 465, 493, n. 35 (1976), and post, at -, n. 8. 
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several States.'" Pennhurst I I, supra, at --, quoting 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332, 342 (1979). Accord, Em-
ployees v. Missouri Public Health Dept., 411 U. S. 279 
(1973). 
In this case, we are asked to decide whether the State of 
California is subject to suit in federal court for alleged viola-
tions of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Respondent makes 
three arguments in support of his view that the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar such a suit: first, that the State has 
waived its immunity by virtue of Art. III, § 5 of the Califor-
nia Constitution; second, that in enacting the Rehabilitation 
Act, Congress has abrogated the constitutional immunity of 
the States; third, that by accepting federal funds under the 
Rehabilitation Act, the State has consented to suit in federal 
court. Under the prior decisions of this Court, none of these 
claims has merit. 
III 
Respondent argues that the State of California has waived 
its immunity to suit in federal court, and thus the Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar this suit. See Clark v. Barnard, 
supra. Respondent relies on Art. III, § 5, of the California 
Constitution, which provides: "Suits may be brought against 
the State in such manner and in such courts as shall be di-
rected by law." In respondent's view, unless the California 
Legislature affirmatively imposes sovereign immunity, the 
State is potentially subject to suit in any court, federal as 
well as state. 
The test for determining whether a State has waived its 
immunity from federal court jurisdiction is a stringent one. 
Although a State's general waiver of sovereign immunity 
may subject it to suit in state court, it is not enough to waive 
the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment. 
Florida Dept. of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 
U. S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam). As we explained just 
last Term, "a State's constitutional interest in immunity 
encompasses not merely whether it may be sued, but where it 
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may be sued." Pennhurst II, supra, at --. Thus, in 
order for a state statute or constitutional provision to consti-
tute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must 
specify the State's intention to subject itself to suit in federal 
court. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, 441 (1900); Great 
Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47, 54 
(1944). In view of these principles, we do not believe that 
Art. III, § 5 of the California Constitution constitutes a 
waiver of the State's constitutional immunity. This provi-
sion does not specifically indicate the State's willingness to be 
sued in federal court. Indeed, the provision appears simply 
to authorize the legislature to waive the State's sovereign im-
munity. In the absence of an unequivocal waiver specifically 
applicable to federal court jurisdiction, we decline to find that 
California has waived its constitutional immunity. 
IV 
Respondents also contend that in enacting the Rehabilita-
tion Act, Congress abrogated the States' constitutional im-
munity. In making this argument, respondent relies on the 
pre- and post-enactment legislative history of the Act and 
inferences from general statutory language. To reach re-
spondent's conclusion, we would have to temper the require-
ment, 'well established in our cases, that Congress un-
equivocally express its intention to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States in federal court. 
Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at--; Quern v. Jordan, supra, at 
342-345. We decline to do so, and affirm that Congress may 
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from 
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistak-
ably clear in the language of the statute. The fundamental 
nature of the interests implicated by the Eleventh Amend-
ment dictates this conclusion. 
Only recently the Court reiterated that "the States occupy 
a special and specific position in our constitutional system 
" Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Au-
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thority, 469 U. S. -, -- (1985). The uconstitutionally 
mandated balance of power" between the States and the Fed-
eral Government was adopted by the Framers to ensure the 
protection of uour fundamental liberties." ld., at --
(POWELL, J., dissenting). By guaranteeing the sovereign 
immunity of the States against suit in federal court, the Elev-
enth Amendment serves to maintain this balance. uour re-
luctance to infer that a State's immunity from suit in the fed-
eral courts has been negated stems from recognition of the 
vital role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal 
system." Pennhurst II, supra, at--. 
Congress' power to abrogate a State's immunity means 
that in certain circumstances the usual constitutional balance 
· between the States and Federal Government does not obtain. 
ucongress may, in determining what is 'appropriate legisla-
tion' for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Four-
teenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States 
or state officials which are constitutionally impermissible in 
other contexts." Fitzpatrick, 427 U. S., at 456. In view of 
this fact, it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain 
of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides 
the guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment. The require-
ment that Congress unequivocally express this intention in 
the statutory language ensures such certainty. 
It is also significant that in determining whether Congress 
has abrogated the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the courts themselves must decide whether their own juris-
diction ·has been expanded. Although it is of course the duty 
of this Court uto say what the law is," Marbury v. !Jadison, 
1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803), it is appropriate that we rely only 
on the clearest indications in holding that Congress has en-
hanced our power. See American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 
341 U. S. 6, 17 (1951) (uThe jurisdiction of the federal courts 
is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial inter-
pretation . . . "). 
-·  
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For these reasons, we hold consistent ·with Quern, Edel-
man, and Pennhurst Il,-that Congress must express its in-
tention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment in unmistak-
able language in the statute itself. 8 
1 In a remarkable view of stare decisis, JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent 
states that our decision today evinces a "lack of respect for precedent." 
Post, at--. Not a single authority is cited for this claim. In fact, adop-
tion of the dissent's position would require us to overrule numerous deci-
sions of this Court. However one may view the merits of the dissent's his-
torical argument, the principle of Hans v. Louisiana , 134 U. S. 1 (1890) , 
that "the fundamental principle of sovereign immunity limits the grant of 
judicial authority in Art. III," Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman,-- U.S.--,-- (1984), has been affirmed time and time 
again, up to the present day. E. g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U. S. 
22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee , 172 U. S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell v. Missis· 
sippi, 177 U. S. 693 (1900); Smith v. Reeves , 178 U. S. 436, 446 (1900); 
Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U. S. 32, 34 (1918); Duhne v. NeU' Jersey, 251 U. S. 
311, 313 (1920); E;r Parte Neu· York, 256 U. S. at 497; Missouri v. Fiske, 
290 U. S. 18, 26 (1933); Great Northen1 Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 322 
U.S. 47, 51 (1944); Ford Co. v. Dept . of Trea.sury of Indiana , 323 U.S. 
459, 464 (1945); Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 
299, 304, n. 13 (1952); Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184, 186 
(1964); United States v. Mississippi , 380 U. S. 128, 140 (1965); Employees 
v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S. 279, 280 (1973); 
Edelnwn v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 662-663 (1974); Pennhurst State School 
& Hospital v. Halderman, supra. JusTICE BRENNAN long has main-
tained that the settled view of Hans v. Louisiana, as established in the 
holdings and reasoning of the above cited cases, is wrong. See, e. g., 
County of Oneida , NeU' York v. Oneida Indian Nation, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1985) (BRENNAN, J ., dissenting in part); Pennhurst State School & 
Hospital v. Halderman,-- U.S.--,-- (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); 
Employees v. Missouri Public Health & Welfare Dept., 411 U. S., at 298 
(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Edelnwn v. Jordan, 415 U. S., at 687 (BREN-
NAN, J., dissenting). It is a view, of course, that he is entitled to hold. 
But the Court has never accepted it, and we see no reason to make a fur-
ther response to the scholarly, fifty-five page elaboration of it today. 
In a dissent expressing his willingness to overrule Edelman v. Jordan, 
415 U. S. 651 (1974), as well as at least sixteen other Supreme Court deci- I 
sions that have followed Hans v. LouilliaM, see IUpra, JUSTICE STEVENS 
would "further unravel[] the doctrine of atare decisis," FlcrriiUl Dept. of 
Health v. Florida Nuraing Homes A88n., 450 U. S. 147, 155 (1981), be-
·' 
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In light of this principle, we must determine whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Rehabilitation Act, has chosen to over-
ride the Eleventh Amendment. • Section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act provides in pertinent part: 
"No othervdse qualified handicapped individual in the 
United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, 
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance or under any pro-
gram or activity conducted by any Executive agency or 
by the United States Postal Service." 87 Stat. 394, as 
amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794. 
Section 505, which was added to the Act in 1978, describes, 
as set forth in 29 U. S. C. § 794a, the available remedies 
under the Act, including the provisions pertinent to this case: 
"(a)(2) The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth 
in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U. S. C. 
cause he views the Court's decision in Pennhurst as ''repudiating at least 
28 cases." Post , at -, citing Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. 
Halderman, 465 U. S. -,-, n. 50 (1984) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
We previously have addressed at length his allegation that the decision in 
Pennhurst overruled precedents of this Court, and decline to do so again 
here. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U. S. 
89, -, nn. 19, 20, and 21 (1984). JUSTICE STEVENS would ignore stare 
decisis in this case because in the view of a minority of the Court two 
prior decisions of the Court ignored it. This reasoning would indeed "un-
ravel" a doctrine upon which the rule of law depends. 
• Petitioners assert that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not repre-
sent an exercise of Congress' Fourteenth Amendment authority, but was 
enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, I 8, cl. 1. Petitioners 
conceded below, however, that the Rehabilitation Act was passed pursuant 
to I 6 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we first analyze I 504 in light 
of Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject uncon-
aenting States to federal court jurisdiction. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitur, 421 
U. S. 446 (1976). In Part V, infra, at 9, we address the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeals and conclude that by accepting funds under the Act, the 
State did not "implicitly consent [ ] to be aued . . . . " 736 F. 2d, at 862. 
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2000d et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved 
by any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 
assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 
section 794 of this title. 
"(b) In any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a 
violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in 
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than 
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs." 
The statute thus provides remedies for violations of § 504 
by "any recipient of Federal assistance." There is no claim 
here that the State of California is not a recipient of federal 
aid under the statute. But given their constitutional role, 
the States are not like any other class of recipients of federal 
aid. A general authorization for suit in federal court is not 
the kind of unequivocal statutory language sufficient to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment. When Congress chooses to 
subject the States to federal jurisdiction, it must do so 
specifically. Pennhurst II, 465 U. S., at--, citing Quern 
v. Jordan, 440 U. S. 332 (1979). Accordingly, we hold that 
the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment bar to suits against the States. 
v 
Finally, we consider the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeals that the State consented to suit in federal court by 
accepting funds under the Rehabilitation Act. 6 735 F. 2d, at 
361-362. In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals 
relied on "the extensive provisions [of the Act] under which 
the states are the express intended recipients of federal as-
sistance." ld., at 360. It reasoned that "this is a case in 
which a 'congressional enactment . . . by its terms authorized 
'Although the Court of Appeals seemed to state that the Rehabilitation 
Act was adopted pursuant to t 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, by focus-
ing on whether the State consented to federal jurisdiction it engaged in 
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suit by designated plaintiffs against a general class of defend-
ants which literally included States or state instrumental-
ities,' and 'the State by its participation in the program au-
thorized by Congress had in effect consented to the abro-
gation of that immunity,"' id., at 361; citing Edelman v. 
Jordan, 415 U. S., at 672. The Court of Appeals thus con-
cluded that if the State "has participated in and received 
funds from programs under the Rehabilitation Act, [it] has 
implicitly consented to be sued as a recipient under 29 
U. S. C. § 794." 735 F. 2d, at 362. 
The court properly recognized that the mere receipt of fed-
eral funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit 
in federal court. Ibid., citing Florida Dept. of Health v. 
Florida Nursing Home Assn., 450 U. S., at 150; Edelman v. 
Jordan, supra, at 673. The court erred, however, in con-
cluding that because various provisions of the Rehabilitation 
Act are addressed to the States, a State necessarily consents 
to suit in federal court by participating in programs funded 
under the statute. We have decided today that the Rehabili-
tation Act does not evince an unmistakable congressional 
purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. The Act likewise falls far short of manifesting a 
clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded 
under the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional 
immunity. Thus, were we to view this statute as an enact-
ment pursuant to the Spending Clause, Art. I, § 8, seen. 2, 
supra, we would hold that there was no indication that the 
State of California consented to federal jurisdiction. 
VI 
The provisions of the Rehabilitation Act fall far short of ex-
pressing an unequivocal congressional intent to abrogate the 
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity. Nor has the State 
of California specifically waived its immunity to suit in fed-
, 
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eral court. In view of these determinations, the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals must be reversed. 
It is so ordered. 
\. . 
